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INTRODUCTION

Bismarck once said that there are two things you do not want to
witness being made: one is sausage, the other is legislation. l In' the
hundred years since that observation, we have taken impressive steps
to ensure the wholesomeness of processed meats., bu't the legislative
1. See Edward L. Rubin, Legislative Methodology: Some Lessons from the Truth-in-LendiJlg
Act, 80 CEO. LJ. 233, 306 (1991); Symposium, The Legislative Role in the American Republic, 23
CUMBo L. REv. 7, 24 (1993) (comments of Prof. Martin H. Redish).
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process remains unseemly.2 Part of the public disillusionment with
the legislative process comes from the perception that legislatures are
becoming estranged from their fundamental purpose: finding workable solutions to social problems. 3 This Article suggests that the failure
to find workable solutions results from the failure of legislatures to
employ a problem-solving methodology.
The problem-solving enterprise lies at the heart of the legislative
effort. Yet, when legislators try to perform that function, their efforts
often fall short. The federal Truth in Savings Act (Truth in Savings)
provides one example of failed legislative problem solving. 4 On its
face, Truth in Savings is a congressional attempt to solve constituents'
problems. The statute, however, appears unlikely to resolve the issues
presented to Congress and may even create new and unintended
problems that will make matters worse. Truth in Savings, like many
other legislative efforts, fails adequately to address constituents'
problems because the methodology employed by legislative drafters
suffers from a fundamental flaw-it has no built-in mechanism to define rigorously the problem being addressed. Without first identifying
the problem, legislation stands little chance of providing an effective
solution.

2. At least the public perceives the legislative process to be unseemly. Since the
1970s, public support for Congress as an institution has been quite weak. See Samuel C.
Patterson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Standing Up for Congress: Variations in Public Esteem Since
the 1960s, 15 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 25, 25-30 (1990); see also Kimberly Coursen et aI., Restoring
Faith in Congress, YALE L. & POL'y REv. 249, 250-56 (1993) (noting similar lack of public
support and trust). A comparison of historical polling data prepared by The Roper Center
for Public Opinion Research shows that during the past 40 years the public has
increasingly viewed Congress as out of touch with the people, unethical, and ineffectual. A
Public Hearing on Congress, PUB. PERSP., Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 82, 82-88.
3. In the words of Ross Perot, who has come to symbolize the current wave of voter
dissatisfaction with government: "Our political system has lost its moorings. It no longer
rises to meet new challenges. It seems designed to avoid solving problems." Ross PEROT,
UNITED WE STAND: How WE CAN TAKE BACK OUR COUNTRY 21 (1992); see also Donald
Rumsfield, Foreword to THOMAS B. CURTIS & DONALD L. WESTERFIELD, CONGRESSIONAL
INTENT at xiii, xiii (1992). Donald Rumsfield, a former member of Congress and cabinet
member during the Nixon administration, stated:
Anyone who has served in the Congress of the United States or studied it
closely knows that Congress has lost its way. It has departed from its
essential purposes and functions as set forth in the U.S. Constitution. It has
grown self-satisfied and isolated to a point where it is mistrusted and held in
contempt by a startling and worrisome number of Americans.
Id.; cJ. Christopher Edley, Jr., The Governance Crisis, Legal Theory, and Political Ideology, 1991
DUKE LJ. 561, 564-66 (listing contemporary public concerns regarding the democratic
process).
4. Truth in Savings Act, §§ 261-274, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4314 (Supp. V 1993).
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Legal scholars have been slow to give the subject of legislative methodology the attention it deserves. 5 Although statutes cover much of
the legal landscape and have to a great degree eclipsed the common
law in importance,6 most legal scholarship still focuses on the judge's
art, rather than the legislative drafter's art. This Article counters that
prevailing tendency by considering an important aspect of legislative
methodology-the framing of problems for legislative attention and
the selection of appropriate legislative responses.
The problem-framing exercise as an aspect of legislative drafting
has received remarkably little attention. 7 Most discussions of statutes
and the legislative process skip over the process of framing the problem and assume the existence of a problem that is being, or has been,
addressed in the legislature. Articles dealing with statutory interpretation, for instance, deal with a statute that has already been drafted and
enacted into law. 8 Although scholars examining techniques for legislative interpretation sometimes try to determine the original problem
Congress sought to address, their purpose for doing so is to aid in the
interpretation of the law, rather than to help shape the law's initial
design. 9 Similarly,' many excellent works describe the process by
5. Some scholars have called for the development of a general theory of legislation to
correct this neglect. See Robert B. Seidman.]ustifying Legislation: A Pragmatic, Institutionalist
Approach to the Memorandum of Law, Legislative Theory, and Practical Reason, 29 fuRV. J. ON
LEGIS. I, 2-3 (1992); Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89
COLUM. L. REv. 369, 369-71 (1989).
6. As far back as 1947, the number of controversies before the United States Supreme
Court that did not involve a statute had declined to almost zero. Since that time, both
Congress and the various state legislatures have considered tens of thousands of new
proposals for legislation every year. See Allan C. Hutchinson & Derek Morgan, Calabresian
Sunset: Statutes in the Shade, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1752, 1753 (1982).
7. The only two articles that I am aware of which discuss the matter of problem
framing in the context of legislative drafting are Rubin, supra note I, and Seidman, supra
note 5.
8. This Article does not address the topic of statutory interpretation. Rather, it is
concerned with the need to frame problems in order to promote a legislative problemsolving methodology and to improve the substance of legislation. Although a more
effective problem-solving methodology will likely result in more transparent laws which, in'
turn, should facilitate statutory interpretation, this Article focuses on the problem-framing
step within the larger project of creating the substantive provisions of a statute, rather than
on the interpretation of existing statutes.
9. Traditionally, interpreters of statutes have inquired into the purpose of a statute to
understand the statute's meaning.. Such an exercise assumed that inquiring into the
purpose was merely an "archeological" exercise that would yield a determinate answer. T.
Alexander A1ienikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 20, 21 (1988). The
archeological approach can be used to interpret statutes under the various "originalist"
theories of statutory interpretation. Originalist theories include "intentionalism," which
focuses on the drafters' intention, see, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation - in
the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 800 (1983), "purposivism," which
focuses on the original purpose behind the legislation (an approach most frequently
attributed to Henry M. Hart,Jr. and Albert M. Sacks), see, e.g., William N. Eskridge,Jr. &
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which bills become law. lO Yet, these works, too, pay only cursory attention to the task of specifically identifying the problem the bill was
designed to address or, alternatively, they just assume the existence of
a drafted bill that has been placed in the ~egislative hopper. l l Finally,
some literature deals with the way bills should be drafted as a matter
Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321, 332-39
(1990), and "textualism," which focuses on the "plain meaning" of the statute's text as
adopted by the legislature, see, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in
Statutory Construction, 11 HARv.].L. & PUB. POL'y 59 (1988).
Originalist theories of statutory interpretation have been severely criticized. See, e.g.,
Eskridge & Frickey, supra. Scholars have pointed out that trying to determine the intent or
the purpose a legislature had in mind when it passed a statute is a fool's errand because
legislatures do not speak with one voice; therefore, attempts to determine a particular
intent or purpose must fail. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains, 50 U. CHI. L.
REv. 533, 547-48 (1983) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains]. Textualism has
received criticism for failing to deal with the inherent uncertainties of language, especially
in light of the modern scholarship dealing with the intimate interaction between the
reader and the text. See, e.g., Francis]. Mootz, Is the Rule of Law Possible in a Postmodern
Warld?, 68 WASH. L. REv. 249 (1993).
Nevertheless, the approaches to statutory interpretation seeking to supplant originalist
techniques continue to undertake an inquiry into the purpose of the legislation. See, e.g.,
Alienikoff, supra (arguing that current values confronting courts cannot and should not be
excluded from the courts' interpretation of statutes, but that originalist techniques playa
role); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479
(1987) (being informed by hermeneutics and arguing for interpretations that are coherent
when viewed in the context of a larger web of beliefs, including the intent, purpose, and
text of the law); Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Farmalism, and
the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REv. 533, 537 (1992) (proposing an approach to statutory
interpretation, after reviewing and updating the views of Karl LJewe\lyn, based on
"practical reason," rejecting the view that normative conclusions can be deduced from a
single unifying principle and instead permitting a judge to consider many factors in the
interpretation process, including the presumed purpose of the statute); Edward L. Rubin,
Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing and Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y. U.
L. REv. 1 (1991) (refuting the trend toward textualism and arguing for a system of
"comprehensive rationality" that would allow judges to take into account both normative
theory and pragmatic considerations, including the purpose of the statute).
10. See, e.g., WILLIAM]. KEEFE & MORRIS S. OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS:
CONGRESS AND THE STATES (7th ed. 1989); ERIC REDMAN, THE DANCE OF LEGISLATION
(1973); STEVEN S. SMITH, CALL TO ORDER: FLOOR POLITICS IN THE HOUSE AND THE SENATE
(1989).
11. For instance, in his famous descriptive account of the evolution and eventual
adoption of the National Health Service Bill, Eric Redman spends approximately three
pages of the 298-page account discussing the problem that the law was supposed to
correct-the shortage of doctors in poor areas. REDMAN, supra note 10, at 31-33. The
proponents of the legislation engaged in no formal analysis of the problem. Id. The idea
for the legislation seems to have come from Dr. Abe Bergman, an advisor to Senator
Magnuson, who believed that the National Health Service Corps would be more successful
than other programs had been at bringing doctors to poor areas. Id. at 31. Other than Dr.
Bergman's personal understanding of why doctors choose to locate their practices in
middle class communities rather than in poor communities, no attempt was made to
determine ~e cause of the doctor shortage or to correct that cause. [d. at 32-33. Instead,
the bill introduced to Congress followed Dr. Bergman's concept. Id. at 34-38.
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of legal writing. 12 These works, however, also avoid an in-depth discussion of the problem-framing task.
The problem-framing aspect of the legislative drafting process deserves closer attention. As part of a true legislative problem-solving
•
methodology, the problem-framing step should provide the foundation upon which the legislative drafter builds the entire statute. Legislators should evaluate the appropriateness of the proposed solution in
light of the problem identified. In turn, alleviating the problem
should serve as a standard against which to judge the effectiveness of
the statute. I3 By adopting a problem-solving methodology, drafters
can improve the quality of legislation.
Extrapolating from the experience of Truth in Savings, this Article
examines the common failure of legislatures to analyze carefully the
policy choices they make, and it identifies the reasons why the legislative process fails as a problem-solving method. While this Article focuses on Truth in Savings as one example of congressional lawmaking,
much of what follows applies to the legislative process generally.I4 Because proposals for legislation come from so many different sources, 15
12. See, e.g., REED DICKERSON, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL DRAFTING (2d ed. 1986);
LAWRENCE E. FILSON, THE LEGISLATIVE DRAFTER'S DESK REFERENCE (1992); DONALD HIRSCH,
DRAFTING FEDERAL LAw (2d ed. 1989); MAxWELL J. MEHLMAN & EDWARD G. GROSSMAN,
YALE LEGISLATIVE SERVICES HANDBOOK OF LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING (1977).
13. Legislative drafters receive remarkably little reliable feedback concerning the
success or failure of legislative enactments. As a matter of designing more effective
legislation, drafters need a more reliable feedback loop in order to evaluate whether a bill
has failed to achieve its purpose. On this point, designers of statutes could take a lesson
from the designers of tangible artifacts. Engineers of tangible artifacts have longrecognized that when an object fails to perform its function well, its design must be
changed in order to make it more effective. Artifacts evolve in this manner-in the words
of Professor Henry Petroski, "form follows failure." HENRY PETROSKI, THE EVOLUTION OF
USEFUL THINGS 22-33 (1992). Without failure, artifacts do not evolve. This engineering
principle should apply to statutes as well, which, after all, are intangible artifacts produced
by "social engineers." Designers of statutory artifacts must have some way to determine a
statute's success or failure in order for the design of the legislative artifact to improve.
Without identifying the problem that the statute addresses, however, we cannot evaluate its
failure or success. Without the prospect of failure, the design process loses a vital link and
hopes dim for more effective legislation.
14. More specifically, this Article focuses on the substantial number of bills that come
into being from the drafting efforts of a member of Congress without explicit policy
analysis from institutional analysts such as the General Accounting Office, the Office of
Technology Assessment, the Congressional Budget Office, or the analysts in an executive
or administrative office.
15. Proposals for legislation considered by Congress come from many different
sources. Businesses, public interest groups, trade associations, constituents, executive
departments, and administrative agencies all produce draft bills for introduction to
Congress. In addition, members of Congress can originate legislation. The bills they
prepare may be the result of years of study by a special commission or executive branch
department, may be the work of congressional committees, or may be the fulfill~ent of a
campaign promise or the result
of personal experiences. As a result of these diverse
paths,
I
' .•
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however, and because the course of their development varies as well,
not all of these observations apply with equal forceto all types of proposed legislation. The idea of developing a more explicit legislative
problem-solving methodology, however, lies at the heart of this Article, and that central idea applies to all bills-regardless of how they
come into being.
This Article is divided into three parts. Part I presents a case study
of Truth in Savings as a failed congressional attempt to solve a perceived problem. Part II examines the deficiencies in the problem-solving methodology employed in the legislative process that produced
Truth in Savings. Finally, Part III discusses prospects for improving
the methodology employed in the legislative process.
I.

TRUTH IN SAVINGS:

A

CASE STUDY

Although most Americans are taught in civics class that bills are introduced into Congress when enough citizens say "there ought to be a
law,"16 the actual legislative process does not always work this wayP
Instead of starting the legislative process with constituents crying out
for a solution to a recognizable problem, Congress frequently starts
the process with a draft-bill solution and then proceeds to hold hearblanket statements about the way in which bills come into being are difficult to make.
ROBERT u. GOEHLERT & FENTON S. MARTIN, CONGRESS AND LAw-MAKING: RESEARCHING THE
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 10-11 (2d ed. 1989); EDWARD F. WILLETT, JR., How OUR LAws ARE
MADE, H.R. Doc. No. 139, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1990).
16. The "civics class" model of legislative behavior permeates our culture. A cartoon
that aired regularly on the ABC television network in the 1970s, entitled "I'm Just a Bill,"
accurately summarizes th!'= civics class model of legislative behavior. Schoolhouse Rock:
History Rock - I'm Just a Bill (ABC television broadcast, 1973) (video copy on file with
author). The cartoon told about a small town where school buses regularly crossed the
railroad tracks. The townspeople worried that trains might not be visible to the bus
drivers. They wanted to make school buses stop at railroad crossings. They called their
congressional representative and he said, ''You're right, there ought to be a law." Then he
drew up a bill and introduced it to Congress. "Bill," an anthropomorphic piece of paper,
starreq in the cartoon. He sat on the capitol steps and sang a song, part of which described
the committee process and suggested that he would have to wait "while a few key
Congressmen discuss and debate whether they should let me be a law." Bill did eventually
get signed into law by the President. This cartoon crystallizes the civics class model of the
legislative process that most Americans learned in school. In this model, legislation is a
method of solving social problems. Legislators are motivated to solve those problems out
of a sense of civic duty. These civic-minded representatives deliberate to find the best
outcome for the process. They do not make special deals for themselves or act solely to
ensure their reelection.
17. For instance, in the case of Truth in Savings, the chief sponsor of the bill during
the 1980s-Representative Lehman of California-stated that his motivation for
introducing the legislation came from personally viewing misleading advertisements, not
from constituents' pressure. The Truth in Savings Act: Hearing Before the Suhcomm. on
Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking
Finance1and·Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 Hearings].
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ings to find out what the problem is.IS The proposed legislative solution may be modified in response to comments of witnesses or
concerns of legislators, but, in many cases, to a great extent the basic
first solution directs the evolution of the bill. 19
Of course, not all legislation develops in the same way. Some congressional efforts in especially complicated or politically sensitive areas
such as social security reform,20 military base closings,21 bankruptcy
law,22 and copyright law23 have departed radically from the typical
18. Many commentators have noted Congress' propensity to propose "solutions"
without first figuring out what the "problems" are. Professor Linda Mullenix has discussed
the development of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 as a solution in search of a
problem. See Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural justice, 77 MINN. L.
REv. 375 (1992); Linda S. Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking: The Civiljustice Reform Act
and Separation of Powers, 77 MINN. L. REv. 1283 (1993). Professor Rubin described a similar
situation in connection with Truth in Lending. See Rubin, supra note I, at 268-69. Eric
Redman described the hearing process in the case of the National Health Service Bill as a
window-dressing exercise, where the witnesses 'were carefully chosen to establish the
existence of a preconceived problem that the legislation addressed and to support the
bill's approach to that problem. REDMAN, supra note 10, at 114-37. Of course, sometimes
the "bill" submitted for consideration is not seriously considered a solution to a problem,
but rather is merely an "idea draft" that makes a general point but is not fully fleshed out.
The "idea draft bill" might be proposed as a formality in order to initiate the legislative
process, hold hearings, and determine the best way to proceed. FILSON, supra note 12, at
35.
19. Roger Purdy, Professional Responsibility for Legislative Drafters: Suggested Guidelines and
Discussion of Ethics and Role Problems, 11 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 67, 98 (1987).
20. In the early 19805, republicans and democrats in Congress assembled an ad hoc
committee.,...-the National Commission on Social Security Reform-to prepare legislative
reforms to the Social Security System, thereby avoiding the possibility of unmitigated
partisan political battles over the much-needed legislation. Warren Weaver, Jr., New Panel
Asked on Social Security, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1981, at A8.
21. Congress recognized the need to reduce the military budget and to eliminate
unnecessary military installations. Susan F. Rasky, House Votes BiU That Could Bring
Shutdown of 20 U.S. Bases in '89, N.Y. TIMES,July 13, 1988, at AI. Closing a military base has
historically been a difficult task because of the political difficulties of removing an
important economic activity from a congressional representative's district. To avoid the
unpleasant political realities of the base-closing decision, Congress established a
commission to undertake the task of identifying bases to be closed. Id. Once the
commission prepared its list, Congress could only act to reject the entire list, not individual
sites on the list. Id. The vote to reject the list would require a two-thirds majority to carry.

M

.

22. In the early 1970s, faced with the daunting task of revising the bankruptcy law,
Congress established the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States to
"study, analyze, evaluate, and recommend changes" in the existing bankruptcy hlW. SJ.
Res. 8, 9Ist Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) (enacted as Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91;354, 84
Stat. 468 (1970)). The Commission held public hearings, gathered evidence, sought the
views of interested parties, and made a general study of the bankruptcy system. Mter its
two-year study, the Commission reported its findings to Congress in 1973.
COMMUNICATION FROM THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAws OF THE
UNITED STATES, REpORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAws OF THE UNITED STATES,
H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., lst Sess. (1973). The bankruptcy law was eventually revised
in 1978.
'
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procedure. The recent experience with health care reform also provides an alternative model for the production oflegislation. 24 In addition, most substantive bills originate in the executive branch or in the
administrative agencies. 25 Often those agencies have an internal poliey analysis function that defines the problem with some rigor before
considering solutions. 26 Nevertheless, for many of the remaining bills
generated in a given session of Congress, the initial development of
the legislative solution evolves without the benefit of an explicit problem-identification or policy-analysis process. 27 This Article examines
one of those bills, Truth in Savings.
Mter considering the idea for twenty-three years,28 Congress passed
Truth in Savings as part of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991. 29 Truth in Savings regulates the way depos23. U.S. copyright law was comprehensively revised in 1976, culminating a long process
initiated by the Legislative Appropriations Act of 1955, which appropriated funds for the
Copyright Office to conduct a thorough review and reevaluation of the existing copyright
law. The Copyright Office delivered its "Report of the Register of Copyrights on the
Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law" to Congress in 1961. 1 Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) 'lI 1
(Oct. 1988). A revised copyright law. was finally passed 15 years later after many
congressional hearings and false starts. Id.
24. The Clinton administration's approach on health care reform has been to canvas
the nation to seek the views of various constituencies. This fact-finding project was
conducted to flesh out the issues and was not linked to any specific statutory language.
Although when the actual proposal was unveiled it precipitated the predictable political
wrangling, the great deal of presubmission homework done on this matter sets it apart
from the typical bill considered by Congress. The administration's approach to
policymaking may reflect a communitarian philosophy. See Amitai Etzioni, Is Bill Clinton a
Communitarian?, 82 NAT'L CIVIC REv. 221 (1993).
25. FILSON, supra note 12, at 29 ("Most bills taken seriously in any legislative forum are
simply designed to clear up difficulties that have come to light in the everyday
administration of some existing law or program.").
26. Most executive departments and administrative agencies have policy analysts on
staff. In addition, all bills that originate in the administration must be cleared through the
Office of Management and Budget'S (OMB) Legislative Reference unit, which acts as a
clearing house for administrating proposed bills. JOHN M. KERNOCHAN, THE LEGISLATIVE
PROC;::ESS 9-10 (1981). For a general discussion of the strong points and shortcomings of
the OMB's policy-analysis function, see THOMAS O. MCGARllY, REINVENTING RATIONALllY:
THE R,OLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 271-91 (1991).
27. Of t;:0urse, not all bills originating in Congress lack this step. As an institution,
Congress does have several resources to call on for policy analysis, including the Office of
Technology Assessment, the Congressional Budget Office, and probably most importantly,
the q~rieral Accounting Office. For example, the General Accounting Office has assessed
pending legislation to reduce financial regulation in light of existing safety and soundness
policies. ,See GAO Warns Against Weakening FDICIA, Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) No. ISIS,
at 6 (Oct. I, 1993) (citing GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BANK AND THRIFT REGULATION:
FDIClA SAFElY AND SOUNDNESS REFORMS NEED TO BE MAINTAINED (1993) (assessing H.R.
962, the "Economic Growth and Financial Institutions Regulatory Paperwork Reduction
Act of 1993"».
28. See infra note 222.
29~ Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
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itory institutions may advertise deposit accounts and also requires
comprehensive disclosure of deposit account terms, such as the
method by which interest will be calculated and the fees that will be
imposed. 30 If we assume that Congress enacted Truth in Savings to
correct a social problem,31 the hearings held on the Act should shed
some light on the specific problems Congress was attempting to
address.
This section of the Article describes the problems that proponents
of the legislation identified during the hearings on the Act and the
legislative response to those problems. It also includes a critique of
the legislative response.

A.

The Witnesses' Problems

We will never know for certain what underlying problems Truth in
Savings was supposed to address. Like with many statutes, no place
exists in the vast legislative materials that accompanied this relatively
modest statute to determine exactly what phenomenon the law aimed
to correct. One can scour the committee and subcommittee hearings
and learn of many different problems. The difficulty in trying to divine the problem is that witnesses identified many problems of various
scope and severity during the hearings, while those same problems
were denied by other witnesses. Of course, because congressional
hearings only took place after the bill had been drafted, it is difficult
to say that the bill responded to any problem in particular, other than
its sponsor's personal discomfort with what he considered misleading
advertising of deposit products. 32 The hearings, therefore, do not set
30. Truth in Savings Act, §§ 263-268, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4303-4308 (Supp. V 1993).
31. The assumption that Congress enacts laws in order to solve problems may strike
some readers as questionable. One's theory of legislative behavior may shape one's
perception of the significance of Congress' problem-solving role. The most recent debate
about legislative behavior seems to come down to a competition between two world viewsthe republican model and the public choice model-although each of these models in
turn has given rise to numerous related or derivative approaches (such as liberal
republicanism and positive political theory). The republican model posits that problems
of concern to the community are addressed through public-spirited deliberation in the
political arena. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., What Is Republicanism, and Is It Worth Reviving?,
102 fuRV. L. REv. 1695, 1698 (1989). A competing model of legislative behavior,
sometimes called the public choice model, holds that legislation amounts to nothing more
than a product that effects a wealth transfer from one group to another. For a general
discussion, see Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REv. 339 (1988).
I believe that whether one adopts a republican view, a public choice view, or a
combination of the two, problem solving provides the central focus of the legislative effort.
Whether the problem has been identified by the people or by an interest group, the
legislative drafter must still confront the challenge of identifying the purpose of the
legislation and devising an effective method to achieve that end. See infra notes 165-73 and
accompanying text.
32. See 1984 Hearings, supra note 17, at 5.
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out an explicit and coherent articulation of the problem that Trutll in
Savings was designed to address.
Nevertheless, the congressional testimony reveals a pattern among
witnesses who supported the proposed legislation. They perceived the
need for federal action on at least three grounds: (1) misleading and
deceptive advertising, especially in connection with "teaser" rates on
individual retirement accounts;33 (2) the inherent unfairness in the
relationship between banks and their customers due to unequal bargaining power;34 and (3) the confusing (and perhaps unconscionable) array of methods by which depository institutions legally could
calculate interest. 35
1.

Misleading and Deceptive Advertising

Historically, unfair advertising practices have not been a major
problem in the banking industry.36 During the 1970s, however, the
financial services industry experienced tremendous changes. Nonbank providers of financial services, such as mutual funds and insurance companies, began to compete actively for depositors' dollars. As
the 1970s drew to a close, bankers found themselves in an intensely
competitive market.

33. See id. at 11-25, 48-52 (statements of Thomas G. Riley, Senior Vice President,
Washington Federal Savings & Loan, and Albert Sklar, Member, American Association of
Retired Persons, respectively).
34. See id. at 52-57 (statement of Mark Hannaford, President, Bankcard Holders of
America).
35. See id. at 25-32 (statement of Stephen Brobeck, Executive Director, Consumer
Federation of America, Washington, D.C.).
36. The lack of abusive advertising came about largely as a result of Regulation Q, 12
C.F.R. §§ 217.1-.6 (1993), which, prior to 1980, set the maximum interest rates that banks
could pay for deposits. See Donald C. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial
Process: The Revisionist Role of the Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REv. 672,
681-82 (1987). The Regulation aimed to increase the stability of the banking system by
eliminating dangerous competition between banks for deposits. JONATHAN R. MAcEY &
GEOFFREY P. MILLER,·BANKING LAw AND REGULATION 30-31 (1992). Because banks were
limited by law as to the interest rate they could pay on deposit accounts, when banks
competed with each other for deposit accounts they were precluded from engaging in a
"price war" by offering more and more attractive rates. [d. Instead, as a method of
product differentiation, banks focused on other incentives, such as premiums or no cost or
no fee accounts to attract depositors. [d. During the halcyon days of Regulation Q,
bankers attracted deposits while paying low interest, then lent the money at a higher
interest rate and profited from the spread between the two. These were the days of "3-6-3"
banking: bankers took money from depositors at 3%, lent it to borrowers at 6%, and were
on the golf course by 3:00. John S. Gordon, Understanding the S&L Mess, AM. HERITAGE,
Feb./Mar. 1991, at 49,65. The spread was attractive because Regulation Q kept the cost of
the deposits artificially low.
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In 1980, Congress responded to the realities of the financial marketplace and ordered interest-rate ceilings phased OUt. 37 When the
artificial regulatory constraints on the price of deposits disappeared
and deposit interest rates soared, the traditional wide spread between
deposit rates and loan rates disappeared. 38 In light of the shrinking
interest rate spread, noninterest income, in the form of fees and
charges, began to play an increasingly important role in the finances
of banks. 39 This development resulted in banks' charging fees for
services and products they had previously provided for free. At the
same time banks were increasing fees to offset the loss of interest income, they also changed their marketing tactics to attract deposit accounts. The intense competition for deposits resulted in the
development of marketing-driven deposit products designed to lure
customers away from money market funds. Some of the deposit products were advertised in a deceptive and misleading manner. 40
The abusive advertising practices were not, however, taking place in
a legal vacuum. Federal regulators had the authority to regulate advertising and, in fact, had promulgated regulations to address the issue. 41 The regulators' response, however, was not enough for many
37. Depository Institutions Deregulation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 204, 94
Stat. 143 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3503 (1988)). For a general discussion of the legislation,
see Ronald L. Weaver & Andrew M. O'Malley, The Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act of 1980: An Overoiew, 98 BANKING LJ. 100 (1981).
38. The decline in the interest-rate spread was quite dramatic. For example, in 1975, a
bank could lend money to a corporate customer at two percentage points above the bank's
cost of funds. By 1985, that spread had shrunk to about half a percentage point. Sarah
Bartlett, Are Banks Obsolete?, Bus. WK., Apr. 6, 1987, at 74, 75.
39. Banks began' to appreciate the importance of activity-related fees, such as
commitment fees, origination fees, points, trust services, and other charges that extracted
income from customers without relying on a stream of interest income from the borrowing
relationship. DONALD R. FRASER & JAMES W. KOLARI, THE FUTURE OF SMALL BANKS IN A
DEREGULATED ENVIRONMENT 200-01 (1985); Richard I. Kirkland,Jr., Banks Seek Life Beyond
Lending, FORTUNE, Mar. 3, 1986, at 54. In addition, bankers focused on ways to reduce
costs as a way to improve their profitability. Id. at 56.
40. Even bankers admitted that some account advertising crossed the line into the
realm of the misleading. Laura L. Mulcahy, Fine Print in New Account Ads Draws Some
Complaints; But DIDC Spokesman Says Deregulation Requires Consumers to Be More Astute, AM.
BANKER, Feb. 1, 1983, at 1. The hearings held in 1984 on an early version of Truth in
Savings legislation were full of examples showing abusive advertising practices by banks
attempting to lure depositors. See 1984 Hearings, supra note 17, passim.
41. Prior to the adoption of Truth in Savings in 1991, applicable federal banking
regulations relating to deposit account advertising and disclosure included the following:
(1) Regulation Q, 12 C.F.R. § 217.6 (1989), for national banks and state chartered member
banks; (2) 12 C.F.R. § 329.3 (1989), for state·chartered nonmember banks insured by the
FDIC; and (3) 12 C.F.R. § 563.27 (1989), for institutions under the jurisdiction of the
Office of Thrift Supervision. The regulations were fairly consistent with each other and
dealt primarily with deposit account advertising. Among other things, they required the
following: (1) that interest rates be stated in terms of the annual rate of simple interest, 12
C.F.R. §§ 217.6(a), 329.3(a), 563.27(a) (1); (2) that the percentage-yield figures be based
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consumer groups, or legislators,42 who used the emergence of misleading advertising to renew the campaign for Truth in Savings. 43

2. The Bank-Customer Relationship
The changing economics of the banking industry resulted in fees
and charges for services that had previously been provided for free.
While these fees were not illegal, they often came as an unwelcome
surprise to the customers who had to pay them.44 Customers frequently were unaware that their banks had the right, under the form
documents that created the account, to impose fees unilaterally and
raise them at wil1. 45
.
on a period of not more than one year and, if such a figure is used, that the annual rate of
simple interest also be stated with equal prominence, with a reference to the period of
compounding, §§ 217.6(b)(c), 329.3(b)(c), 563.27(a)(2)(3); (3) that any time or amount
requirements necessary in order to earn the advertised rate be clearly and conspicuously
stated, §§ 217.6(d), 329.3(d), 563.27(a) (4); (4) that advertising for time deposits include a
clear and conspicuous statement that a substantial penalty is required for early withdrawal,
§§ 217.6(e), 329.3(h), 563.27(a)(5); and (5) that banks not engage in advertising that is
inaccurate, misleading, or that misrepresents its deposit contracts, §§ 217.6(g), 329.3(f),
563.27(b).
42. See 1984 Hearings, supra note 17, at 6 (statements of Rep. Lehman).
Many people ask what the Federal bank regulators are doing to stop these
advertising practices, and to be fair I must say that they are trying.
However, the mail from my constituents who have asked the Federal
Reserve Board to intervene on their behalf indicates that the Fed seeks to
appease dissension between depositors and financial institutions, rather
than looking out for the rights of the consumer.
[d.
43. Mulcahy, supra note 40.
44. As a legal matter, banks have no special duty to provide full and fair disclosure to
their customers about the fees or material terms of the relationship. The law of debtor and
creditor governs the relationship between a bank and its deposit account customer.
Denison State Bank v. Madeira, 640 P.2d 1235, 1243 (Kan. 1982); Consolidated Bearing &
Supply Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 720 S.w.2d 647, 650 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986). A bank has no
duty of disclosure to a customer unless a fiduciary relationship exists. See Barnett Bank v.
Hooper, 498 So. 2d 923, 925 (Fla. 1986) (holding that bank could have duty to disclose to
customer certain material facts peculiarly within bank's knowledge and not otherwise
available to customer where bank had fiduciary or confidential relationship with customer
and stood to gain financially at expense of customer); Macon County Livestock Mkt. Inc. v.
Kentucky State Bank, 724 S.W.2d 343, 349-51 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that bank
had no duty to disclose to customer information concerning customer's business
associate). For a discussion ofthose situations where a bank might be considered to have a
fiduciary relationship with its customer, see Neils B. Schaumann, The Lender as
Unconventional Fiduciary, 23 SETON HALL L. REv. 21, 40-43 (1992).
45. A depositor usually creates the deposit-account relationship with a bank by
executing a "signature card." The fine print on most signature cards reserves to the bank
the right to unilaterally change the terms of the agreement. While the typically onerous
terms of these bank form documents have been challenged by disgruntled customers, they
rarely win. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Citibank, 462 N.E.2d 1182, 1183-84 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that
bank charges to customers who had checks returned for insufficient funds, where charges
exceeded actual overdraft processing costs, did not breach deposit-account agreement and
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Although bankers usually held the upper hand in the relationship
with their customers (partly through the use of onerous form documents), their position of primacy was severely shaken by a 1985 California class action suit, Perdue v. Crocker National Bank. 46 In Perdue, the
plaintiffs' causes of action for unconscionability and breach of good
faith based on the bank's form documents survived a motion for summary judgment. 47 Although the case settled before being tried, it sent
shock waves through the banking community.48 The case made bankers realize that their once hallowed form documents were subject to
the same contract analysis as other standard business forms.
3.

Method of Interest Calculation

Confusing, deceptive, and arguably unconscionable methods of calculating interest on deposit accounts emerged as a third problem revealed by Truth in Savings' proponents during the congressional
testimony.49 The phase out in the early 1980s of federal limits on the
were not "penalties" in violation of VCC provisions on liquidated damages); Dietrich v.
Chemical Bank, 454 N.Y.S.2d 490, 490-91 (Sup. Ct. 1981), a/I'd, 459 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (App.
Div. 1983) (holding that by signing a signature card and receiving a copy of pertinent rules
and regulations, a customer assented to the bank's service charges as term of the deposit
relationship, and the bank did not breach its contract by imposing fees for checks returned
for insufficient funds, even though the fees charged may have been, as alleged by plaintiff,
"grossly disproportionate to the actual costs, if any, incurred").
46. 702 P.2d 503 (Cal. 1985), appeal dismissed, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). In Perdue, the
plaintiff claimed his bank's charges for checks returned for insufficient funds were
unconscionable and invalid. Id. at 508. The California Supreme Court held that the
signature card signed by the depositor was, "as a matter of law," a contract that authorized
the bank to impose fees and charges, even though the plaintiff had argued lack of mutual
assent. Id. at 509-10. The court also found, however, that the bank's power to impose fees
and charges was subject to a duty of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 510. The court
characterized the signature card as "a classic example of a contract of adhesion."' Id. at
511. Under the contract of adhesion analysis, the plaintiff's claim that the charges were
unconscionable stated a cause of action because the court found that there could be "price
unconscionability" in the deposit account context. Id. at 512.
47. The Perdue case has been followed in at least one other jurisdiction. See Best v.
United States Nat'l Bank, 714 P.2d 1049, 1053 (Or. Ct. App.), a/I'd, 739 P.2d 554 (Or.
1986). The Best case was another class action claiming unconscionability and invalidity of
charges for checks returned because of insufficient funds. Id. at 1050. The court held that
the power of the bank to set charges under the account agreement is not unlimited, but
rather must be exercised within an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at
1056.
48. See, e.g., William Alsup & Lawrence Lincoln, A Management and Litigation Strategy
Under Perdue, 42 Bus. LAw. 893 (1987); Michael D. Finnegan, Perduev. Crocker National Bank
- The Attack on Pricing, 41 Bus. LAw. 997 (1986); Robert L. Lofts, The Perdue Case and Other
Litigation Involving Bank Charges, 42 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REp. 97 (1988).
49. This problem had existed even under Regulation Q, when banks were limited by
law as to how much interest they could pay. Because of the many variables that go into the
calculation of interest, two banks could claim to offer the "highest interest allowed by law"
and yet pay their depositors radically different amounts of interest. Among the many
variables affecting the amount of interest earned are such matters as frequency of
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amount of interest banks could pay on deposits 50 .,resulted in ever
more complicated methods of calculating interest as the banking industry developed new marketing-driven products, thereby aggravating
the perceived problem of interest calculation methods. 51
Proponents of Truth in Savings found the myriad methods of calculating interest on deposit accounts unnecessarily complicated and
confusing to the average customer. 52 In addition, the proponents testified that some methods of interest calculation were not only confusing to the customer, but were actually unconscionable. 53 The
consumer groups called for the "investable balance" method of interest calculation to be banned. In their testimony, these witnesses
clearly considered Truth in Savings to be more than a disclosure statute. To them, it regulated the substantive aspects of deposit accounts
as wel1. 54
.
B.

The Legislative Scheme

Supported by the testimony presented in the hearings, Congress
considered-and eventually passed-a bill to require comprehensive
compounding, whether the bank uses a 360- or a 365-day year, minimum balances,
computation of balance upon which interest is paid, and service charges. Michael J.
Bonfanti, Truth In Savings - Is There a Need? 1 (1981) (unpublished thesis, Graduate
School of Retail Bank Management, University of Virginia) (on file with author).
50. See supra note 38.
51. Deregulation Has Potential for Consumer Confusion, Abuse, AM. BANKER, July 12, 1983, at
6.
52. For instance, a survey by the Consumer Federation of America found that there
were more than 50 different ways of describing the balance on which a customer would
earn interest. See Fees for Routine Bank Services Climbed Sharply in Last Year, CFA Study Finds,
48 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 997 Gune 8, 1987) [hereinafter CFA Study]. To make
matters even more complicated, the survey found little standard terminology in the
brochures and other material received from various banks. [d.
53. In their testimony, the consumer groups complained most vociferously about a
method of calculation called the "investable balance" method, where the depository
institution paid interest only on that portion of the money not .tied up in reserve
requirements. Truth in Savings, H.R 447: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs
and Coinage of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
51-55 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Hearings] (testimony of Edmund Mierwinski, consumer
advocate representing U.S. PIRG, Consumers Union, and the Consumer Federation of
America).
54. For example, the Consumer Federation of America and U.S. PIRG would have
preferred to move beyond mere disclosure and to pass legislation regulating banks like
public utilities. Consumer Groups Allege Price Gouging, Fed. Banking L. Rep .. (CCH) No.
1499, at 6 Gune 11, 1993). Their approach to Truth in Savings indicates a tendency for
substantive regulation of banking practices, rather than mere disclosure. Sensing that the
goal of regulating banks as public utilities is politically impossible, however, these
consumer groups may be attempting to get their agenda adopted piecemeal. In addition
to Truth in Savings, they have championed life-line accounts and government checkcashing laws. [d.
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disclosure of deposit account terms.55 On its face, Truth
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55. Comprehensive account disclosure has been the essence of Truth in Savings since
its original introduction in 1968. Bonfanti, supra note 49, at 12. The Truth in Savings Act
that was finally passed in 1991 has as its major provisions the following:
(1) Required Disclosure. The statute mandates that each advertisement, announcement,
or solicitation made by any depository institution that mentions a specific rate of interest
payable on an account state in a clear and conspicuous manner: (a) annual percentage
yield (APY) in greater prominence than any other rate, (b) the period during which such
APY is in effect, (c) all minimum balance and time requirements to earn the advertised
rate of interest, (d) any initial deposit requirements, (e) a statement that regular fees or
other conditions could reduce the yield, if applicable, and (f) a statement that an interest
penalty is required for early withdrawal. Truth in Savings Act, § 263, 12 U.S.C. § 4303
(Supp. V 1993).
(2) Regulation of Advertising. The statute directs the Federal Reserve Board to
promulgate regulations consistent with the law prohibiting misleading or inaccurate
advertisements and restricting the use of terms "free" or "no-cost." Id. § 263(c), (d), 12
U.S.C. § 4303(c), (d). The Federal Reserve Board was also empowered to exempt by
regulation communications made by radio, TV, or on billboards. Id.
(3) Account Schedule. The statute requires each depository institution to maintain a
schedule of fees, charges, interest rates and terms, and conditions applicable to each class
of accounts offered by the depository institution. Id. § 264, 12 U.S.C. § 4304. Disclosure
must be in plain English and include, among other things, the following items: (a) a
description of all fees, charges and penalties, (b) minimum balance requirements that
affect fees and description of how minimum balance is determined, (c) the minimum
initial deposit, (d) APY, (e) the period during which APY will be in effect, (f) the annual
rate of simple interest, (g) the frequency with which interest is compounded and credited,
(h) a clear description of the method used to determine the balance on which interest is
paid, (i) minimum balance requirements,
minimum time requirements, (k) a
statement, if applicable, that interest that has accrued to an account but has not been
credited at the time of withdrawal will not be paid or credited to the account, (I) any
provision or requirement relating to the nonpayment of interest, including penalties for
early withdrawal, and (m) "other information" as per Federal Reserve Regulations,
including frequency of rate adjustments and renewal policies on time deposits. Id.
(4) Disclosure Requirement for Certain Accounts. The law further provides that the Federal
Reserve Board shall promulgate regulations to modify the disclosure requirements of the
Act with regard to: (a) accounts with APY guaranteed for less that a year, (b) variable rate
accounts, (c) accounts which, pursuant to law, do not guarantee payment at a stated rate,
(d) multiple rate accounts, and (e) accounts with respect to which determination of
annual percentage yield is based on an annual rate of interest that is guaranteed for a
stated term. Id. § 265, 12 U.S.C. § 4305.
(5) Distribution of Schedules. The statute requires that notices be mailed to account
holders within 180 days after promulgation of the regulations, informing the account
holders of their right to receive an account schedule upon request. Id. § 266, 12 U.S.C.
§ 4306. Otherwise, schedules shall be made available in the following manner: (a) to any
person, upon request, (b) to a potential customer before the account is opened, (c) in the
case of any time deposit that is renewable at maturity without notice from the depositor, at
least 30 days before the date of maturity, (d) within 10 days after the opening of an
account, if the account is not opened in person, and (e) to all depositors affected by an
adverse change in account terms within 30 days prior to any such adverse change. Id.
(6) Payment of Interest. The statute prohibits the "investable balance" method of interest
calculation and requires that interest be paid on the entire amount of principal in the
account. Id. § 267, 12 U.S.C. § 4307. The Act does not prohibit any particular method of
compounding or crediting interest, although it requires that interest begin to accrue not
later than the date the funds become available as required by the Expedited Funds
Availability Act (Regulation CC). Id.

m
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appears to address the issues identified in the hearings. Closer analysis, however, shows that the legislative action either added nothing to
the existing law or provided ineffective solutions.
1.

Misleading and Deceptive Advertising

The statute clearly appears to address the issue of misleading or
deceptive advertising in connection with deposit accounts. It specifically prohibits misleading or inaccurate advertisements and restricts
the use of terms "free" or "no-cost."56 While the statute appears to
address the problem, however, that perception is incorrect. Federal
banking regulations enacted before Truth in Savings had already prohibited misleading or inaccurate advertisement of deposit accounts. 57
As a result, the provisions of Truth in Savings devoted to this problem
were redundant with existing regulations. The statute, in fact, added
nothing except, perhaps, a clear message from Congress to the banking regulators that Congress expected more results from the regulators on the topic of account advertising. 58
Not only did Truth in Savings do little, if anything, to strengthen
deposit account advertising regulation, it also failed to provide any
new protection to unsophisticated savers against unfair advertising
practices of financial services providers other than banks. Truth in
(7) Periodic Statements. The statute requires that periodic statements contain
conspicuous statements showing the annual percentage yield earned. the amount of
interest earned. the amount of any fees charged and the number of days in ~he reporting
period. [d. § 268. 12 U.S.C. § 4308.
.
(8) Administrative Enforcement. The law provides for enforcement of the Act by the
primary regulator of the various types of depository institutions. [d. § 270. 12 U.S.C.
§ 4310.
(9) Civil Liability. Finally. Truth in Savings establishes a cause of action for bank
customers and limits liability of banks. [d. § 271. 12 U.S.C. § 4311. This section makes
banks liable to private plaintiffs for actual damages suffered by the plaintiff. plus an
additional amount between $100 and $1.000. [d. The law provides ground rules for class
actions. limiting the total recovery thereunder to the lesser of $500.000 or 1% of the net
worth of the depository institution. but also providing for reasonable attorney's fees. [d.
Under the law. banks are permitted to raise defenses based on "bona fide errors" and
"good faith reliance" on Federal Reserve Board rulings. [d.
56. [d. § 263(c). 12 U.S.C. § 4303(c).
57. See supra note 41.
58. The idea of sending a message to the regulators by introducing legislation in
Congress was on the minds of at least some congressional representatives. Representative
Annunzio. an early sponsor of Truth in Savings. has stated:
In a previous Congress I introduced my own version of Truth in Savings but
did not push for its passage because I had hoped that the regulatory
agencies would deal with the problem on their own. Unfortunately. the
regulatory agencies have not acted in this area .... I cannot wait any longer
for the agencies to act.
Seroices Disclosure Bill Reflects View There is Still Unfairness to Consumers. AM. BANKER. Mar. 29.
1979. at 4.
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Savings did not broaden the coverage of the advertising regulatory
scheme to include investment products outside of bank deposits. Witnesses during the hearings on the bill had suggested that if the law
was needed to protect unsophisticated savers and investors from unwittingly getting into disadvantageous transactions, it should cover all
such transactions regardless of whether the financial services provider
was a bank, a thrift, a mutual fund, or an insurance company.59 Truth
in Savings, however, does not reach that goal. Although money market mutual funds 60 and insurance annuity contracts61 serve as close
substitutes for bank deposit accounts, these products are not covered
by Truth in Savings. Even deposit-like products offered by banks, such
as mutual funds and repurchase agreements,62 do not come under the
law's coverage. Therefore, while Truth in Savings appears to address
deceptive advertising issues, it adds nothing to the existing regulatory
scheme and falls short of the larger goal of protecting unsophisticated
investors from unscrupulous investment and savings advertising.
59. See 1991 Hearings, supra note 53, at 27-38 (statement of Consumer Bankers
Association), 39-50 (statement of Russell Dunman, Senior Vice President, First Alabama
Bank, on behalf of the American Bankers Association).
60. A mutual fund is a pool of investors who invest in securities indirectly by
purchasing shares in an "investment company" regulated by the Investment Company Act
of 1940. The investment company (mutual fund), in turn; invests the shareholders' money
in securities in accordance with an investment policy articulated in a prospectus covering
the mutual fund shares. Like deposit accounts, "open end" mutual funds provide investors
with a high level of liquidity by standing ready to redeem shares in the fund on demand.
Mutual funds may invest in a range of underlying securities, including relatively safe
investments such as short-term government securities or money market instruments. The
combination of relative safety and liquidity make mutual funds a close substitute for bank
deposit accounts in the minds of many customers. For an overview of mutual funds, see
GEORGE G. KAUFMAN, THE U.S. FINANCIAL SYSTEM: MONEY, MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS 24549 (4th ed. 1989).
61. Annuities are technically insurance products, but they can provide a vehicle for
long-term savings. See THE WALL STREET JOURNAL GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING PERSONAL
FINANCE 98-99 (Kenneth M. Morris & Alan M. Siegel eds., 1992). Typically, an investor
makes a single payment or a series of payments in exchange for an annuity contract that
guarantees the payment of a future income stream. See id. at 99. Annuities often figure in
retirement planning strategies because of their tax-advantaged treatment. See id. at 89.
62. A repurchase agreement, or "repo," is a form of a short-term secured loan, where
the borrower "sells" a security, typically an obligation of the U.S. treasury, to the lender
and, at the same time, the borrower agrees to repurchase the security at a given time and
price from the seller. The difference in the prices represents the interest on the loan. The
lender is protected from the borrower's failure to repurchase the security by having title to
the security and therefore the ability to sell the security on the secondary market.
Although repurchase agreements once were employed primarily as a method for banks to
lend money to each other for short periods of time, today many banks make these
arrangements available to deposit customers, especially those customers whose deposit
accounts exceed the deposit insurance limit. Steve Cocheo, MunicipalDeposits: "Yes," "No,"
and "Maybe," ABA BANKING J., Apr. 1992, at 22; Banks Weigh the Costs of Deposit Insurance,
ABA BANKING J., Sept. 1991, at 45; Old Tool Brings New Bucks to Oregon Bank, ABA BANKING J.,
June 1991, at 7.
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The Bank-Customer Relationship

The statute appears to address the imbalance of power between
banks and their customers by mandating comprehensive disclosure of
deposit account terms.63 At least intuitively, requiring disclosure of
key terms is an attractive way to "level the playing field" between the
bank and its customer~64 On closer inspection, however, the disclosure approach in the Truth in Savings context may not only fail to
provide an advantage to consumers, but may actually put them at a
disadvan tage.
Truth in Savings requires disclosure of a great deal of information,65 apparently on the assumption that the consumer receiving the
information possesses the ability to process it in a meaningful way.66
Truth in Savings, however, does not concern itself with whether a
bank customer can appreciate the differences between deposit accounts based on the information provided. 67 Experience with other
disclosure statutes tells us that consumers often are not capable of
assessing the significance of the information disclosed. 68 By requiring
63. Truth in Savings Act, § 263, 12 U.S.C. § 4303 (Supp. V 1993).
64. Disclosure frequently has been employed as a method of relatively unobtrusive
regulation that respects the autonomy of the parties to the underlying transaction by
refraining from direct commands to producers to behave in a particular way and by
allowing individuals in the marketplace to chose their own course of action after being
informed of relevant information through the disclosure process. Stephen Breyer,
Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HARV. L.
REv. 547, 579 (1979).
65. See supra note 55. The disclosure of this type has been characterized as
"hypertechnical trivia" by one banking industry observer. Jo Ann S. Barefoot, How
Consumer Regs Can Work Against Consumers, ABA BANKING J., Apr. 1993, at 26.
66. The underlying assumption of disclosure statutes is that consumers act as rational
wealth-maximizers and will use the information supplied by disclosure statutes to shop
around to get the best deal. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., One Hundred Years of Ineptitude:
The Need for Mortgage Rules Consonant with the Economic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home
Sale and Loan Transaction, 70 VA. L. REv. 1083, 1113-14 (1984). Empirical studies have
tended to show, however, that consumers do not actually behave that way. Id. at 1114-15.

67. Although Truth in Savings was designed to facilitate comparison shopping by
requiring that all deposits accounts disclose the annual percentage yield (APY), some
factors that do not enter into the APY calculation, such as minimum balances, fees, and
interest penalties, nevertheless affect the economic attractiveness of the account. The
Truth in Lending Act suffers from similar shortcomings. Under that statute, comparison
shopping for consumer credit is facilitated by requiring creditors to disclose the annual
percentage rate (APR). Depending on the type ofloan, however, the regulations prescribe
different methods of calculating APR. In addition, some costs of lending are not reflected
in the APR, such as real estate related fees, late payment fees, and other costs. For a
description of the problems under the Truth in Lending Act, see Griffith L. Garwood et
aI., Consumer Disclosure in the 1990s, 9 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 777, 786 (1993).
68. Ironically, the disclosure of information often makes the decisionmaking process
less effective for consumers. Jeff Sovern, Toward a Theory of Warranties in Sales of New Homes:
Housing the Implied Warranty Advocates, Law and Economics Mavens, and Consumer Psychologists
Under One Roof, 1993 WIS. L. REv. 13, 27-30. Consumers often make poor choices when
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banks to disclose technical information that the typical consumer cannot use, therefore, the disclosure method of consumer protection
tends to defeat itself. 69
Although some studies suggest that required disclosures have some
beneficial effect on the level of consumer knowledge,70 other studies 71
and anecdotal evidence 72 suggest that required consumer disclosures
impose considerable costs with little concomitant benefit. Our collective faith in the value of disclosure to "level the playing field" between
sophisticated banks and their unsophisticated customers should be reexamined in light of a recent survey by the Educational Testing Service and the Department of Education. This survey showed that
almost half of all Americans over age sixteen lack basic reading and
math skills.73 These findings suggest that account disclosure may have
little meaning for the very people it has been designed to protect.
they are overcome by "information overload." Id. at 27-28. The oversupply of information
may itself become a barrier to the information acquisition process. Melvin Eisenberg, Text
Anxiety, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 305, 309-10 (1986).
69. Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REv. 657, 690-91
(1985); Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 407, 424-25
(1990).
70. Many studies carried out in connection with the Truth in Lending Act suggest that
the law made consumers more aware of the annual percentage rate and costs of credit. See,
e.g., William K. Brandt & George S. Day, Information Disclosure and Consumer Behavior: An
Empirical Evaluation of Truth-in-Lending. 7 U. MICH.j.L. REF. 297. 302-03 (1974); Eskridge,
supra note 66. at 1163.
71. Some researchers have concluded that the information made available by the
Truth in Lending Act did not in fact promote comparison shopping for credit. Rather,
researchers found that comparison shopping for financial services remained limited to the
relatively sophisticated consumers who would have been able to comparison shop even
without the law's information requirements. See, e.g.• Joseph O. Eagan et aI., The Impact of
Truth-in-Lending on Automobile Financing - An Empirical Study, 4 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 179. 194
(1979).
72. Bankers complain that required disclosures do not have any real effect on
customer behavior. In the words of David K. Smith. senior vice president. Union State
Bank. Arkansas City, Kansas: "I see so many of the other regulatory disclosures we are
required to give them in lobby trash cans or worse yet. blowing down the street in the
Kansas wind." Steve Cocheo, Savings Reg Yields Banker Distress, ABA BANKING j.. Aug. 1992,
at 10.
73. The study tested more than 26.000 Americans on practical, everyday matters such
as reading newspaper articles and bus schedules. filling in simple business forms like bankdeposit slips. and answering questions involving basic math skills. IRWIN S. KIRSCH ET AL.,
NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, AoULT LITERACY IN AMERICA xii-xv (1993).
The test's questions were categorized into five levels of difficulty. Id. at xiv-xv.
Extrapolating from the test results. approximately 40 to 44 million Americans perform at
the lowest level. meaning they are unable to calculate the total of a purchase. determine
the difference in price between two items. read a street map, or enter information on a
simple form. See id. It also indicates that an additional 50 million perform at the secondlowest level: they are unable to answer specific questions about facts in a newspaper article
or to interpret charts summarizing information. Id. at xv. With regard to the rest of the
difficulty levels. the test found that 61 million Americans function with middle-level skills.

1994]

TRUTH IN SAVINGS

1301

A great irony of Truth in Savings is that it presents customers with
information they cannot use, while at the same time creating a possible safe harbor for banks to gain protection from customer claims.
The 1985 decision of Perdue v. Crocker National Bank put banks on notice that business dealings with customers had to meet minimum standards offairness. 74 Although the standard was not statutorily defined,
it nevertheless modified bankers' behavior. In the post-Perdue world,
banks understood that they could be subject to potential liability
under state banking regulations, consumer protection laws, unfair
trade practices, common law fraud, unconscionability, or any number
of other state-law-based legal theories. 75
The passage of Truth in Savings may make state courts reluctant to
follow the Perdue line of cases to address the imbalance of power between banks and their customers. The Perdue court expressly determined that California law governed the bank-depositor relationship
because the court found no federal preemption of the subject. 76 In
light of changes in the federal law since Perdue was decided, however,
a court reviewing the issue today might not reach the same
conclusion. 77
Even if not preempted by federal law, courts may be reluctant to
entertain Perdue-type claims in light of the fact that consumers were
fully informed of the terms of the account relationship at the time the
30 million function at the next level, and up to 8 million function at the highest level. Id.
at 50.
74. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
75. See Alsup & Lincoln, supra note 48; Finnegan, supra note 48; Lofts, supra note 48.
76. Perdue v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 702 P.2d 503, 516-25 (Cal. 1985), appeal dismissed,
475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
'
77. Since 1985, when Perdue was decided, federal law has taken a larger role in the legal
relationship between banks and their depositors. In 1986, Congress passed the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570,100 Stat. 3207 (1986), which expanded the scope of
the Bank Secrecy Act. In 1987, the Expedited Funds Availability Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 248a,
4001-4010 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), became law, which was followed closely by the
expansion of Regulation J, 12 C.F.R. § 210 (1994), dealing with the check-collection
process. In 1991, Truth in Savings appeared. These laws, together with the federal laws
regulating deposits that were in place at the time Perdue was decided, such as the Electronic
Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), the Right to Financial
Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3401-3422 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), Regulation D reserve
requirements, 12 C.F.R. § 204 (1994), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 264,1728,1811-1831 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (which was also strengthened in 1991),
could be seen as so thoroughly occupying the legislative field "as to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it." Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2617 (1992). It would appear from the Cipollone case,
however, that the preemption clauses (if any) of each act would control and that matters
outside the scope of the explicit preemption clauses would be within the province of the
state to regulate if not implicitly preempted. Not all of the federal laws touching on the
deposit relationship have preemption provisions, however, so the implied preemption
question remains an open issue.
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account was opened. 7s Courts might view Truth in Saving's comprehensive disclosure requirements as the measure of protection accorded depd~itors and limit review of account relationships to
compliance with these requirements. 79 Truth in Savings, therefore,
might in effect provide a "safe harbor" for banks regarding the
amount and type of disclosure required in the deposit account context, thereby precluding consumers from making Perdue-type claims.
While the creation of a safe harbor may take away some causes of
action, customers nevertheless can sue for failure to comply with
Truth in Savings. The statute explicitly provides for a civil cause of
action. Unfortunately for customers, however, the civil liability provision does not pose much ofa threat to banks. so Given the weakness of
this provision, the law will be enforced primarily through its administrative enforcement section. Sl Because the primary federal banking
regulators have gone on record as being opposed to the idea of Truth
in Savings,S2 one might expect the banking regulators to be less than
enthusiastic about enforcing strict compliance with the law. In addition, the violations are not the type that would affect the "safety and
78. After Perdue was decided, some commentators suggested that full disclosure of
account terms was the best defense against Perdue-type claims. See Alsup & Lincoln, supra
note 48, at 900 ("In virtually all states, a seller who made full disclosure up front would be
immune from unconscionability suits. This is not necessarily true under Perdue, although
full disclosure is a powerful consideration and (me which, as a practical matter, will
discourage almost all suits."). With Truth in Savings mandating disclosure, it may have the
effect of precluding Perdue-type suits.
79. Certainly, states adopting the view that adhesion contracts will be enforced
consistent with the reasonable expectations of the parties will have a difficult time
overcoming the "unfair surprise" requirement of that doctrine after Truth in Savings. The
account disclosure required by the law should create the reasonable expectation in the
mind of the account customer of what the terms of the relationship will be. Finnegan,
supra note 48, at 1000-03.
80. The law caps the maximum penalty for a violation at $1,000 per individual action,
or, in a class action, the lesser of $500,000 or 1% of the net worth of the depository
institution involved. Truth in Savings Act, § 271, 12 U.S.C. § 4311 (Supp. V 1993). In
addition, the law allows banks defenses for "bona fide errors" and for reliance on Federal
Reserve Board rulings. Id. § 271(c), (f), 12 U.S.c. § 4311 (c), (f). The combination of
these factors results in a civil liability section that does not impose much of a threat to
banks and, combined with the one-year statute of limitations, id. § 271 (e), 12 U .S.C.
§ 4311 (e), makes banks' exposure under this proposed law very limited.
81. Id. § 270, 12 U.S.C. § 4300.
82. See, e.g., 1991 Hearings, supra note 53, at 56-67 (statement of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve Board); HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN
AFFAIRS, TOGETHER WITH ADDITIONAL, SUPPLEMENTAL, MINORllY AND DISSENTING VIEWS,
DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS Acr OF 1988: REpORT TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 5094, H.R. Doc. No.
822, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, at 384, 399, 406-08 (1988) [hereinafter H.R. 5094
REpORT], reprinted in Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1245, at 384,399,406-08 (Aug. 12,
1988) (statements of the Federal Reserve Board, Comptroller of the Currency, and Federal
Deposit, Insurance Corporation, respectively).
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soundness" of a financial institution,83 so the regula..tors might not be
willing or able to use all of the administrative sanctions at their disposal84 to force banks to comply.85
Therefore, the statute's attempt to solve the problem of the imbalance of power between banks and their customers by bombarding customers with a great deal of information will likely be ineffective. The
disclosure requirement may not only be ineffective protection for consumers, it may be a boon for bankers if it creates a safe harbor for
banks by foreclosing Perdutrtype claims. In any event, neither the statute's limited private right of action nor the administrative remedy
pose a serious threat to banks. The attempt to equalize the relationship between banks and their customers through this legislation,
therefore, also appears to fall short of the mark.

3.

Method of Interest Calculation

Truth in Savings also addresses the problem raised during the hearings that banks sometimes employ unfair methods of interest calculation. The statute prohibits the use of the "investable balance" method
of calculating interest. 86 If the 'problem identified during the hearings consisted only of the use of the investable balance method of
83. Generally speaking, an unsafe or unsound practice embraces any action, or
lack of action, which is contrary to generally accepted standards of prudent
operation, the possible consequences of which, if continued, would be
abnormal risk of loss or damage to an institution, its shareholders, or the
insurance fund administered by the corporation.
Overdrafts and Correspondent Banking Practices: Hearings Before the Sen. Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1977) (statement of George LeMaistre,
Chairman, 'Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation), quoted in EDWARD L. SYMONS, JR. &
JAMES]' WHITE, BANKING LAw 554 (3d ed. 1991).
84. The banking regulators have an array of sanctions available to use against financial
institutions and institution-affiliated parties, ranging from cease-and-desist orders through
civil money penalties to criminal prosecutions. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b), (i), (j) (1988).
85. First Nat'l Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of the Currency, 697 F.2d 674 (5th Cir.
1983); Gulf Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 651 F.2d 259 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1121 (1982). In Gulf, the court noted that an "unsafe or
unsound" practice must threaten the financial integrity of the institution before a ceaseand-desist order may issue. [d. at 264. In a footnote, the court left open whether a ceaseand-desist order based on a violation of law must meet the same standard: "The 'violation
of law' provision ... may be subject to the same limits as the 'unsafe or unsound practice'
provision discussed ... above. If so, the cease and desist power would arise only when an
association violates a law which protects the association's financial integrity." [d. at 265 n.5;
cf Saratoga Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 879 F.2d 689, 693 (9th Cir.
1989) (finding that a specific violation of a law or regulation would not have to' affect the
stability of the institution or create a risk for the deposit insurance fund as long as "the
underlying regulation [being violated] has the financial stability of the bank. as its
purpose"). Because the official finding of Truth in Savings lists "stability" as one of the
purposes for the law, the cease-and-desist power would presumably be available to enforce
the law under the Saratoga test.
86. Truth in Savings Act, § 267, 12 U.S.C. § 4307 (Supp. V 1993).
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interest calculation, the statute clearly addresses that problem. On
the other hand, if the problem identified extends beyond a particular
method of interest calculation-to unfair methods of interest calculation generally-the statute does not fully address the problem. The
statute prescribes no particular method of interest calculation and
does not articulate a standard of fairness that interest calculation
methods must meet. 87 Given bankers' ingenuity, they almost certainly
can devise new unfair methods of interest calculation for which Truth
in Savings will offer no remedy.
C.

The Failure of Legislative Methodology

As the previous section illustrates, determining the effectiveness of

the legislative action in light of the problems identified during the
committee and subcommittee hearings presents a difficult challenge.
Deceptive advertising by banks, the unfair nature of the relationship
between banks and their customers, and unfair methods of calculating
interest seem like specific problems for which the proposed legislation
provided a solution. On closer examination, however, these
"problems" really are quite broad issues, rather than specific
problems. For example, while the hearings produced some degree of
consensus that deceptive advertising was a matter of concern,S8 the
apparent consensus did not constitute a rigorous definition of the
problem because the witnesses spoke with more than one voice.
While some witnesses focused on the advertising practices of banks,
others focused on the advertising practices of other financial services
providers. 89 Therefore, even though most witnesses concurred in
87. An alternative Truth in Savings proposal considered during the lOlst Congress,
H.R. 6, did contain a provision mandating a standard method of interest calculation. H.R.
6, § 1l09(a), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). That approach was rejected in the mark-up of
the competing Truth in Savings bills, H.R. 6 and H.R. 447, that were eventually reported
out of committee as H.R. 2654. Some witnesses saw the omission as a major mistake that
would prevent the Truth in Savings law from achieving the purpose of preventing unfair
methods of interest calculation. See 1991 Hearings, supra note 53, at 52-54 (testimony of
Edmund Mierwinski). Other witnesses thought prescribing a method of calculating
interest would go beyond the scope of the legislation's disclosure purpose. See id. at 62
(statement submitted by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System). Once
again, the testimony reveals that the hearings process did not identifY a specific problem to
be solved.
88. All of the pro-consumer witnesses and at least one thrift banker believed that
advertising was out of hand. 1984 Hearings, supra note 17, passim.
89. The banking industry repeatedly insisted that the mutual fund industry should be
covered by Truth in Savings, as well. See, e.g., Truth-in-Savings Act - H.R 736: Hearing
Befare the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs and Coinage of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance
and Urban Affairs, lOlst Cong., 1st. Sess. 8-10 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 Hearings] (statement
of Joe Belew, President, Consumer Bankers Association, accompanied by Russell Dunman,
First Alabama Bank, representing American Bankers Association).
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identifying this particular issue, they did not concur in defining the
specific problem.
Similarly, some testimony noted the disparity in power and knowledge between banks and their customers. 90 The hearings, however,
did not consider whether the imbalance in the bank-customer relationship was a problem in and of itself or whether it was merely symptomatic of the larger problem that customers do not possess enough
sophistication to deal with banks. 91 The latter problem suggests a different set of solutions than the former. The former problem assumes
the capacity on the part of the customer to stand up to the bank if
given the appropriate information; the latter suggests that even with
the information, the customer will be at a disadvantage.
Identifying the problem makes an important difference in the selection of an appropriate solution, but what the problem is depends on
the perspective of the problem framer. Both consumer and bank lobbyists perceived the bank-customer relationship to be a problem, but
the problems they each saw were very different. Consumer groups
focused on the disparity in bargaining power between banks and their
customers, and at least some testimony before Congress suggested
that Truth in Savings should correct that imbalance. 92 Banks, for
their part, recognized a problem in the bank-customer relationship in
that they feared customers would subject them to Perdue-type claims. 93
The congressional testimony, however, never clearly articulated to
what extent the imbalance of power was to be addressed by Truth in
Savings or how it should be resolved.
Finally, proponents raised concerns about the methods used by
banks to calculate interest on accounts. 94 From the testimony, however, one cannot determine whether the "problem" identified was
merely the use of the "investable balance" method of interest calculation or a broader concern with such practices as calculating interest
on a 360-day year. 95 Some witnesses believed that any regulation of
90. See, e.g., 1984 Hearings, supra note 17, at 52-57 (statement of Mark Hannaford,
President, Bankcard Holders of America).
91. Lack of consumer sophistication often serves as the foundational premise for
consumer protection laws. See Sovern, supra note 68, at 25.
92. See 1989 Hearings, supra note 89, at 104-12 (testimony of Consumers Union and
Consumer Federation of America).
93. See, e.g., Alsup & Lincoln, supra note 48; Finnegan, supra note 48; Lofts, supra note
48.
94. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
95. 1984 Hearings, supra note 17. at 59 (statement of Richard L.D. Morse). The survey
prepared by the Consumer Federation of America noted the lack of standard terminology
and the bewildering array of interest-rate calculation methods. See CFA Study, supra note
52. Although the investable balance method received the most attention during the
hearings. these other methods were arguably before the committee as well. [d.
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the substantive terms of the interest calculation was beyond the law's
purported scope. 96 Like the other identified areas of concern, the
"problem" of interest rate calculation methods was really an "issue"
that needed further definition. The legislative process, however,
never focused the issue with the degree of specificity necessary to determine exactly what the problem was.
D.

Unintended Consequences of the Legislative &sponse

Because we can never know the real problem at which Truth in Savings was aimed, we will never know for certain whether the law will
achieve the ends sought by its proponents. The effectiveness of the
law must be judged in terms of the problems it sought to correct, but
the existing problem-definition process stops far short of rigorously
defining exactly what the legislation was supposed to achieve. While
failure to identify the problems may make evaluating the legislative
response difficult, it may also give rise to unintended consequences.
1.

Costs of the Legislation

Without rigorously defining what the statute aims to achieve, the
law might have the unintended consequence of imposing a greater
cost on society than the benefit it returns. Truth in Savings saddles
banks with substantial compliance costs. 97 Although banks will pass
along the cost to their customers in the form of higher fees and lower
interest rates,98 the added compliance costs will nevertheless hurt the
banking industry.
96. 1991 Hearings, supra note 53, at 62 (statement submitted by the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System).
97. Truth in Savings compliance involves retaining professionals for assistance, such as
attorneys to review the regulations, training-professionals to educate the workforce,
computer programmers, et cetera. Phil Roosevelt, Banks Scramble to Meet Truth in Savings
Deadline, BANKING WK.,jan. 11, 1993, at 10. In addition, compliance entails the production
of complicated documents that require staff time, training of bank personnel, printing
costs, review of marketing plans, and the adjustment of complicated computer programs to
facilitate data provision. Truth in Savings Nears. Are You Ready?, ABA BANKING]', Sept. 1992,
at 36-38. The costs of compliance are especially high for small banks. Bill Atkinson, Small
Banks, Big Compliance Load, BANKING WK., Feb. 1, 1993, at 1. For example, Metcalf Savings
Bank of Overland Park, Kansas, a $120-million institution, spent $30,386 in Truth in
Savings compliance costs. Beth Piskora, Metcalf Savings Howls Ouer Cost of Truth In Savings,
BANKING WK., Aug. 9,1993, at 1. The bank's entire operating budget for 1993 totaled only
$172,500. Id.
98. Commenting on the compliance costs imposed by Truth in Savings, john Brittain,
vice president of retail deposit product management at Meridian Bancorp, Reading, Pa.,
said: "[It] will be made up in slightly lower interest rates and slightly higher fees." Barbara
A. Rehm, Moment of Truth-in-Savings Arrives, and Banks Wince, BANKING WK., june 28,1993,
at 10.
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The federal banking regulation burden imposes considerable costs
on the banking industry, placed by one estimate at fifty-nine percent
of profits. 99 The costs imposed by Truth in Savings compliance make
bank deposit products more expensive relative to similar products
available through mutual funds and insurance companies. In the aggregate, these adqitional costs create an incentive for depositors to
move their money out of banks and into mutual funds. lOo The disintermediation to which high compliance costs contribute runs directly counter to the overall goals of banking regulation. IOI
99. Barbara A. Rehm, Compliance Cost Put at 59% of Profits, BANKING WK.,June 22, 1992,
at 10. The cost of regulatory compliance has long been a rallying cry of the banking
industry against further regulatory mandates. See, e.g., Patrick Dalton, Red Tape Maze
Hinders Credit, ABA Tells House Subcommittee, ABA BANKERS WKLY., Aug. II, 1992, at 6. The
banking industry has found some support for their position on Capitol Hill among some
congressional representatives who have proposed legislation to reduce the crush of federal
banking regulatory paperwork, especially for small banks. See Patrick Dalton, Bereuter
Introduces Bill to Ease Compliance Burden, ABA BANKERS WKLY., June 3D, 1992, at 6; Patrick
Dalton, Senator Places Burden in the Record, ABA BANKERS WKLY., May 26, 1992, at 7. In the
102d Congress, as of mid-summer 1993, four bills dealing with regulatory relief-H.R. 59
(Rep. Bereuter, R-Neb., sponsor), H.R. 269 (Rep. Bill McCollum, R-Fla., sponsor), S. 265
(Sen. Richard Shelby, D-Ala., sponsor), and S. 1124 (Sen. Alfonse D'Amato, R-N.Y.,
sponsor)-were under consideration. The industry also has found support among the
banking regulatory agencies, see Claudia Cummins, Regulations Too Costly, Agencies Tell
Lawmakers, BANKING WK., Dec. "21, 1992, at I, and especially one member of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System,John P. LaWare, a former commercial banker, see
John Ginovsky, Governor LaWare Feels Pain Of Overregulated Industry, ABA BANKERS WKLY.,
June 2, 1992, at 8.
Governor LaWare has spoken out on many occasions concerning the burden that
compliance costs impose on the banking industry. See, e.g., Simplifying the Regulatory Burden
on Well-Run Financial Institutions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions
Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban
Affairs, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 65, 66-79" (1992) (statement of John P. LaWare, Member,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board), reprinted in 78 FED. REs. BULL. 607, 60712 (1992). While many industry observers believe the cost of the regulatory burden to be
substantial, the exact cost of regulatory compliance remains undefined. See Barbara A.
Rehm, Compliance Price Tag: $3 Billion, BANKING WK., June 15, 1992, at 1. But see Steve
Klinkerman, Banks Accused of Inflating Compliance Cost Estimates, BANKING WK., Apr. 12, 1992,
at 10.
100. Banks suffer from a structural handicap when competing against mutual funds on
yield alone, because the costs of doing business as a bank are higher than the costs of
doing business as a mutual fund, especially if one takes into account the cost of deposit
insurance premiums, reserve requirements, and compliance with social policy legislation
such as the Community Reinvestment Act. See Randall Smith, Banks Could be Pinched for
Deposits to LendAfter Consumer Exodus, WALL ST. J., June 3D, 1993, at C1.
101. The Credit Crunch and Regulatory Burdens in Bank Lending: Hearings Before the
Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government
Operations, 103d Cong., 1st Sess 118, 124-26 (1993) (statement ofJohn P. LaWare, Member,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board, and Chairman, Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council), reprinted in 79 FED. REs. BULL. 466, 468 (1993). The
flight of funds from bank accounts into mutual funds has caused some concern among
economists, who fear that with fewer financial assets in the hands of banks, the Federal
Reserve will have a much more difficult time controlling the money supply and responding

1308

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

2.

[Vol. 62

Reduction in Variety of Financial Products

If the market for deposit account products behaves in the same way
as the markets for other products subject to comprehensive disclosure
requirements, another unintended consequence of the statute will be
to reduce the types of financial products that banks offer to consumers.102 Experience has shown that when a previously unregulated area
becomes subject to regulation, the products offered become relatively
standardized and innovation in the marketplace diminishes. 103

3.

Promotion of Interstate Banking

Truth in Savings likely will have the effect of promoting interstate
banking. Prior to the enactment of Truth in Savings, regulation of
deposit disclosures varied significantly from one state to the next.'04
Although the banking lobby had hoped for a stronger preemption
to short-term volatility in the economy. Phillip R. Mack, Recent Trends in the Mutual Fund
Industry, 79 FED. REs. BULL. 1001, 1011-12 (1993). In addition, as banks lose deposit
accounts they have less cash available to lend to borrowers. The flight of money from
banks could cause another credit crunch for small businesses, who rely on banks much
more than larger businesses do to raise money. Kenneth H. Bacon, Bank's Declining Role in
Economy Worries Fed, May Hurt Firms, WALL ST. J., July 9, 1993, at AI.
102. 1991 Hearings, supra note 53, at 58 (statement submitted by the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System: "[Wj e have learned that rules that are not intended to affect
the variety of products offered nonetheless may have the practical effect of standardizing
products and reducing the options available to customers").
103. FFIEC Study on Regulatory Burden: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions
Supervision, Regulation and Deposit Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban
Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 28, 33-34 (1993) (statement of John P. LaWare, Chairman,
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, and Member, Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve Board), reprinted in 79 FED. REs. BULL. 281, 283 (1993).
The current approach to regulation, which often relies on mandates and
uniform standards, has led to inflexibility, which can be costly. Very
specific requirements necessarily bring standardization ... such inflexibility
can be costly because it tends to preclude new approaches, prevent
innovation, and even limit access to new technology and new markets.
Id.
104. Prior to the enactment of Truth in Savings, several states had enacted their own
versions of deposit account disclosure laws. State laws requiring disclosure of deposit
account terms varied greatly. In general, the state law responses fit into four broad
categories: (1) states with no explicit disclosure requirements; (2) states requiring that
fees, rules, and regulations be posted in the banking lobby or offices, see, e.g., ALASKA STAT.
§ 06.05.120 (1988 & Supp. 1993); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 30.20.060 (West 1986 & Supp.
1993); (3) states requiring that bank rules and regulations be printed in the passbooks
evidencing the accounts or delivered to the customer, see, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 7-1-350
(Michie 1989); HAw. REv. STAT. § 403-123 (1985); R.1. GEN. LAws § 19-11-14 (1989); and
(4) states imposing an affirmative duty of disclosure regarding the calculation and
payment of interest, fees and charges, and advance notice of changes in these terms, see,
e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE, §§ 865-865.10 (West 1989) (repealed 1993); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.
140E, § 2 (West 1991 & Supp. 1994); N.Y. BANKING LAw §§ 14[1], 14-c (McKinney 1990 &
Supp. 1994). See Mary Jane Large, Deposit Account Disclosure, 37 Bus. LAw. 1317, 1319
(1982).
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provision,105 Truth in Savings nevertheless bestows a major benefit to
institutions engaging in interstate banking. While the law does not
explicitly preempt existing state statutes,I06 it does make compliance
across state lines easier. This result obtains because the advent of federallegislation likely will prevent additional state statutes from c~ming
into existence.
Complying with the federal law and a few special state laws (assuming th'at some state laws are not preempted completely by Truth in
Savings) will be a much easier task for institutions engaged in interstate banking than complying with fifty different statutes on the same
topic. In addition, some states are moving to repeal their deposit disclosure laws in light of Truth in Savings. 107 If one federal standard
applies to require disclosures on deposit accounts rather than fifty different standards, compliance costs for interstate banks could be reduced, thereby making interstate banking marginally less expensive.
The law's effect, therefore, may change the existing costs and benefits
that define the competition between interstate and intrastate banks in
favor of the interstate banks.
4.

Aggravation of Compliance Cost Economies of Scale

The mere existence of a new regulation has ramifications for the
banking market. New regulations create advantages for medium- to
large-sized banks over their smaller competitors. The advantage
comes from the economies of scale that medium- to large-sized banks
enjoy in compliance costs. lOB Although studies of economies of scale
The lack of uniformity among states may have been due to existing federal regulations
that already required a certain amount of disclosure, or merely to philosophical
differences between the various states. The passage of Truth in Savings, however,
squelches any state-level preferences and disregards the special kind of federalism that
exists in the banking area. For a discussion of the rise of federal power in the demand
deposit account context and its ramifications, see Edward L. Rubin, Unifrmnity, Regulation,
. and the Federalization of State Law: Some Lessons from the Payment System, 49 OHIO ST. LJ. 1251
(1989). Although Truth in Savings does not necessarily preempt additional state laws on
the topic, it certainly takes away a great deal of the incentive for states to act as
"laboratories" in enacting new and innovative ways to deal with the perceived problems
raised by Truth in Savings' proponents.
105. See 1991 Hearings, supra note 53, at 28-29 (testimony of the Consumer Bankers
Association), 45 (statement of the American Bankers Association).
106. Truth in Savings Act, § 273, 12 U.S.C. § 4313 (Supp. V 1993).
107. Lynne B. Barr & Anne Wallace, Deposit Account Developments: Truth in Savings, 48
Bus. LAw. 1129, 1131 (1993).
108. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System commissioned a report to
determine whether banks enjoy economies of scale in compliance with consumer
protection regulations. The study found modest economies of scale in compliance costs
for institutions up to an optimal size of 375,000 consumer credit accounts. Mter that
point, the researchers noted small diseconomies of scale. GREGORY E. ELLIEHAUSEN &
ROBERT D. KURTZ, SCALE ECONOMIES IN COMPLIANCE COSTS FOR CONSUMEi CREDIT
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in the banking industry have reached somewhat different conclusions
over the years, they quite consistently find that smaller banks have a
higher cost of compliance per deposit account than do larger
banks. 109 In 1989, of the approximately 13,500 banks in the United
States, about 4,500 were small banks. IIO Truth in Savings, therefore,
puts those banks in an even more dif~cult competitive position.
5.

Reduction of Competition for Deposits

Some proponents of Truth in Savings argued during the congressional hearings that the law would benefit the banking industry by
setting ground rules under which accounts may be advertised. l l l By
requiring all banks to adhere to the same fair disclosure requirements, the argument went, bankers would compete on the real terms
of their products, rather than on hype. 1l2 While that proposition may
be true, the law might also have the effect of dampening advertising
for deposit accounts, which could result in reduced competition
among banks. Bankers have an interest in preventing "advertising
wars" that bid up the interest rates on deposit accounts, as the costs of
runaway deposit competition could be crippling to the banking industry.113 In this way, the law. could benefit the banking industry as a
whole by keeping advertising within certain bounds, thereby reducing
unfettered competition for deposit accounts and helping to keep the
interest rates paid on deposit accounts at a manageable level.1l4
REGULATIONS: THE TRUTH IN LENDING AND EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNIlY LAws 10 (1985).
While scale economies have been obselVed in the area of regulatory compliance, whether
overall scales of economy exist eludes a definitive answer. Over the years, different studies
have reached different conclusions. One study suggests that where scales of economy exist,
they are not very significant. David B. Humphrey, Cost Dispersion and the Measurement of
Economies in Banking, EcoN. REv., May/June 1987, at 24 (published by the Federal ReselVe
Bank of Richmond). A more recent study found that economies of scale do exist, but that
the optimum size for a bank may be smaller than previously supposed. George M.
Bollenbacher, America's Banking Dinosaurs, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 1992, at A8.
109. ELLIEI-IAUSEN & KURTZ, supra note 108, at 6; Humphrey, supra note 108, at 32;
Bollenbacher, supra note 108, at A8. How significant this difference in cost of compliance
is remains an open question. See FRASER & KOLARl, supra note 39, at 128-31.
110. "Small" banks are defined as those institutions with less than $25 million in assets.
1989 Hearings, supra note 89, at 6 (statement of Martha Seger, Governor, Federal ReselVe
Board).
111. As the representative of one savings and loan noted during the hearings on Truth
in Savings, legislation that restricts the allegedly unfair practices of some banks benefits
other banks in the marketplace by leveling the playing field. 1984 Hearings, supra note 17,
at 16-17 (statement of Thomas G. Riley, Senior Vice President, Washington Federal Savings
and Loan).
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id.
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These unintended consequences l15 and shortcomings of Truth in
Savings directly result from the lack of a problem-solving methodology
in the development of the legislation. The drafter's failure to adopt a
problem-solving methodology led to the development of a statute with
no clear purpose and a legislative response with no clear target. As a
result, the law's effect may be to injure the very interest groups it was
intended to protect.
E.

The Failure to Consider Alternatives

The failure of the legislative process to identify specifically the problem to which Truth in Savings was addressed may be due, in part, to
the fact that the bill was cast from the start as a disclosure statute. The
bill's title, aspiring to "Truth," implies that the underlying problem
was something dealing with false or misleading information. The legislation, therefore, invited other participants in the legislative process
to assume a problem and not to examine rigorously the underlying
issues. 116 By linking the legislative solution to the problem from the
start of the legislative process, the energies of legislators and lobbyists
115. This discussion has assumed that the intended purposes of Truth in Savings are to
reduce deceptive advertising, level the playing field, and eliminate unfair interest
calculation practices. One could argue, however, that the consequences that I have
identified as "unintended" were in fact anticipated and planned for by the private interest
groups that supported or opposed the legislation.
116. The links between the problem identified and its proposed solution are subtle and
complex. Findings in the field of cognitive psychology show that people tend to organize
their knowledge into related groups, and, once a problem is framed, the problem itself
suggests the solution. See James F. Voss et aI., Individual Differences in the Solving of Social
Science Problems, in INDMDUAL DIFFERENCES IN COGNITION 205, 228 (Ronna F. Dillon &
Ronald R. Schmeck eds., 1983) (finding that experts tend to spend more time defining the
problem at hand, but once problem is identified, only one or two solution sets emerge);
Judith Torney-Purta, Cognitive Representations of the Political System in Adolescents: The
Continuum from Pre-Novice to Expert, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL UNDERSTANDING: A
NEW PERSPECTIVE 11,22-23 (Helen Haste &Judith Torney-Purta eds., 1992) (noting similar
phenomenon to Voss et aI., supra, that experts developed more sophisticated problem,
which led to specific solutions); see also Farber, supra note 9, at 554-58 (expressing view that
cognitive psychology supports the position that "practical reason" exists and provides the
framework for how people do in fact make decisions); if. Anthony Palasota, Expertise and the
Law: Some Recent Findings from the Cognitive Sciences About Complex Human Information
Processing, 16 T. MARsHALL L. REv. 599 (1991) (discussing cognitive psychology in the
context of legal pedagogy); Richard L. Roe, Valuing Student Speech: The Work of the Schools as
Conceptual Development, 79 CAL. L. REv. 1271, 1292-1301 (1991) (discussing cognitive
psychology in the context of the learning process).
The natural tendency to link the problem and the solution, however, may prevent the
consideration of alternative solutions. The way a bill is characterized (for example, "Truth
in _") by tradition and conditioning suggests a particular approach to the underlying
problem (for example, a comprehensive disclosure statute). In the design of legislation as
in the design of any other artifact, however, function does not dictate form. PETROSKI,
supra note 13, at 174-75; Eugene S. Ferguson, The Mind's Eye: Nonverbal Thought in
Technology, 197 ScIENCE 827 (1977). The legislative problem solver must be careful to
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alike tended to focus on the solution proposed, rather than the problem to be corrected. 117
The link between text and problem tends to develop a legislative
response that does not necessarily address the underlying problems,
but rather focuses on passage of the bill as the goal of the legislative
process. 11S In the case of Truth in Savings, the link between problem
and solution prevented Congress from considering alternative legislative responses. Ai; Professor Rubin commented in connection with
the development of Truth in Lending, the many alternative solutions
to the problem "were simply beyond the conceptual horizon of the
drafters because there was no methodology for identifying the statute's goals and separately evaluating its techniques."1l9 If the issues
presented by the proponents of Truth in Savings had been reduced to
specific problems and separated from the language of a specific legislative proposal, the lawmakers could have given serious consideration
to a number of options, including the following:

1.

Defer to Regulators

Depending on what problem they decided the law was intended to
address, the legislators could have concluded that the administrative
agencies charged with regulating our nation's banks had the situation
under control and deferred to their expertise. 120 Courts often defer
to agency expertise,121 even though some commentators have questioned the value of the supposed independence and expertise of regulators.122 In some situations, congressional deference to agencies may
be appropriate as well, especially in highly regulated areas where the
frame the problem completely yet flexibly in order to consider all workable solutions and
not to exclude some inadvertently.
117. Rubin, supra note I, at 295.
118. Sometimes the problem being corrected by Congress appears to be the mere
absence of the proposed legislation. This view, however, does not comport with a problemsolving approach to legislation; rather, it suggests that the passage of the legislation itself,
rather than the correction of an underlying problem, is the object of the legislative
process. See Seidman, supra note 5, at 63 ("To state the absence of a proposed solution as a
cause transforms problem-solving into an ends-means methodology.").
119. Rubin, supra note I, at 289.
120. The federal banking regulators had already promulgated regulations dealing with
some issues raised by the proponents of the Truth in Savings Act. See supra notes 41-43 and
accompanying text.
121. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984);
Maureen B. Callahan, Must Federal Courts Defer to Agency Interpretations of Statutes?: A New
Doctrinal Basis for Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 1991 WIS. L. REv.
1275.
122. See, e.g., Lloyd N. Cutler & David R. Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84
YALE LJ. 1395, 1402-09 (1975); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government:
Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573 (1984).
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responsibility for the development of a coherent regulatory strategy
rests with a particular regulatory agency.123
Although the regulations in effect before the enactment of Truth in
Savings were primarily directed at advertising,· the Federal Reserve
Board had interpreted its regulations to address other perceived issues in the bank-depositor relationship, as well.l 24 With appropriate
direction from Congress, perhaps in the form of ajoint resolution, all
of the federal banking regulators might have been persuaded to adopt
similar interpretations. Even without those additional regulatory interpretations, however, the fact that the Federal Reserve Board had
taken the steps it did meant that as of June 1990, 40.7 percent of all
banks in the country-controlling 76.2 percent of all bank assetsalready were effectively covered by regulations aimed at the issues covered under Truth in Savings. 125

2.

Target Specific Practices

Rather than imposing an ongoing, costly requirement of comprehensive disclosure, Congress could have identified the underlying specific practices that the witnesses found oppressive and made those
practices illegal. Truth in Savings effectively adopted this approach
with regard to the investable balance method of interest rate calculation. 126 Proponents of the bill, however, did riot favor the approach
of specifying particular methods of calculation that would be unac123. Cf Helen A. Garten, Regulatory Growing Pains: A Perspective on Bank Regulation in a
Deregulatory Age, 57 FORDHAM L. REv. 501, 568-77 (1989) (exploring the transition of
banking regulation from a set of prophylactic prohibitions to a set of prudential
restrictions and the challenges of banking regulators to adapt the regulatory changes to
the realities of the banking marketplace).
124. The Federal Reserve interpreted its regulations to require that member banks: (1)
disclose to the depositor at the time the account is opened the method to be used in
paying interest; and (2) that depositors be given notice of any changes that adversely affect
the calculation of interest. Disclosure-Computation of Interest, 1 Fed. Reserve Reg. Servo pt.
2-420 (Apr. 1982) (Board interpretation), available in LEXIS, Banking Library, FRRS File;
Contract Terms, 1 Fed. Reserve Reg. Servo pt. 2-514 (Apr. 1989) (staff opinion of Sept. 21,
1979), available in LEXIS, Banking Library, FRRS File; Disclosure-Reduction of Interest Rate,
1 Fed. Reserve Reg. Servo pt. 2-523.1 (Apr. 1989) (staff opinion of Dec. 15, 1981), available
in LEXIS, Banking Library, FRRS File. In addition, the Federal Reserve outlawed so-called
"teaser" rates by considering the advertising of an account with an annual rate of simple
interest that exceeds its average effective yield to be inaccurate, misleading, and
misrepresentative of the deposit contract. Advertising-Time Deposits Not Subject to Interest
Rate Limitations, 1 Fed. Reserve Reg. Servo pt. 2-41l.1 (July 1982) (Board interpretation),
available in LEXIS, Banking Library, FRRS File; Advertising-Multiple-Rate Time Deposits and
IRAs, 1 Fed. Reserve Reg. Servo pt. 2-411.3 (May 1984) (policy statement of Mar. 22, 1984),
available in LEXIS, Banking Library, FRRS File.
125. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM XIX-2 (1991),
reprinted in Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1377, at XIX-2 (Feb. 14, 1991) (giving
statistics for banks in the United States).
126. Truth in Savings Act, § 267, 12 U.S.C. § 4307 (Supp. V 1993).
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ceptable because they believed banks would be able to avoid the dictates of the law. 127 Given the reluctance of the bill's supporters to
agree to that approach, therefore, Congress could have mandated certain business practices, such as specific methods of interest calculation, in order to alleviate the problem. In fact, although opposed by
the banking industry, this approach actually was considered, but was
later rejected when H.R. 6 was combined with H.R. 447 to form H.R.
2654, the bill that eventually became Truth in Savings. 128 In the end,
neither approach was adopted, again illustrating that the bill did not
address a specific problem.
3.

Create a Consumer Education Program

Most of the issues raised in the testimony flowed from the larger
problem that consumers were relatively unsophisticated about financial matters and were being taken advantage of by banks. If lack of
sophistication was the underlying problem, however, and the issues
complained of in connection with Truth in Savings were but symptoms, Congress could have developed the sophistication of the public
with regard to the consumption of financial services. Although one
could argue that a disclosure statute performs the function of making
consumers more sophisticated, in practice, disclosure alone will not
benefit unsophisticated consumers. 129 Unless the information disclosed is delivered to the consumer in a manner he or she will understand, the disclosure statute will have no effect.I3o In order to correct
this problem, therefore, Congress could have entertained the policy
option of devising ways to increase customer sophistication. As one
method, for instance, Congress could have created a program of consumer education courses in our nation's schools.
4.

Develop a Government Rating System

If increasing customer sophistication represented an unachievable
end, Congress could have devised a way to communicate the relative
127. See 1991 Hearings, supra note 53, at 17 (statement of Edmund Mierzwinski, U.S.
Public Interest Research Group) ("And if you simply prohibit specifically, for example, the
low balance method, the smart counsel for a bank will inform his or her operations staff,
calculate interest on the next to low balance.").
128. See supra note 87. Although the prescribed interest calculation method had been
considered, its relative merits in light of the goals of the statute were never explicitly
discussed in the hearings.
.
129. See supra notes 63-73 and accompanying text.
130. STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITs REFORM 163 (1982); Craswell, supra note 69,
at 690-91; Sovern, supra note 68, at 25-27; Sunstein, supra note 69, at 424-25. While this
point seems obvious, disclosure statutes are enacted with little discussion of whether the
required disclosure will end up in the hands of a consumer who can actually understand
and act on the information.
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fairness of banking practices that eliminated the need for customer
sophistication. The legislators might have opted to digest the relevant
information for the people and develop a government-sponsored rating system that would let even the most unsophisticated bank customer understand whether his or her bank was offering a fair deal.l3l

5.

Foster Industry Self-Regulation

Although heavily regulated industries historically have not been especially effective self-policers,132 Congress could have devised a system
to encourage self-policing in accordance with strict guidelines. In
fact, the banking industry had considered taking the initiative to enact
a proposed self-policing mechanism in the early 1980s. 133 Although
the banking industry missed that opportunity, Congress could have
enacted legislation creating incentives for the industry to self-regulate. 1M Creating incentives for self-regulation might prove a meaningful method for Congress to provide more flexible and responsive
regulation. 135

6.

Foster Citizen Oversight

Yet another approach might have been for the government to sanction the creation of a system of citizens' banking and insurance
boards. 136 These boards could have served as "watchdogs" over the
financial services industry and warned customers of abusive
practices. 137
Instead of considering any of these options, however, Truth in Savings marched through its twenty-three year journey as a disclosure
131. Professor Rubin suggested the possibility of such a scheme. Rubin, supra note 1, at
289.
132. HELEN A. GARTEN, WHY BANKING REGULATION FAILED 151-52 (1991). Although, in
general, highly regulated industries have not proven to be adept at self-regulation,
exceptions to the general rule exist. The securities industry provides an example of a
heavily regulated industry that nevertheless polices itself. IAN AYRES &JOHN BRAITHWAITE,
RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING'THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 104 (1992).
133. The plan would have called for banks belonging to the American Bankers
Association to contribute to fund an industry-run advertising enforcement agency. Alice
Arvan, Promise-the Moon IRA Ads: Trouble Ahead, AM. BANKER, Feb. 16, 1982, at 9.
134. Recently, the state of Texas passed legislation creating incentives for its chemical
industry to voluntarily comply with the stringent guidelines of the Texas hazardous waste
law. All Things Considered (National Public Radio broadcast, Dec. 28, 1992) (transcript on
file with author).
135. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 132, at 101-32; CHARLES L. SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC
USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST 13 (1977).
136. An article in American Banker, the newspaper of record for the banking industry,
discussed the possibility of such boards. Deregulation Has Potential for Consumer Confusion,
Abuse, AM. BANKER, July 12, 1983, at 6.
137. In the chartering legislation, Congress could have given the boards the, right to
include notices in regular mailings of financial institutions. See id. at 8.
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statute. The fact that the disclosure approach might not be effective,138 that it clashed with the banking regulators' agenda ofreducing
the regulatory burden,139 and that the regulators of banking's chief
competitor-the mutual fund industry-were proposing to require
even less disclosure,140 had no effect on the evolution of the legislation. Truth in Savings went through the process as if in a vacuum;
exogenous factors could not change its basic approach. It could only
be fine-tuned by reference to its own provisions.
What a statute aims to do and how it aims to do it are closely related, but different, questions. Different problems call for different
solutions. By not clearly defining what problem Truth in Savings
sought to address, Congress could not have chosen among the various
policy options available, even if it had identified those options. While
more rigorous problem framing and methodology will not guarantee
a statute's effectiveness, poor problem framing and methodology
makes failure likely.

II.

FLAWS IN THE PROBLEM-SOLVING METHODOLOGY

If the goal of legislation is to solve problems,141 the legislative
drafter should adopt a problem-solving methodology. Problem solving, though one of the most basic human activities, remains a poorly
understood process. 142 While we remain in the dark about the process by which individuals solve problems, the process by which groups
solve problems presents an even more difficult subject of study. 143 Despite our collective ignorance of how both groups and individuals
138. BREYER, supra note 130, at 162; Craswell, supra note 69, at 690-91; Sunstein, supra
note 69, at 424-25.
139. 1991 Hearings, supra note 53, at 57 (statement of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System); 1989 Hearings, supra note 89, at 5-6 (statement of Martha Seger,
Governor, Federal Reserve Board).
140. Mutual fund shares are securities and, as such, may only be purchased after the
purchaser has obtained a prospectus from the fund. The prospectus contains a great deal
of information, but-as a practical matter-is only a formality, as the investment gets sold
through advertisements or brokers. Recognizing the hollow nature of the prospectus
requirement, the SEC supports a change in the mutual fund rules to allow no-load mutual
funds to sell shares with clip out coupons in newspapers and magazines. Claudia
Cummins, SEC Policy Likely to Support Mutual Fund Innovations, BANKING WK., Jan. II, 1993,
at 11.
141. For a response to the criticism that legislation is not concerned with solving
problems, see infra notes 149-73 and accompanying text.
142. Although no one completely understands the problem-solving process, various
researchers have given the topic considerable thought. For a utility-maximizing approach,
see SHAUN H. HEAP ET AL., THE THEORY OF CHOICE: A CRITICAL GUIDE 36-50 (1992). For a
perspective from the field of cognitive psychology, see Torney-Purta, supra note 116; Voss
et aI., supra note 116.
143. For a general discussion of the differences between individual and collective
choice, see HEAP ET AL., supra note 142. at 199-216.
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solve problems, however, intuition and logic suggest that the first step
in any problem-solving methodology should be to identify the
problem. 144
As currently structured, the legislative process does not necessarily
begin by identifying and defining the problem to be corrected.
Although the sources of legislation are too numerous to make a general statement,145 a significant number of bills evolve in a manner similar to the path followed by Truth in Savings. In this mode of
legislative development, Congress essentially starts with a solution in
the form of a bill. The existence of that bill in the legislative process
causes a series of events to take place, including the holding of subcommittee hearings to clarify the issues and discuss the pros and cons
of the proposed legislation. 146 When Congress operates in this man-·
ner, it in effect puts the cart before the horse by considering the solution (in the form of the proposed bill) before it has fully investigated
the problem (through the he,aring process). With the solution in
hand before the problem has been fully analyzed, Congress fails to get
the problem-solving process off on the right foot. 147
As the following discussion illustrates, even if Congress wanted to
engage in rigorous problem framing, however, political and structural
impediments might prevent it from doing so. Professor Robert Seidman has persuasively argued that an effective problem-solving methodology requires the problem framer to separate facts from values, to
144. This intuitive step is supported by the two other works that have specifically
addressed the challenges of legislative methodology. See Rubin, supra note I, at 285-86
("The proper starting point for the design of effective legislation is an issue, not a bill.");
Seidman, supra note 5, at 5 ("Following a four-part problem-solving methodology, the
memorandum first ought to specify the behavior constituting the social problem at which
the legislation aims.... "). In addition, material dealing with drafting legislation starts with
identification of the jlroblems. See HIRSCH, supra note 12, § 1.1, at 2; Purdy, supra note 19,
at 99-100.
.
145. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
146. In some circumstances administrative agencies, executive branch departments, or
knowledgeable committee staffers prepare legislation after a thorough policy analysis.
Under another scenario, a bill may be drafted with the assistance of policy analysis
prepared by the General Accounting Office or the Office of Technology Assessment.
There are other ways that bills evolve as well, see supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text,
but many of the bills taken up by Congress came into being in a way similar to the path
taken by Truth in Savings.
147. When legislation in the Truth in Savings mode is subjected to the problem-framing
step at all, the task appears to fall on the shoulders of the legislative drafter. FILSON, supra
note 12, at 31-36; HIRSCH, supra note 12, § 1.1, at 2; Purdy, supra note 19, at 98-100.
Legislative drafters (usually someone other than the elected representative), for their part,
often find that they have no trouble grasping the problem because the sponsor of the
legislation has instructed them what the problem is and what the bill should a.im to do.
FILSON, supra note 12, at 31. As a result, the drafter expends remarkably little effort on
what should be the most important aspect of the drafting process-problem identification.
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adopt a sophisticated model of the real world, and to address causes
rather than conditions. 148 Political realities may prevent attaining
these conditions. In addition, problem framing may not receive· the
attention it deserves due to the failure to appreciate the power the
problem framer possesses in the legislative process.
Before considering the elements that affect the problem-identification process, however, I must first address an underlying premise of
this discussion, which until this point has been assumed: that legislation serves a problem-solving function. This Article proceeds on the
belief that the purpose of legislation is to solve problems. Not all
readers, however, will subscribe to a similar belief. Therefore, before
dealing with the failure of problem identification, a discussion of the
role of problem solving in the legislative project is in order.
A.

The Role of Problem Solving in the Legislative Project

The belief that legislatures exist to solve social problems is not an
immutable and universal truth. Empirical evidence shows that Congress often proposes or passes pieces of legislation that have nothing
to do with solving problems, but rather are merely political statements. 149 Putting aside obvious political statements, however, some
people might characterize the legislative project not as an exercise in
problem solving, but rather as an effort to effect a wealth transfer
from one group to another. 150
148. These three requirements for effective problem identification are drawn from
Professor Seidman's discussion of the philosophical beliefs to which legislative drafters
must subscribe in order to be effective. Seidman, supra note 5, at 32.
149. A significant percentage of all bills placed in the legislative hopper do not seriously
attempt to solve perceived social problems, or even to do the bidding of interest groups,
but rather serve only as a way for a representative to attract publicity, or to go on record as
a proponent or opponent of a particular idea. WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL
PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 83 (3d ed. 1989). In addition, members of Congress
spend a great deal of time and energy passing specialty biI1s for constituents, such as
"commemorative" legislation establishing National Grapefruit Month. See Helen Dewar, A
Day (or Month or Year) in the Sun: "Commemoratives" Accounted for Much of Legislation Enacted
in '91, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 1992, at A15. The scope of this nonsubstantive legislative
activity boggles the mind. In 1977, four percent of all laws enacted were commemoratives.
How CONGRESS WORKS 43 (Mary W. Cohn ed., 2d ed. 1991). By 1985, the percentage of
commemoratives had increased to 59% of all public laws enacted by Congress. 1d. Even
given Congress' recent tendency to enact fewer but more massive public laws, this increase
is startling.
150. This position is taken by many scholars who operate within the loosely knit group
of public choice theorists. See Tollison, supra note 31. Stating a general theory of public
choice is impossible because there are many variations on the set of core principles that
have inspired many of the scholars. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAw AND
PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 21-33 (1991);Jerry L. Mashaw, The Economics of
Politics and the Understanding of Public Law, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 123, 143 (1989).
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The recognition that legislatures are influenced to a significant degree by organized interest groups and other factors has led to the development of "public choice" theories of legislative behavior in the
political science, economics, and legal fields. I51 A "public choice"
model of legislation most often refers to one of the several economic
models of legislation that have been proposed over the years, or, more
frequently, to an amalgam of those various theories. I52 In their simplest form, the economic models depict legislation as a product sold
in a market by legislators to interest groups in exchange for money or
votes. I53 In a more sophisticated form, the economic model places
legislators in the thick of the market, where they act as brokers of
wealth transfer from one group to another. I54
151. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L.
REv. 873, 883 (1987). Much of the theoretical work relates to organization theory and
group decisionmaking. A significant school of thought within the movement owes much
to the work of Kenneth Arrow, who developed the famous theorem that bears his name.
Arrow's Theorem holds that, under certain conditions, it is impossible to aggregate the
preferences of a given group because the way in which voting is conducted could result in
an infinite cycling of choices. See id. at 902. For a useful summary of Arrow's Theorem and
its larger implications, see HEAP ET AL., supra note 142, at 209-15. Despite being thoughtprovoking and insightful, Arrow's Theorem does not serve as the foundation for the model
of legislative behavior most frequently referred to as the "public choice" model. Farber &
Frickey, supra, at 904-06. Instead, the "public choice" theory of common parlance derives
from the application of economic principles to the political process .. I have gathered some
of the common threads of the various versions of the economic public choice theory for
discussion here.
152. Economic models of legislation have been in existence at least since the late
eighteenth century, but the most recent wave of theories trace their roots to the 1950s.
Mashaw, supra note 150, at 124. While the economic model possesses great power to
explain how statutes get passed, scholars have debated whether a world view dominated by
bargaining interest groups and excluding higher values runs the risk of becoming morally
impoverished and ultimately politically illegitimate. See, e.g., Geoffrey Brennan &James M.
Buchanan, Is Public Choice Immoral? The Case for the "Nobel" Lie, 74 VA. L. REv. 179, 180
(1988); Daniel A. Farber, Democracy and Disgust: Reflections on Public Choice, 65 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 161 (1989); Farber & Frickey, supra note 151, at 906-24; Mashaw, supra note 150.
153. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 496-99 (3d ed. 1986).
154. Tollison, supra note 31, at 343. Although the legislative process may be seen as an
economic transaction, it cannot be compared to such straightforward economic
transactions as, say, buying a major appliance, because the groups that bargain for the
legislation usually cannot take immediate delivery. While the economic theory of
legislation casts legislators as brokers of legislatively enforced wealth transfers, id., it is an
odd kind of brokerage arrangement because legislators get paid their commission even if
they do not deliver the legislative product. The political system allows the sponsors of bills
to return to interest groups and say, "I'm working hard for the passage of that law, but
special interests, or the committee chair, or the other party have blocked its progress."
How CoNGRESS WORKS, supra note 149, at 42-43. In exchange for the representative's
efforts (not necessarily his or her results), the group will pay with political or financial
support. R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 71 (1990). At some
point, however, the sponsor has to deliver the legislative product or run the risk of
appearing ineffectual. Finding the right time to get the bill passed presents a tricky
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Truth in Savings can be analyzed as an example of legislation as
brokered wealth transfer. The legislation calls for a wealth transfer
from banks to their customers. Proponents of Truth in Savings admitted that the bill was intended to cause just such a wealth transfer. I55
In the public choice view, Truth in Savings shifts the cost of deciphering information from the unsophisticated depositor to the bank.
In exchange for that transfer, various members of Congress extract a
commission in the form of additional political or financial support
from the consumer lobby.I56
While the history of Truth in Savings can be interpreted through
the public choice model of legislation, the public choice view is not
the only way to look at legislative behavior. The public choice model's
primary modern intellectual counterweight is the neo-republican
model. 157 Justifying Truth in Savings in the language of the neo-recalculation because it is in the legislator's self-interest to extract continuing support from
the affected groups by having the bill come up in session after session.
155. In the words of Dr. Richard L.D. Morse. long-time advocate for comprehensive
deposit account disclosure: "The cost of explaining these complexities [of methods of
interest calculation) will [after the enactment of Truth in Savings) become part of the cost
considerations which the bank should calculate. Under the present law, the cost of
deciphering is borne totally by the unsophisticated depositor." 137 CONGo REc. H6758,
6762-64 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1991).
156. Of course. under the public choice theory of legislation, a wealth transfer that
benefits one group will result in a decrease in the wealth of another group. RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 354-55 (1990). The group from whom the
wealth transfer is to be taken will resist the transfer and spend resources to prevent its
occurrence. [d. If the rent-seeking group demanding the wealth transfer and the group
from whom the transfer will be extracted are equally well-organized. the transfer will not
occur. [d. The brokered wealth transfer will occur only if the constituency from whom the
transfer is taken perceives the costs of opposing the transfer to outweigh the costs of
allowing the transfer to take place. Tollison. supra note 31. at 343-44. In the case of Truth
in Savings. the group from whom the wealth transfer was being extracted-the banking
industry-did not fight the enactment of the law very strenuously, perhaps because it
sensed long-term benefits would outweigh the short-term costs. or perhaps because many
banks were already providing the disclosures required by Truth in Savings as required by
state law or existing federal regulation, or perhaps because in that session of Congress the
banking industry had more important issues on which it needed to spend its political
capital. Truth in Savings was one small part of a very large bill. the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991. Pub. L. lO2-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified
as amended in various sections of 12 U.S.C.). The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act (FDICIA) contained many provisions that affected the business of
banking much more profoundly than Truth in Savings, such as strengthened capital
requirements. deposit insurance reform and new enforcement powers for regulators.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act, § 305.12 U.S.C. § 18280 (Supp.
IV 1992); id. § 311,12 U.S.C. § 1821 (Supp. IV 1992); id. § 307.12 U.S.C. § 1818 (Supp. IV
1992). In any event, the banking industry did not oppose the passage of Truth in Savings
as strongly as it might have.
157. In attempting a brief discussion of the "republican" model, one runs the risk of
over-simplifying the case, especially in light of the fact that there is not one republican
model, but many. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in
Constitutional Adjudication. 72 VA. L. REv. 543 (\986) (discussion of republicanism from
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publican modeP58 requires that we find Truth in Savings to be a public-regarding solution to a community problem, the identification and
solution of which came about through public-spirited deliberation.
Because the neo-republican model is best viewed as an aspirational,159
rather than a descriptive, model of legislative behavior, it should not
be surprising that in its particulars the process by which Truth .in Savings was adopted fell short of the neo-republican mode1. 160
feminist point of view). For a history of the republican tradition, see J.G.A. POCOCK, THE
MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REpUBLICAN
TRADITION (1975); Daniel T. Rodgers, Republicanism: The Career of a Concept, 79 J. AM. HIST.
11 (1992). What follows, however, is a discussion of those elements that seem to form the
paradigm of "neo-republicanism," which attempts to update traditional republicanism into
a form more consistent with modern sensibilities. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the
Republican Revival, 97 YALE LJ. 1539, 1547-58 (1988).
158. The following discussion of the neo-republican view of legislative behavior rests on
the four foundational principles of citizenship, political equality, problem solving for the
common good, and deliberation articulated by Professor Sunstein. See Sunstein, supra note
157.
159. Although the republican model has been used to describe how legislatures work, at
least in part, see, e.g., Allan W. Vestal, Public Choice, Public Interest, and the Soft Drink Interbrand
Competition Act: Time to Derail the "Root Beer Express"?, 34 WM. & MARy L. REv. 337, 354-60
(1993), it is not well-suited as a descriptive model. Instead, the republican model serves
better as an aspirational model that provides guidance and direction. As Professor
Sunstein points out, "The republican belief in deliberation is aspirational and critical
rather than celebratory and descriptive .... Modern republicans do not claim that existing
systems actually embody republican deliberation." Sunstein, supra note 157, at 1549.
160. First, the neo-republican model holds as a fundamental assumption the idea that
political power comes from the community. Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate Revival of Civic
Republicanism, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 801, 811-833 (1993); Sunstein, supra note 157, at 1555-58.
The rights of citizens to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness-together with their
concomitant responsibilities to participate in the political process-playa central role in
the lawmaking process. Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE LJ. 1493, 1503-04
(1988) [hereinafter Michelman, Republic]. (In actuality, however, laws are far more likely to
originate in the offices of elected officials or at administrative agencies than from
constituent requests. FILSON, supra note 12, at 29.) Truth in Savings clearly lacks this neorepublican attribute. The real impetus behind Truth in Savings was not a general public
outcry. In fact, during the hearings on the bill, Congressman Thomas commented on the
lack of such public concern. 1991 Hearings, supra note 53, at 2. Instead, from 1984 on, the
bill owed its existence to the personal motivation of Representative Richard Lehman of
California, the self-acknowledged "godfather" of Truth in Savings. Id. at 3. Representative
Lehman testified that he introduced the 1984 version of the Truth in Savings bill "after
noticing a great number of ... misleading advertisements in newspapers, magazines, and
even on billboards on the side of the road." 1984 Hearings, supra note 17, at 5. Far from
being an expression of the popular will, this legislative act was the ultimate paternalistic
measure.
A second key element of the neo-republican ideal is that the people and their
representatives have access to the political process and participate in that process in a
meaningful way. The neo-republican model posits that all citizens have equal access to the
political machinery. Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L.
REv. 4, 27 (1986) [hereinafter Michelman, Foreward]; Sunstein, supra note 157, at 1552-53.
Similarly, their political representatives play meaningful and valuable roles in the political
process within Congress. Under the neo-republican model, a representative's position in
the legislature (that is, seniority, party affiliation, committee assignment) should not
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influence his or her effectiveness because he or she, too, is one among many political
equals. The history of Truth in Savings also lacks this second key element. As noted above,
Truth in Savings was not a major concern for the people. They may have had access to the
political system regarding the issue, but they did not use it. Moreover, the political
representatives of the people did not playa truly meaningful role in the process either. See
infra notes 225-42 and accompanying text. Although the neo-republican ideal aspires to
the concept of political equality, see Michelman, Republic, supra, at 27; Sunstein, supra note
157, at 1552-53, reality forces us to recognize that all representatives are not created
equal-some have more talent than others, some have more seniority, some have better
committee assignments; they do not enjoy equal power. Tollison, supra note 31, at 353-54.
The third element of neo-republicanism calls for the legislature to address problems for
the common good. Fallon, supra note 31, at 1698; Michelman, Foreward, supra, at 1503-04.
It holds that at least some problems can be addressed with "substantively right answers" for
the public good without regard to political ideology or individual preferences. Sunstein,
supra note 157, at 1541. As we have seen, however, Congress did not in any rigorous way
attempt to identify exactly what problem Truth in Savings was supposed to address. One
might argue that, on its face, the statute should be considered for the common good
because it obviously addresses the noble social goal of consumer protection. This assertion
is the strongest neo-republican argument justifying Truth in Savings, and on the most
superficial level, it seems consistent with the neo-republican ideal. On a deeper level,
however, the broad purpose of consumer protection does not tell us much about the
specific problem the legislation was intended to address or how that problem relates to the
common good.
Finally, the fourth and most vital element of the neo-republican model is public-spirited
deliberation. The concept of deliberation occupies a paramount position in the neorepublican model. Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv.
29,45-48 (1985). The theory holds that civic virtue motivates lawmakers to deliberate and
reach the best conclusion consistent with the common good. Sunstein, supra note 157, at
1548-51. Once again, Truth in Savings also lacks this element of the neo-republican
model. The debates and hearings relating to Truth in Savings over the years are devoid of
true deliberation. When Congress held hearings on the proposed Truth in Savings
legislation, most of the persons testifying represented consumer groups. See 1991 Hearings,
supra note 53; 1989 Hearings, supra note 89; 1984 Hearings, supra note 17. The groups
uniformly supported the proposed legislation, although many tried to make the case for
even more extensive disclosure. See, e.g., 1991 Hearings, supra note 53, at 53 (testimony of
Edmund Mierwinski). In some cases, the banking lobby did not ev~n appear before the
committee, but merely sent a letter to the committee registering dissent. 1989 Hearings,
supra note 89, at 81; 1984 Hearings, supra note 17, at 174. In addition to the banking
industry, the various federal banking regulators voiced their opposition to the legislation.
See, e.g., H.R. 5094 REpORT, supra note 82, at 407, 412, reprinted in Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) No. 1245, at 407, 412. The federal regulators believed the then-existing federal
regulations, see 12 C.F.R. §§ 217.6, 329.3, 563.27. (1992), already offered the protection
sought by the proponentl! of Truth in Savings. 1991 Hearings, supra note 53, at 55
(statement of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System). The regulators also
warned that additional regulatory requirements on the banking industry would be harmful
both to the industry and its customers. 1d. at 56 (statement of the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System); 1989 Hearings, supra note 89, at 4 (testimony of Martha Seger,
Governor, Federal Reserve Board); H.R. 5094 REpORT, supra note 82, at 406-07 (testimony
of L. William Seidman, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation), reprinted in
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1245, at 406-07. Yet, despite comments from the
regulatory experts that the regulation was unnecessary, and despite the admission by the
chief consumer group that its study of rising consumer banking costs was unscientific, CFA
Study, supra note 52, the committee's published proceedings provide little evidence of any
meaningful deliberation over how much deference to pay to the regulatory agencies or
how much credence to give the consumer group's statistics. The failure to engage in a
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The experience of the Truth in Savings Act and much recent scholarship tells us that more is going on in the legislative process than can
be explained by the neo-republican model. 161 Yet, at the same time,
the public choice model also fails to provide a complete explanation
of how laws are enacted. 162 Although Congress sometimes enacts obdialogue with the regulatory agencies not only pays short shrift to the neo-republican ideal,
it also provides an unfortunate example of the lack of coordination between the legislative
branch and the regulatory agencies concerning strategies for regulatory implementation.
See GARTEN, supra note 132, at 64-66.
The actual subcommittee debate in the year Truth in Savings finally passed was fairly
perfunctory. It consisted in large part of Representative Thomas of Wyoming (the most
junior member of the minority party) questioning whether the bill was reaily necessary.
1991 Hearings, supra note 53, at 2-3. Debate beyond the committee stage was virtually
nonexistent. The Congressional Record on the day the bill passed the House chronicles
glowing endorsements of the measure, with the only negative note being a concern that
the statute might "create another title in the 'Lawyers Full Employment Act.''' 137 CONGo
REc. H6758, 6762 (daily ed. Sept. 24,1991) (statement of Rep. McCandless). The lack of
debate should not come as a great surprise, as it is probable that few members of Congress
were aware what the bill contained. In reality, most members of Congress (other than the
committee members) probably never even read the Truth in Savings Act. According to
one member of Congress, surprisingly few members of Congress even have the chance to
read specific pieces of pending legislation. Symposium, supra note 1, at 9 (comments of
Rep. Christopher Cox).
161. See, e.g., jonathan R. Macey, The Missing Element in the Republican Revival, 97 YALE
LJ. 1673 (1988) ("[W]hat is missing from the republican revival is an appreciation of the
frightening power of man to subvert the offices of government for what can only be
described as evil ends."); see also Donald]. Boudreaux & Robert B. Ekelund,jr., The Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992: The Triumph of Private Over Public
Interest, 44 ALA. L. REv. 355 (1993).
.
162. One problem with the public choice approach is that it does not comport with
empirical evidence. For instance, contrary to what would be expected by public choice
theory, one research study found little evidence that PAC contributions influenced voting
behavior. In those situations where a correlation existed, the PAC contributions were
actually better seen as symptomatic of a more important and larger package of support for
the representative from the interest group. janet M. Grenzke, PACs and the Congressional
Supermarket: The Currency is Complex, 33 AM.]. OF POL. SCI. 1 (1989), reprinted in 8 THE
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1989 689 (Joel Silbey ed., 1991) [hereinafter
CONGRESS]; see also Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and
"Empirical" Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REv. 199,236-68 (1988).
Other scholars have criticized the methodology of the public choice approach as failing
to give weight to legitimate concerns about the public interest that legiSlators may have
had and instead constructing an ex post explanation for legislative behavior based on who
benefitted from the legislation. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 36, at 692 (criticizing the
public choice critique of the Glass-Steagall "wall" separating commercial and investment
banking as a bargain struck by special interest groups).
[T]he claims [of the public choice scholars] ... are based on deduction
rather than discovered fact: convinced there is no rational economic policy
to support a wall of separation between banking and the securities industry
... they conclude that the only possible alternative explanation is a skewing
of the political process by those who later turned out to be immense
beneficiaries of the statute.
Id.; see Rubin, supra note 9, at 5-31 (offering a comprehensive criticism of the public choice
movement and concluding that its focus on economic motivations, while providing the
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vious political bargains .into law as public choice theorists would predict,163 at other times it enacts laws that appear to benefit no
particular interest group.164
On close examination, therefore, neither model describes all legislative enactments. Because both models are incomplete, to look at
the actions of legislatures exclusively through one theoretical lens or
the other distorts one's perception. Instead of viewing legislative behavior as either "neo-republican" or "public choice," it may be more
profitable to visualize it as lying on a continuum, defined on one end
by the paradigmatic neo-republican model and at the other end by
the pure form of the economic public choice model. The explanation for most legislation would lie somewhere in between these two
extremes. Describing legislative behavior at either end of the spectrum presents little difficulty because we can merely invoke the language of either the neo-republican or the public choice paradigm, as
the case may be. In reality, however, very few pieces of legislation can
be completely explained solely in the language of either the public
choice or the neo-republican model. 165
While the two models seem incompatible, at least three ways
emerge in which they work together to shape legislative behavior: (1)
legislators must justify their actions in the language of the neo-republican model; (2) the public uses the neo-republican model as a standard against which to evaluate legislative behavior; and (3) individual
legislators may find inspiration in the ideals of the neo-republican
model.

1.

The Justification Role

The neo-republican model embodies our ideals and myths about
what we want our government to be. We have largely defined the legitimacy of political action in light of the model's foundational princibenefit of a simple model, distorts the legislative process by failing to consider that legislative behavior is more complex than a reelection-maximizing model countenances: "[Legislators] want to be re-elected, as they readily admit, but they also want to represent their
constituents' views, to make good public policy, and to be well-respected by their peers. All
these motivations are quite conscious, and none are overwhelming in their impact").
163. Some scholars have suggested that the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930 provides an
example of interest-group bargaining for legislation. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE,jR. & PHILIP
P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC
POLICY 40-46 (1988).
164. Examples of this type of legislation might include proposals to reduce the deficit or
to "reform" welfare. Some scholars maintain that even traditional economic regulation
cannot be entirely explained by the public choice model. See ARNOLD, supra note 154, at
224-61.
165. See ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 163, at 37-64; Boudreaux & Ekelund, supra note
161; Vestal, supra note 159.
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ples. 166 Those principles represent potent political ideals.
Representatives understand that the political legitimacy of their actions will be judged by their citizen constituents under a civics class
neo-republican model. Therefore, representatives understand that
they must justify their actions in terms of the neo-republican ideal. 167
While by no means an ironclad checking mechanism, the justification
function of the neo-republican model does impose some discipline on
the legislative process. 168 Although the flexibility of language allows
legislators a great deal of latitude in explaining their actions-enough
so that some actions taken solely for political or personal gain might
nevertheless be capable of rationalization using the general terms of
the neo-republican ideal-the language is not infinitely flexible. Actions incapable of justification will not survive scrutiny.
2.

Standard to Evaluate Legislative Behavior

In addition to its role in justifying legislative action, the neo-republican model can also provide a check on the public choice model if we
allow the models to exist side by side: one as aspiration, one as description. 169 If legislative action falls too far short of the ideals of the
166. The model of government by which most Americans judge the legitimacy of
governmental action is informed by the lessons learned in civics class. The civics class
model of legislative behavior shares the foundational principles of the republican model.
See supra notes 16, 158.
167. Seidman, supra note 5, at 7.
168. Despite the justification requirement, representatives can nevertheless invoke the
language of the republican model to disguise the fact that they are acting for political
purposes or on behalf of special interests. No representative ever publicly admits to taking
action purely for political purposes without regard to the common good. Similarly, no
representative would urge passage of a bill (or argue against it, as the case may be) on the
strength of the bald admission that powerful interest groups paid good money for it. All
opposition (and support, for that matter) for proposed legislation must be cloaked in the
language of public interest and common good. Sunstein, supra note 160, at 78 ("Requiring
justifications does not, to be sure, guarantee 'reasoned analysis' on the part of the
legislature. . . . But requiring justification does provide an important prophylactic
function.") .
169. The distinction between aspirational models and descriptive models raises some
conceptual problems. Many Americans regard the model of legislative behavior they
learned in civics class as a descriptive model, when it should really be understood as an
aspirational model-like the republican model developed by modern legal scholars.
Consequently, many Americans believe the civics class model describes how Congress does
work, instead of how it ought to work. Because of this confusion, our citizens have
encountered a great deal of difficulty rationalizing the actions they observe legislators
taking. When citizens see legislators behaving as the political beings they are instead of the
public-spirited beings required by the civics class model, they perceive the system to be
broken because it does not comport with their mental models.
The clash between the aspirational and the descriptive brings us back to Bismarck's
observation about sausage and legislation. Our aspirational model of sausage provides one
reason why we do not want to see sausage being manufactured: we want to believe that
sausage is meat. While this mental model of sausage holds some truth-sausage does
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neo-republican model, the people can discipline their representatives.
Appropriate discipline might include not voting for the incumbent at
reelection, spouting off on a call-in show, writing a letter to the editor,
or starting a recall petition. Political adversaries of the incumbent will
try to cast the incumbent's record in a light that raises concerns about
how closely actual behavior has approached the neo-republican ideal,
and the electorate will make the decision. 170
3.

Neo-Republican Model as Inspiration

The neo-republican model also serves as a source of inspiration to
individual legislators. Congressional representatives have been inculcated with the same values inherent in the civics class model of legislative behavior as the rest of mainstream America. Somewher.e in the
cores of their beings, legislative representatives believe the underlying
values of the neo-republican ideal are meaningful, and in some cases,
those values may inspire the representative to "do the right thing."171
In these ways, the two forces at the ends of the continuum-neorepublicanism and public choice-work on each and every legislative
act, not to their mutual exclusion, but rather in dynamic tension. In
some situations, congressional behavior lies close to the neo-republican end of the spectrum, and the resolution of community issues
through public-spirited deliberation is the activity it truly concerns itself with. As congressional action moves further from the neo-republican ideal, the goal of effecting wealth transfers from one interest
group t~ another may play an increasingly important role in the legislative process, but the need to justify the legislation in terms of the
public interest and the common good remains.
Given the dynamic tension between neo-republicanism and public
choice, the legislative process should conform (or at least appear to
conform) to the neo-republican model as much as possible. Moving
in that direction would serve the legislators' interests in at least two
ways. First, to the extent legislators themselves are frustrated republicontain meat-it certainly does not tell the whole story. If we saw sausage being made we
would see that it also contains fat, gristle, spices, filler, and unspeakably disgusting parts.
See 9 C.F.R. §§ 319.140-.182 (1993). It is not purely meat-it is at once something much
more and much less than meat. Similarly, the republican model of legislation holds as a
central belief, or at least a central aspiration, that legislators deliberate to solve problems
for the common good. While this belief holds some truth-many, perhaps most, members
of Congress probably believe that they are civic-minded representatives who want to do
what is best for the people they represent, see Symposium, supra note 1, at 43 (statement of
Rep. Barney Frank)-it does not tell the whole story either. The legislative process
involves interest group pressures, dealmaking, institutional politics, and many other
factors, along with at least some problem solving thrown in.
170. Cf ARNOLD, supra note 154, at 71-73.
171. Symposium. supra note 1. at 43 (statement of Rep. Barney Frank).
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cans, making the process comport with the neo-republican ideal is the
normatively right thing to do. Second, to the extent legislators are
also actors in the public choice model, a process that more closely
resembles the neo-republican model makes it easier to justify political
actions and to fend off political opponents.
To help keep the descriptive public choice model and the aspirational neo-republican model as closely aligned as possible, legislative
drafters should focus their attention on the problem~solving process.
Problem solving comports with both extremes of the legislative behavior continuum. The neo-republican paradigm holds as a fundamental
tenet the goal of solving problems for the common goOd. 172 At the
same time, the public choice paradigm also requires legislators to engage in problem solving, although the problem takes the form of devising an effective method to bring about a wealth transfer from one
group to another. 173 Therefore, at both ends of the spectrum, legislators must find effective means to solve problems.
Having established the central role of problem solving to the legislative project, I now turn to several obstacles that prevent effective problem framing in the legislative process. These obstacles include the
failure to candidly identify values and facts, the failure to adopt a sophisticated model of the real world, the failure to separate causes
from conditions, and the failure to appreciate the power of the problem framer in the legislative process.
B.

The Failure to Candidly Identify Values and Facts

As currently established, the legislative process erects formidable

obstacles to the problem-identification process. One of the greatest
obstacles comes from the failure of legislatures to grapple with the
interconnectedness of facts and values. Problems do not exist in the
abstract. They only exist with reference to a set of values that classifies
a given phenomena as problematic. Because everyone has their own
unique set-of values, the same phenomena may present a problem for
one person but not for another. 174 Therefore, one cannot identify a
problem without first identifying, implicitly or explicitly, the values
that are offended by the particular phenomenon at issue.
172. See supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 152-56 and accompanying text.

174. Take as an example one of the problems identified during the hearings about
Truth in Savings-the imbalance of power between banks and their customers. This
condition may present a problem if one sees the concentration of economic power in a few
large corporations as wrong. On the other hand, if one believes that the natural order of
things calls for a class of wealthy people to control the economy and to be responsible to
the masses under a notion of noblesse oblige. then the disparity in economic power presents
no problem whatsoever.
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Legislative drafters must struggle with this process every time they
address a problem. In some way, the legislative drafter must ask herself: "Under what set of values does the phenomenon complained of
constitute a 'problem'?" Because every legislator brings his or her
own meaning to the text of the bill,175 if the drafter wants the bill to
pass, she must craft the bill's text in such a way that, regardless of the
meaning individual legislators bring, a critical mass of legislators-applying their own sets of values-will consider the phenomenon a
problem that deserves attention.
Truth in Savings provides an example of the difficulty in candidly
identifying facts and values in the context of problem identification.
Although the legislative materials do not provide a specific place
where one may turn to discover the exact problem that Truth in Savings was intended to correct, the statute does contain a findings clause
that should shed some light on the problem being addressed.
Although the findings clause cannot be interpreted as speaking definitively about the purpose of the statute,176 it must convey some information about it.177 Truth in Savings makes the following findings:
SEC. 262(a) FINDINGs.-The Congress hereby finds that economic stability would be enhanced, competition between depository institutions would be improved, and the ability of the
consumer to make informed decisions regarding deposit accounts, and to verify accounts, would be strengthened if there
was uniformity in the disclosure of terms and conditions on
which interest is paid and fees are assessed in connection with
such accounts. 178
If we take the findings clause literally, the drafter has identified
three problems that existed prior to the enactment of Truth in Savings: (1) the economy was not as stable as it could be; (2) depository
institutions were not as competitive as they could be; and (3) consum175. When analyzing a bill, a legislator is like any actor who must interpret a written
text. The reader brings his or her own set of beliefs to the text and interacts with the text
to reach some meaning. The text does not determine the meaning the reader reaches, but
it plays an important role in the process. See Daniel C.K. Chow, A Pragmatic Model of Law,
67 WASH. L. REv. 755, 791-92 (1992).
176. See WILLIAM P. STATSKY, LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS AND DRAITING 168 (2d ed. 1984)
("The main danger is that [purpose clauses) will not accurately reflect what the legislature
did in the rest of the statute. The purpose clause, for example, may be underinclusive in
that it does not appear to cover everything in the statute."); see also DICKERSON, supra note
12, at 286; Hirsch, supra note 12, § 4.2, at 29-30.
177. Judges will consider the purpose clause when interpreting the law in order to
understand what purpose Congress intended the statute to achieve. STATSKY, supra note
176, at 98. At a minimum, the drafter who put the bill together must have had something
in mind as a problem when she set pen to paper. That is. she must have believed that a
required system of comprehensive account disclosure would accomplish something.
178. Truth in Savings Act, § 262(a), 12 U.S.C. § 4302(a) (Supp. V 1993).
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ers' ability to determine the true terms of their accounts was not as
easy as it might be. I79 While these official findings may provide some
evidence of what the drafter perceived the problem to be, they appear
to be at odds with the problems identified during the hearings. ISO
The legislative drafter likely was aware of the real problems of imbalance of bargaining power, deceptive advertising, and misleading
methods of computing interest identified by the proponents. Yet, instead of adopting those problems in the findings section, she chose to
describe the purpose of the bill as promoting economic stability, increased competition, and comparison shopping.
The disparity between the official findings and the real problems
evidences the drafter's efforts to translate the real problems into politically acceptable language. lSI The drafter phrased the findings clause
179. A moment's reflection on these problems, however, should give the reader pause.
Two of the goals-economic stability and the creation of competition-represent two of
the most intractable problems in economic theory. Certainly, the drafter did not believe
that Truth in Savings' disclosure requirement would correct these problems, although she
may have believed that the statute's requirements would move the economy closer to those
policy goals. While the first two goals are overly ambitious, the third goal, on the contrary,
seems quite humble. The third goal of the legislation is to assist consumers in comparison
shopping among banks for deposit accounts. The truly modest nature of the third goal
becomes all the more apparent when one considers the fact that the law does not apply to
. nonbank competitors for depositors' money, such as mutual funds or insurance
companies, Rae Mims, Fed Gears Up to Release Truth in Savings Regulations, ABA BANKERS
WKLY., Mar. 31, 1992, at 6; 1991 Hearings, supra note 53, at 29, 42-43 (testimony of The
Consumer Bankers Association and the American Banker's Association, respectively), and
does not even apply to similar nondeposit account products offered by banks, such as
mutual funds and repurchase agreements. The findings clause does not tell us why
consumers had difficulty comparison shopping before the law, nor does it tell us what
improved comparison shopping will achieve. It merely says that customers could not easily
comparison shop before, and now the law assists them in comparison shopping. Read
closely, the third goal really amounts to a shorthand statement of the law's substantive
provisions. See Rubin, supra note I, at 288.
180. See supra notes 32-54 and accompanying text.
181. There may be several ways to explain the disparity between the findings clause and
the problems raised during the hearings. One way to view the disparity is as conclusive
evidence that the drafter did not engage in an explicit 'problem-framing analysis, for if the
legislative drafter had conducted such an analysis, it would seem logical to memorialize it
in the findings clause of the statute. See Rubin, supra note I, at 289. From this
interpretation, one might infer the more extreme position that problem solving is not the
real purpose of the legislative effort. Such an interpretation, however, would fail to
address the dynamic tension between public choice and neo-republicanism that results in a
problem-solving exercise, or at least the appearance of one. See supra notes 161-73 and
accompanying text.
A second plausible explanation for the disparity is that the purpose of the findings
clause is not to describe the problem addressed by the legislation, but instead to lay a
foundation for federal jurisdiction. In a recent case from the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the lack of Commerce Clause language in the findings clause
of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, § 1702, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (Supp. IV 1992),
prevented the application of federal law to an act committed entirely within the state of
Texas. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1367-68 (5th Cir. 1993). In holding that
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without a congressional finding to the contrary, the act of carrying a gun into a Texas
school was not within the realm of the Commerce Clause, the court stated: "Neither the
act itself nor its legislative history reflect any congressional determination that the
possession denounced by section 922(q) is in any way related to interstate commerce or its
regulation, or, indeed, that Congress was exercising its powers under the Commerce
Clause." [d. at 1366. On the other hand, if Congress makes formal findings invoking its
power under the Commerce Clause, its enactments routinely will be upheld. See, e.g.,
EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 237 (1983) (upholding Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992»; FERC v. Mississippi, 456
U.S. 742, 754 (1982) (upholding Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-617,92 Stat. 3117 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.»; Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 271 (1981) (upholding
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.».
In fact, when Congress makes inroads on a substantive area of law traditionally within
the domain of the state, the drafter will often include a findings and purpose clause to
establish a rationale for the exercise of congressional power based on the Commerce
Clause. HIRSCH, supra note 12, § 4.2; MEHLMAN & GROSSMAN, supra note 12, at 49 ("[T]he
findings of fact may disclose the 'intrastate' nature of a regulation of commerce, thereby
alleviating potential problems in connection with federal preemption."). That cannot be
the case with regard to Truth in Savings, however, because the findings clause does not
invoke the magic words of the Commerce Clause or any other constitutional justification.
A third explanation for the disparity might be based on the assertion that the findings
clause does not address the problem, but rather serves a formal or traditional role in the
legislative process. In this view, the purpose clause plays a ceremonial role in the larger
drafting effort, but does not carry any legal significance, nor does it attempt to convey any
information about the law's substance. This view holds some validity. Certainly, findings
clauses lack legal force and often are written so broadly as to effectively lack meaning. See
DICKERSON, supra note 12, at 287 ("Who can make jurisprudential capital, for example, out
of a 329-word 'Declaration of National Environmental Policy' that ... says no more than
'Hurrah for Nature'?"); see also HIRSCH, supra note 12, § 4.2. That is not to say that all
findings and purposes clauses end up as meaningless generalities completely lacking in
candor. For example, the findings and purposes clause of the federal statute dealing with
restrictions on garnishment uses some fairly strong language condemning the practice of
garnishment: that garnishment "encourages the making of predatory extensions of credit,"
and "has frustrated the purposes" of bankruptcy law. 15 U.S.C. § 1671 (a) (1988) (emphasis
added). On the other hand, the mere fact of the findings clause's existence suggests it has
some meaning. A long-established rule of statutory construction states that a provision of a
statute will not be read to be without meaning. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v.
Whisnant, 387 F.2d 774, 778 (5th Cir. 1968) ("[I]t is not to be presumed that the legislature
intended any part of a statute to be without meaning."); Cooper v. Tazewell Square
Apartments, 577 F. Supp. 1483, 1487 (W.O. Va. 1984) ("[M]eaning [must] be given to each
word and phrase of the statute"); Triplett v. Azordegan, 421 F. Supp. 998, 1002 (N.D. Iowa
1976) ("[A] statute must be construed in such a fashion that no part of it is rendered
superfluous and it will not be presumed that a statute contains useless or meaningless
words.").
Finally, the meaning of the findings clause may be nothing more than an attempt to
justifY the law in the language of the nea-republican model. But it might also be
something more than that. If the findings clause served only as a blatant attempt to justify
the legislation, it could simply state: "The Congress finds that passage of this law will
address problems affecting the common good and will make the world a better place." A
findings clause this broad and platitudinous would truly lack meaning. But a truly
meaningless findings clause like the foregoing would be remarkable. In practice, findings
clauses end up somewhere between the truly meaningless broad statement and the truly
frank articulation of the proponents' problems. The Truth in Savings' findings clause
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of Truth in Savings this way because to do otherwise (that is, candidly
state the problems) would have been politically difficult. For instance,
to state the problem as bluntly as "banks have unfair economic power
over their customers" might not have been politically acceptablethat sounds too Marxist. Not enough legislators would have subscribed to the drafter's underlying normative foundation to explicitly
recognize that formulation as a problem. The relatively innocuous
statement that the legislation promotes comparison shopping, however, is fairly uncontroversial, if not somewhat misleading.
While watering down the problem to make it politically acceptable
may be a fact of political life,182 from the point of view of legislative
methodology, it gets the whole process off to a bad start. Lack of candor on the part of the legislative drafter weakens the entire legislative
process. 18S Without candor, the legal system can never be sure what
the real problem is that the law is supposed to correct. Legislators
cannot evaluate whether the legislative response called for in the bill
is an appropriate remedy. And, perhaps most importantly, we will
never know if the law was successful in correcting the problem if we
never knew what the real problem was.
In addition to the problems that lack of candor creates for legislative methodology, it raises other concerns as well. Intentionally obreflects this pattern. It contains a substantial degree of specificity, at least by comparison to
a truly broad statement. In addition, it appears on its face related to the substance of the
law. Therefore, assuming a modicum of candor on the part of the drafter, the findings
clause most likely suggests the reasons for the law's existence.
182. From a political point of view, an innocuous problem also carries with it the added
benefit of being unlikely to come back to haunt the legislator in the next election.
ARNOLD, supra note 154, at 71-73.
183. The su~ject of candor in the legal system has received extensive attention from
legal scholars examining the adjudication process. The scholarship reveals the benefits of
candor in the judicial process to be at least threefold: (1) candor establishes the .moral
authority of the bench and the public trust necessary for the judiciary to function, David L.
Shapiro, In Defense ofJudicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REv. 731, 736-37 (1987); (2) candor acts
as restraint on judicial power by requiring a reasoned response to a reasoned argument, id.
at 737-38; and (3) candor makes the law predictable by giving parties notice of the real
basis for a court's decision and allowing other courts to follow suit, Nicholas S. Zeppos,
Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 CEO. LJ. 353, 401 (1989).
Despite the purported benefits of candor in the adjudication process, however, it has not
been seen as a universally desirable goal in the adjudication process, and some scholars
suggest it may in fact be unobtainable. See, e.g., Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L.
REv. 296 (1990) (finding that there may be pragmatic reasons, such as creating the
appearance of judicial restraint or decreasing the search time for judges and lawyers, for
eschewing "introspective" candor and instead employing formalistic techniques of
adjudication); Zeppos, supra, at 409-12 (finding that true candor may be impossible
because judges may not have the self-awareness to identify what the "real" reasons are for
their decisions: "Until we put to rest doubts about our understanding of the judicial
decisionmaking process, the calls for judicial candor are premature, if not altogether
unrealistic. ").
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scuring the true purpose of a bill brings a measure of dishonesty into
the legislative process. IS4 In the great flurry of paper that swirls
around Congress, the vast majority of congressional representatives
know practically nothing about the bills on the calendar, except perhaps a rough idea of their stated purposes. Furthermore, most members of Congress likely will never even read the bill, never mind have
any idea what took place in hearings regarding it. ISS In this way, lack
of candor undermines the legislative process because it compromises
the honesty and the moral authority of the legislation's proponents. IS6
Putting the moral force of candor aside, lack of candor in the identification of a problem also makes life more difficult for those who
must interpret, enforce, and comply with the law. This is the point
where legislative methodology and statutory interpretation overlap.
Candor in the problem-framing phase would tend to make interpreting the enacted statute easier because the world would be on notice of
the real reasons for the legislative action. IS7 However, if the problems
to which the law was addressed have not been fully and honestly identified, but rather have been watered down for political purposes, those
actors charged with putting the law into effect will be given an incomplete directive. If the actors who actually implement the law have
been misinformed about the law's real purpose, chances are great that
the law will not effectively address the real problems it was intended to
correct.
In determining the purpose of the law, enforcers, interpreters, and
subjects must rely primarily on the text of the statute. Although the
184. Such intentional obfuscation occurs with regularity. Purdy, supra note 19, at 89-90.
Sponsors try to phrase the title and purpose sections of bills to influence the committeeassignment process, to mislead interest groups or political opponents, and to manipulate
the bill's placement on legislative calendars. [d. On occasion, the manipulation is more
insidious. Reed Dickerson recounts the following episode:
When I was drafting laws for the Pentagon, a high-level lawyer from the
National Security Agency (NSA) asked me to 'fuzz up' a draft bill so that,
when the particular provision came back to NSA to be administered, they
could interpret it to mean what they wanted to have subtly hidden in it.
Although such an action would certainly not have been unprecedented, I
indicated that I would not participate in any scheme that put blinders on
Congress.
DICKERSON, supra note 12, at 13.
185. Symposium, supra note I, at 9, 11 (comments of Rep. Christopher Cox).
186. For a discussion of the analogous role of candor in the judicial con text, see Zeppos,
supra note 183, at 401-02. As in the judicial candor situation, lack of candor at the
legislative level may result in increased cynicism about the role of legislatures, lack of
respect, and ultimately loss of legitimacy. Shapiro, supra note 183, at 737.
187. This has been offered by legal commentators as one of the great benefits ofjudicial
candor. Zeppos, supra note 183, at 40l. Many have raised questions, however, of whether
candid opinions provide any greater prediction value than dynamic interpretations of
statutes masquerading as originalist opinions. [d. at 403.
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statutory language is probably the best indicator of the intent of the
legislature, the language of the statute has its inherent limitations. 188
Because the enforcers, interpreters, and subjects of the law need to
understand what the law really says, those actors may have to look beyond the language of the statute, to its underlying purpose. 189
Despite the desirability of candor for the purpose of articulating a
meaningful problem, political realities present a difficult obstacle to
the would-be candid problem framer. Candor runs counter to the
political realities of the legislative process. 190 Being too candid about
one's purpose may only result in the failure to amass a critical
amount of support for one's proposal. The legislative proposal must
be set forth in somewhat opaque terms in order to keep the bill's prospects for passage alive. 19I
In addition, because our system requires that legislative actions be
justified in the language of the neo-republican ideal, often the true
purpose of the law cannot be forcefully stated. The neo-republican
ideal requires that the purpose of the law be cast in terms of a benefit
to the public interest. If the true purpose of the legislation is to advance the private advantage of an interest group, for instance, the
neo-republican ideal prevents the drafter from being completely
forthright about the law's purposes. Therefore, even if a consden188. Given the inevitable differences of opinion that will arise when several people read
the same text, we must provide some way for them to discuss the meaning on common
ground so that they might persuade one another of the right view. Agreeing what the
statute was supposed to achieve helps establish that common ground. Chow, supra note
175, at 791-95; see also Alienikoff, supra note 9; Eskridge, supra note 9.
189. Although the exercise of determining the purpose of a statute smacks of an
archeological investigation in the originalist tradition, see Alienikoff, supra note 9, at 22-32,
even scholars who propose a dynamic approach to statutory interpretation consider the
purpose of the statute to be relevant in the development of the statute's interpretation.
See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 9; Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 9; Rubin, supra note 9.
190. See supra note 184. Sometimes lack of candor in bill drafting is employed for noble
ends, however. The most celebrated case of intentional manipulation of a draft bill's
purpose and title was the bill that eventually became the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It was
drafted somewhat differently for each chamber of Congress so that in the House it would
be referred to the sympathetic Judiciary Committee, chaired by Representative Emanuel
Celler of New York, instead of the unsympathetic Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Committee, chaired by Representative Oren Harris of Arkansas. In the Senate, the bill was
drafted in such a way as to ensure its referral to the Commerce Committee, chaired by
Senator Warren Magnuson of Washington, instead of to the Judiciary Committee, chaired
by Senator James Eastland of Mississippi. KERNOCHAN, supra note 26, at 15-16; OLESZEK,
supra note 149, at 86-87. Although changes in the House and Senate rules since the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 affect the procedures for the referral of bills, they do
not eliminate the incentive to manipulate the referral process through crafty drafting.
CURTIS & WESTERFIELD, supra note 3, at 90-91; KERNOCHAN, supra note 26, at 15-16.
191. Angus MacIntyre, The Multiple Sources of Legislative Ambiguity: Tracing the Legislative
Origins of Administrative Discretion, in AoMINISTRATrvE DISCRETION AND THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF PUBLIC POLICY 72-74 (Douglas Shumavon & H. Kenneth Hibbeln eds., 1986).
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tious legislative drafter were to identify the problem honestly, she
would have to confront the political realities that accompany problem
framing, and craft a politically acceptable formulation of the problem.
C.

Lack oj a Sophisticated Model

In order to identify problems and propose solutions thereto, a
drafter must have a mental model of how the real world works. Using
her mental model, the drafter can test her approaches to the problem
as she progresses through the drafting stage. Her model should also
permit her to project how the world will work after the legislation has
been enacted. Mental models may be sophisticated or simplistic. In
the case of Truth in Savings, the model employed by the drafter appears to have been relatively simplistic.
From the language in the findings section, the predominant model
employed by the drafter was one of perfectly competitive markets,
from the school of neo-classical economics. 192 The purpose of the
statute was based on the traditional regulatory goal of correcting market failures. 193 Market failures are those situations that develop from
time to time that tend to push our economy away from the result that
would obtain under a purely competitive market system. 194 The findings contained in the legislation invoke the language of correcting
market failure by employing terms such as "economic stability," "enhanced competition," and "informed decisions."195
Within the framework of the market failure model, however, the
drafter of Truth in Savings committed some methodological errors.
192. A market is said to operate under perfect competition when the following four
conditions are met: (1) there exists in the market enough buyers and sellers such that no
one buyer or seller may influence prices; (2) the products sold in the market are fungible;
(3) no ba~riers to entry or exit exist in the market; and (4) buyers and sellers have perfect
information. Finding an actual market that exhibits these characteristics presents a
daunting challenge. Few, if any, actual markets meet the definition of perfectly
competitive markets. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & AlAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICY 418-19 (1979).
193. THOMAS W. DUNFEE & FRANK F. GIBSON, LEGAL AsPECTS OF GOVERNMENT
REGULATION OF BUSINESS 7-12 (3d ed. 1984); A. LEE FRITSCHLER & BERNARD H. Ross,
BUSINESS REGULATION AND GoVERNMENT DECISION-MAKING 41-42 (1980).
194. Traditionally, economists have recognized three specific departures from perfect
competition as "market failures": (1) imperfect information; (2) natural monopoly; and
(3) externalities. Imperfect information is a market failure because perfectly competitive
markets require complete, cost-free, information to function. Without complete
information, consumers may make inefficient decisions that will result in an inefficient mix
of goods in the market. Natural monopolies are those businesses for whom the laws of
supply and demand permit but a single efficient producer. Externalities are the costs or
benefits imposed on third parties as a side effect of a given transaction, which are not
reflected in prices. For a general discussion of these market failure problems, see ROBERT
E. LITAN & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, REFORMING FEDERAL REGULATION 36-39 (1983).
195. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
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Most importantly, she failed to define the market. Economic markets
are usually defined in terms of geographic dimensions and product
line dimensions. 196 Even if one takes the geographic dimension of
the market corrected by Truth in Savings to be the entire United
States, no effort was made to give the market a meaningful product
line dimension.
One possible product. line would include all deposit-like investment
products where the potential exists for sellers to take advantage of
relatively unsophisticated savers. This market would include the product line identified by Truth in Savings itself-accounts at depository
institutions as defined in section 19(b)(1)(A), of the Federal Reserve
Act l97 _but would also include other products with similar attributes,
such as money market mutual funds, insurance annuity contracts, and
repurchase agreements. While such a product line dimension makes
sense, it is not the dimension adopted in the legislation. From a policy perspective, it is difficult to rationalize the decision not to include
these other products within the definition of the market. A political
reason, however, clearly exists for leaving those products out. As Representative Torres candidly stated, those products probably should
have been a part of the law, but to include them would have meant
referring the legislation to another committee. 198
Given that political realities prevented a meaningful definition of
the relevant market, supporters could still justify Truth in Savings as
an attempt to correct a market failure in the market for deposits
within the banking industry alone. A failure exists in this market, proponents could argue, because of imperfect information in the relationship between banks and their customer. Because the theoretically
perfect market depends on complete information to function properly, a comprehensive disclosure statute could be seen as promoting
this aspect of the theoretical model. 199
196. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); U.S. Dep't of
Justice Merger Guidelines §§ 2.1, 2.3, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 'II 13,103 Uune 14, 1984).
197. Truth in Savings Act, § 274, 12 U.S.C. § 4314 (Supp. V 1993).
198. 1991 Hearings, supra note 53, at 1 (comments of Rep. Esteban Torres, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs and Coinage).
I understand there are concerns that the subcommittee print does not
apply to other financial service providers, which compete with depository
institutions. . . . However, to broaden the scope of. the legislation may
create jurisdictional problems which could delay the passage of the bill, and
obviously this is of tremendous concern to myself and the members of the
subcommittee.
[d.

199. Correcting failures of the market to supply information is a traditional justification
for economic regulation. BREYER, supra note 130, at 26-28. This approach has been
pursued with great vigor in the area of securities regulation. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REv. 717
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While the market failure rationale may be a coherent argument in
favor of Truth in Savings, it is not necessarily a convincing one. It fails
to convince because it accepts the "more perfect market" goal without
determining its feasibility (or even its desirability). Perfect markets
are very rare and exist in few sectors of economic life. 20o Certainly,
the financial services market falls far short of the conditions necessary
for the perfectly competitive mode1. 201 Given that the best allocation
of re~ources, as represented by the attainment of the conditions of
pure competition, will not be achieved in the financial services market, the general theory of second best states that no reason exists a
priori to believe that fulfilling the remaining conditions will improve
the overall efficiency of the system. 202 In such a situation, one cannot
be sure that correcting the remaining conditions will result in increased, rather·than decreased, allocative efficiency.203 Consequently,
without an empirical study to the contrary, no determinate argument
can be made that increased deposit account disclosure is better, in an
economic sense, than the status quO. 204
(1984). But increased disclosure is not always seen as a value-neutral improvement to the
operation of an efficient market. For instance, disclosure in the securities industry has
been attacked as ineffectual and for benefitting one group at the expense of others. Frank
H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA.
L. REv. 669 (1984).
200. 3 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAw, LEGISLATION AND LIBER'IY: THE POLITICAL ORDER OF
FREE PEOPLE 65-66 (1979).
201. The market for bank deposits fails to achieve the conditions of perfect
competition: (1) while the products sold in the market are similar, they are not fungible;
(2) big players can exert strong influence on market prices even though there are many
players in the market; and (3) there are extremely high barriers to entry. The arguable
lack of perfect information only adds but one small brush stroke to a picture of a market
that is clearly not perfectly competitive.
202. The general theory of second best states that if the best allocation of resources
depends on the attainment of a given set of conditions, but the conditions are
unattainable, there is no way to know-short of performing an exhaustive empirical
study-whether attaining the rest of the ideal conditions will improve the allocative
efficiency of the system or make it worse. BREYER, supra note 130, at 16-17; Herbert
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy and the Social Cost of Monopoly, 78 IOWA L. REv. 371, 377 (1993);
Richard S. Markovits, The Case for "Business as Usual" in Law-and-Economics Land: A Critical
Comment, 78 IOWA L. REv. 387 (1993).
203. Markovits, supra note 202, at 388.
204. One could say that the theory of second best proves too much and that Congress
should refrain from adopting any economic legislation because of the complexities of
making it effective. The theory does not require such an extreme conclusion, however, but
rather insists on the more modest position that when economic regulation is proposed it
ought to be consistent with a sophisticated understanding of how things actually work and
how they will work after enactment. Regulatory options should not be dictated by a dearly
held model, such as the model of perfectly competitive markets. Instead, we should
continually question and test the premises on which our models are based to ensure the
models' continued usefulness in understanding the real world. We must recognize that
our models represent a theory about reality, not reality itself. Blind adherence to a model
results in skewed perception because we will tend to rationalize reality in terms of the
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Another reason to question the value of the perfectly competitive
market model as a guide for developing banking regulation is that our
entire system of banking regulation tries to prevent unfettered competition in the banking industry. The financial services markets in the
United States are not perfectly competitive by design-we have made
a public policy choice to trade off the benefits of competition for the
benefits of a more stable banking system. Our national banking policy values stability.205 The national experience with free competition
in the banking industry during the nineteenth century was not a pleasant one, and we do not want to repeat the experience. 206 A moment's
reflection makes clear that perfect competition in the financial market is not only unattainable, it is probably undesirable as well, as increased competition tends to result in less stability. Trying to create
perfectly competitive markets may result in a cure worse than the
disease. 207
Accordingly, adopting an overly simplistic model of how financial
m~rkets operate blinded the drafter of Truth in Savings to alternative
approaches. 208 The history of Truth in Savings reveals no serious attempt to address the problems through any means other than a commodel instead of evaluating the model in terms of reality. For an interesting discussion on
this topic, see Chow, supra note 175, at 777-80.
205. See NICHOlAS A. LAsH, BANKING LAw AND REGULATIONS: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
23 (1987).
.
206. On the good side, the free banking era was marked by almost pure competition:
barriers to entry were low, there were many participants in the banking market, and
government interference was kept to a minimum. Gordon, supra note 36, at 56. On the
bad side, the era was marked by frequent bank failures, unstable money, and widespread
fraud. KERRY CoOPER & DONALD R. FRASER, BANKING DEREGULATION AND THE NEW
COMPETITION IN THE FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY 46 (1984); Gordon, supra note 36, at 56,
58.
207. Considering the obvious shortcomings of the drafter's economic model, one must
question the sincerity and candor of the economic justification offered in the findings
clause. The drafter may have been attempting to justify Truth in Savings as economic
legislation only to obscure its true purpose as social legislation. Although we think of
disclosure statutes primarily as a method of promoting efficient markets, they are often
employed for the purpose of outlawing certain behavior. BREYER, supra note 130, at 16l.
In the area of banking law, for instance, the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, 12
U.S.C. §§ 2801-2809 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), aims to prevent lenders from "red-lining"
certain neighborhoods. [d. at 161-62. Truth in Savings may be seen as such a piece of
social legislation. The witnesses identified many practices that they considered unethical
or unfair. Although the statute speaks in the relatively neutral language of "disclosure,"
with the goal of making markets more competitive, its underlying purpose aims to force
banks to expose their arguably unethical or unfair practices to the light of day and, by
doing so, create an incentive for them to stop employing those practices. While this social
goal may be noble, once again it raises the concerns that flow from lack of candor in the
definition of the problem. See supra notes 181-85 and accompanying text. If the problem
the legislation sought to address was the unfair practices of banks, that should have been
the stated purpose of the law, not mere disclosure.
208. See supra notes 116-40 and accompanying text.
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prehensive disclosure requirement. By failing to challenge her
underlying model, the drafter committed a serious methodological
mistake. 209
D.

The Failure to Distinguish Between Causes and Conditions

A problem solver must be careful to identify the problem in light of
causes and conditions. 210 The problem solver must undertake two inquiries. First, she must examine the problem to discover how the
problem is caused. Second, she must determine whether the cause of
the problem can be corrected through legislation or whether. it is an
uncorrectable condition oflife on earth. 211 Without separating causes
and conditions, the legislature may waste valuable resources addressing phenomena that cannot be corrected or may address phenomena
that are not problems in their own right as much as they are symptoms of larger problems. Failure to examine problems critically to en209. The drafter's mental model limited the legislative response to measures that would
correct the market failure to the exclusion of other alternatives. This limitation made for a
false choice in the policy decision between an imperfect market and an attempt at a more
perfect market. As Nobel-prize winning economist Friedrich Hayek has observed, "The
test should not be the degree of approach towards an unachievable result, but should be
whether the results of a given policy exceed or fall short of the results of other available
procedures." 3 HAYEK, supra note 200, at 67.
210. Seidman, supra note 5, at 62. By identifying the true causes of a problem, we may
avoid Thoreau's observation that "[tlhere are a thousand hacking at the branches of evil to
one who is striking at the root." HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN 68 (Modern Library ed.

1937).
211. An example of causes and conditions illustrates the point. Assume a migrating
species of bird winters in Louisiana and flies to the Canadian tundra to mate and rear its
young. As constituents in the bird's flyway notice a decrease in the population of the
species, they press Congress for action. A drafter confronted with the task of preparing
legislation must determine how to correct the problem of decreasing bird population.
Employing her sophisticated model of the problem, she solicits the expert advice of
ornithologists, wildlife experts, hunters, and others. She commissions an empirical study.
After doing her homework, she concludes that the observed decrease in bird population is
caused by a number of factors, most importantly are the loss of mating habitat due to
hydro.,electric development in Canada and the increase in predators resulting from the
return of the timberwolf. Before she can formulate a response to the problem, she must
appreciate the conditions within which this phenomena occurs, including such things as
these: (1) the birds fly from the arctic to the Gulf coast; (2) the wolf is increasing in
numbers and preys on the nesting birds; (3) Canada is a sovereign nation over which the
U.S. Congress has no direct control. These conditions are facts of life. She must craft her
response to address the cause of the problem, but recognize the limits imposed by the
conditions. Her response to the problem must take both causes and conditions into
account. If the cause of the problem is lack of mating habitat in Canada, a law that
prohibits hunting the birds in Louisiana will not correct the problem. It might ameliorate
it a little, but will not correct it. The real solution, however, requires action in Canada.
The legislative response must be crafted in such a way to get Canadian cooperation on the
problem.
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sure that the solution reaches the cause often results in legislative
responses that are mere band-aids.
In the case of Truth in Savings, for example, the problems complained of in the hearings may actually have been better characterized
as symptoms of larger problems. The changes in the relationship between banks and their customers may in large part have been driven
by economic changes in the financial services marketplace. Banks
had to find ways to cut costs and increase noninterest income. 212 The
problems complained of in the hearings may have been symptomatic
of changes facing banks in the competition for deposits. If this was
the case, the proper way to address the "problems" would have been
to address their underlying cause: the changes in the financial services industry. On the other hand, the problems may have been symptomatic of a much more insidious problem: the banking industry's
having too much power in the economy and misusing that power. 213
If this was the case, the appropriate response should have targeted
that "cause." In either event, the drafter never attempted to determine whether the problems complained of were problems in their
own right or symptoms of something bigger.
When developing legislation, drafters must appreciate that they cannot control everything that contributes to the cause of a problem.
Certain things are beyond human control-. such as the laws of physics, human nature, and the weather-and must be viewed as conditions of life on earth that the drafter must accept as a given. 214 Her
legislative response to a problem must seek to correct the cause of the
problem, while understanding that existing conditions may not be
212. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
213. The illustration of possible analyses of the Truth in Savings problems points out
that the separation of causes and conditions may in fact be another normative judgment
that must be made in the legislative process. Seidman. supra note 5. at 62.
214. In addition to these unchangeable conditions oflife on earth, the drafter must also
consider values to be conditions. Societal values can change relatively quickly. Things
identified as problems today may not be considered problems 10 years from now, and,
conversely, things that we have not yet identified as problems may in 10 years time be very
,pressing issues. For an example of how a nonproblem can change into a problem as a
result of changing societal attitudes. consider the experience of the McDonald's
hamburger chain with polystyrene foam containers. When first introduced, the styrofoam
clamshell design was hailed as an efficient, cheap, and effective means of keeping fast food
warm and protected. As societal concerns about the environment-and especially about
municipal landfills-increased, the styrofoam clamshell container came to be seen as a
problem by the average citizen (it mayor may not have been a real problem. but it was
perceived as one). Eventually McDonald's returned to paper-packaging in light of public
pressure. See PETROSKI, supra note 13, at 220-25. For this reason, problems, once
identified. ought to receive continuing scrutiny. Truth in Savings existed in bill form from
1968 through 1991. That time period saw a revolutionary change in the financial services
market and in the attitudes of the typical consumer of financial services. The Truth in
Savings bill, however. showed little response to these changing conditions.
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subject to change. In the context of Truth in Savings, the conditions
that the drafter might have identified could have included: (1) banks
are profit-oriented enterprises and will not voluntarily give up an advantageous position; (2) consumers lack sophistication; (3) consumers rarely read or understand business or legal documents; and (4)
consumers have a choice of financial services providers who will provide savings account products. Assuming Congress could identify
what problem it sought to address, an appropriate version of Truth in
Savings would have to target its efforts at the cause of the problem
(whatever that cause had been determined to be), while taking cognizance of the conditions under which the legislation would be implemented. An appropriate response would address the causes, while
accepting the conditions as given. There is no evidence that Truth in
Savings was ever subjected to this sort of analysis.
E.

Lack of Appreciation for the Problem Framer's Power

Problem framing may receive short shrift in the legislative process
because Congress fails to appreciate the problem framer's significant
role in the development of legislation. 215 Although the legislative
drafter is not free to draft legislation to whatever whim the sponsor
may desire,216 how she frames the problem may have a great effed on
215. On the other hand, the lack of a more rigorous problem-framing step may be due
to an intense appreciation of the problem framer's power and a reluctance on the part of
problem framers to give up that power.
216. The problem framer must conform the problem to long-standing political and
legal conventions, including such considerations as:
1. Substantive Constraints. The Constitution limits Congress' power to make laws in
several substantive respects, such as prohibiting ex post facto laws and bills of attainder,
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cI. 3, and titles of nobility. id. cI. 8. Additionally, the amendments
to the Constitution place certain subjects off limits, including, for example, laws
establishing religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or laws abridging free speech
or the press or the right of the people to peaceably assemble. Id. amend. I. Finally, the
Supreme Court has identified some substantive areas-such as the right to privacy, Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and the right to interstate travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969)-that, while not specifically articulated in the Constitution, nevertheless
are protected from unfettered legislation.
2. Consistency with Traditional Public Policy Goals. The problem and the solution
identified by the drafter must be consistent with, or at least capable of being rationalized in
terms of, the traditional public policy goals of federal legislation. In the area of banking
legislation, the regulatory goals include such matters as: (1) providing a safe and sound
banking system; (2) preventing concentration of economic power; (3) allocating credit to
the most socially desirable uses; (4) protecting consumers; and (5) providing a financial
system that can facilitate the conduct of monetary policy. See LAsH, supra note 205, at 2225; Stephen J. Friedman & Connie M. Friesen, A New Paradigm Far Financial Regulation:
Gettingfrom Here to There, 43 MD. L. REv. 413,446-54 (1984).
3. Federalism Issues. The Tenth Amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people: U.S. CONST. amend. X. Although Congress has

1994]

TRUTH IN SAVINGS

1341

the bill's evolution. A skillful drafter can frame a problem in a way
that dictates a particular solution. Even if the problem as framed does
not determine the outcome of the legislative process, it often has
great staying power and can shape the course of future negotiations
over the bill's contents.
The powers enjoyed by the problem framer, however, while considerable, will not always carry the day. The problem framed by the
drafter will be subject to the powers of the agenda setter, who also has
a tremendous impact on the outcome of the legislative process. In
addition, political forces inside and outside the legislature may ultimately be responsible for passing or preventing the legislation.

found justification for almost any activity it has desired to regulate based on the commerce
clause, see, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (holding that local "loan
sharking" operation can be regulated by federal government through commerce clause
because loan sharking in its national context affects interstate commerce); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (holding that barbecue restaurant subject to Civil Rights Act
of 1964 because it served food that was moved in interstate commerce); Heart of Atlanta
Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (holding that establishment providing
accommodation for travellers deemed to affect "commerce"), nevertheless, every federal
legislative venture into substantive areas previously governed by state law needs to address
the issue of federalism. To argue otherwise would suggest that the Tenth Amendment has
no meaning. In fact, the Tenth Amendment may have virtually no meaning, as it has long
been held to merely state "but a truism that all is retained which has not been
surrendered." United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. lOO, 124 (1941).
In light of the current Court's conception of federalism, however, the Tenth
Amendment may enjoy a resurgence of authority. See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct.
2408 (1992). In the banking field, federalism has special meaning because of our unique
dual banking system. The differences between the state and federal systems of bank
regulation have led to a competition of sorts between them. Some commentators have
lauded this regulatory competition as a method that reduces regulation to the optimum
point consistent with safe and sound banking practices. See Kenneth E. Scott, The Dual
Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, in REGULATION OF AMERICAN BUSINESS
AND INDUSTRY 1 (Franklin R. Edwards ed., 1979). Other commentators have been less
deferential to the dual banking system, claiming that the differences between state and
federal regulation are more apparent than real. See Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey,
The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 677, 678 (1988).
4. Coherence. Finally, the legislative drafter should strive for coherence between the bill
she drafts and the overall body of statutory and regulatory provisions covering the topic.
For instance, if the larger legislative agenda envisions reduced regulation on banks as a
method to stimulate business lending, see Agency Actions to Reduce the Negative Impact of
Regulations on Credit Availability: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions
Supervision, Regulation and DepOSit Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban
Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 60, 61-62 (1993) (statement of John P. LaWare, Member,
Board of Governors ofthe Federal Reserve System), reprinted in 79 FED. REs. BULL. 781, 781
(1993), a law increasing the regulatory burden should not be passed as it fails the
requirement of coherence. Coherence requires some degree of coordination between the
legislative branch and the regulatory agencies. GARTEN, supra note 132, at 64-66.
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Significance of Framing Effects

The artful problem framer possesses significant powers. How she
frames the problem can strongly influence the actions of those who
must make decisions based on the problem as,framed. 217 In one famous example of the power of framing effects, subjects were asked to
choose between two different cancer treatments, radiation or surgery.
The subjects were given information about the probability of living
through each treatment. When the expected outcomes of the two
procedures was stated in terms survival rates, subjects chose surgery.
When the exact same information was restated in terms of mortality
rates, however, significantly more subjects chose radiation. 218
The problem framer, therefore, has an opportunity to influence decisions of fellow legislators by framing the problem artfully. Although
the framing effect may be just a special case of the requirement that
the underlying normative foundation on which a problem rests be
consistent with the normative values of a critical mass of legislators,219
it appears t<;> be more than that. Framing effects reflect something

of

217. For instance, if a state legislature takes up debate about a bill dealing with hostile
corporate takeovers and the bill's sponsor has framed the issue as "unscrupulous out-ofstate corporate raiders are making'millions at the expense of our state's shareholders,
management, and employees," that description of the problem will strongly influence the
direction of the public debate on the topic and will, in large part, dictate a solution to the
issue that penalizes hostile offerors. Using loaded language can help a problem framer
obtain a given result, but, even on a less blatant level, research has shown that framing
effects influence the decisions of otherwise rational people. See Sovern, supra note 69, at
30-33.
218. HEAP ET AL., supra note 142, at 39-40 (citing Barbara J. McNeil et aI., On the
Elicitation of Preferences for Alternative Therapies, 306 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1259, 1259-62 (1982».
In summary, the researchers presented the test groups with a hypothetical choice between
two treatments for cancer: either surgery or radiation. McNeil et aI., supra, at 1260. The
first group considered the following information in the following form:
Surgery: Of 100 people having surgery 90 live through the postoperative
period, 68 are alive at the end of the first year and 34 are alive at the end of
five years.
Radiation Therapy: Of 100 people having radiation therapy all live through
the treatment, 77 are alive at the end of one year and 22 are alive at the end
of five years.
Id. Only 18% of the first group preferred radiation therapy. Id. at 1261. In contrast, 44%
of the second group chose radiation when exactly the same information was presented as
follows:
Surgery: Of 100 people having surgery 10 die during surgery or the postoperative period, 32 die by the end of the first year and 66 die by the end of
five years.
Radiation Therapy: Of 100 people having radiation therapy, none die during treatment, 23 die by the end of one year and 78 die by the end of five
years.
[d. The researchers found a pronounced framing effect whether posing the choice to
clinical patients or to doctors. HEAP ET AL., supra note 142, at 40.
219. See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
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deeper in the decisionmaking process where otherwise rational decisionmakers can be subconsciously manipulated by the force of
words. 220
2.

The Resiliency of the Original Problem

The problem framer also possesses the power to set the stage upon
which discussion of the issue will take place for years to come. She
can exploit this power because legislative proposals display remarkable resiliency from one Congress to· the next.
Truth in Savings provides an extreme example of the resiliency of a
bill. A proposal for federal legislation mandating comprehensive disclosure of deposit account terms, the basic idea of Truth in Savings,
was first introduced in the 91st Congress, in 1968. 221 It finally passed
in the 102d Congress, in 1991. Despite the fact that the financial services industry changed dramatically between 1968 and 1991, the proposed Truth in Savings legislation remained remarkably static. 222 In
220. Framing effects have been likened to the linguistic equivalent of optical illusions.
Richard L. Hasen, Comment, Efficiency Under Informational Asymmetry: The Effect of Framing
on Legal Rules, 38 UCLA L. REv. 391, 399 (1990).
221. Bonfanti, supra note 49, at 12.
222. The basic Truth in Savings idea has shown amazing resiliency. In the 92d and 93d
Congresses, Senator Vance Hartke of Indiana sponsored bills that would have required the
disclosure of key terms in the interest calculation and regulated the methods by which the
accounts could be advertised. Id. at 12-13. The elements of Senator Hartke's proposals
formed the core of the Truth in Savings idea through its various reincarnations until it was
finally passed in 1991. Versions of Truth in Savings were introduced in the 94th Congress
(§ 107 of the Financial Institutions Act of 1975, S.1267, contained Truth in Savings
provisions, as did H.R. 14), id. at 14, the 95th Congress (H.R. 829 required the disclosure
of key terms and fees), id., and the 96th Congress (H.R. 3461 was essentially the same as
H.R. 829, introduced in the previous Congress), id. After a brief hiatus, Truth in Savings
resurfaced in the 98th Congress as H.R. 5232. That bill died in committee, but was
reintroduced in the 99th Congress as H.R. 2282. In the 99th Congress, Truth in Savings
was reported favorably out of committee with an amendment in the form of a substitution
combining Truth in Savings with credit card disclosure. The bill emerged from committee
as H.R. 5613 entitled the "Truth in Savings and Credit Card Application Act." H.R.5613
passed the House by voice vote on October 7, 1986, 132 CONGo REc. H9313, 9313 (1986),
but was not considered by the Senate, so it did not become law. Continuing its arduous
journey, Truth in Savings reappeared in the 100th Congress as H.R. 176. The bill was
unanimously passed by the House onJune 29,1987. 133 CONGo REc. H5761, 5761 (1987).
Later, but before going to the Senate, the bill was included in H.R. 5094, The Depository
Institutions Act of 1988, as subpart E of Title IV-consumer protection provisions. It did
not pass Congress. It reappeared in the 101st Congress, where it was reintroduced by
Representative Lehman as H.R. 736.
The bill was passed by the House and a similar bill was passed by the Senate as part of the
Money Laundering Act, but once it again failed to get enacted, this time because the
conference committee failed to produce a conference report. HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING,
FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, TRUTH IN SAVINGS ACT: REpORT TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 2654,
H.R. Doc. No. 202, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1991). In the 102d Congress, Representative
Lehman again introduced Truth in Savings. His bill was numbered H.R. 447. Similar
provisions were also contained as part of a larger banking bill, H.R. 6. The House Banking
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its twenty-three years on Capitol Hill, the proposed legislation never
changed to take into account the changing nature of the financial
marketplace, such as the rise of alternative deposit products available
from mutual funds, insurance companies, and credit unions.
The resilience of the originally proposed approach perhaps owes
less to the prescience of its drafters than it does to a fact of legislative
life: the first version of the problem and its proposed solution often
are the only articulations seriously considered during the legislative
process. 223 Of course, this resiliency provides a glaring example of
bad problem-solving methodology because, over twenty-three years,
the problem-whatever it was-must have changed somehow, given
the dramatic changes in the financial services industry during that
time. The response, however, did not change in step.
In light of the fact that the original problem possesses the trait of
resiliency, framing the original problem correctly takes on great im~
portance. The basic decisions made in the original drafting effortespecially the framing of the problem and the identification of a response-can make a lasting impression on the final version of the
bill. 224
While the problem framer has real powers, she exercises them in a
larger arena where other forces and players affect legislative fortunes.
Specifically, the agenda setter may be able to override some of the
problem framer's inherent power by manipulating procedure or by
acting as a second problem framer. Additionally, political forces both
within the institution and from outside force individual legislators to
act in particular ways.

Finance and Urban Affairs Committee's subcommittee on Consumer Affairs and Coinage
conducted a hearing on both H.R. 447 and the Truth in Savings provisions ofH.R. 6. After
hearing testimony, the subcommittee marked up the bills, and Representative Torres,
chairman of the subcommittee, introduced the revised version of Truth in Savings as H.R.
2654. Report 102-202 to Accompany H.R 2654, Truth in Savings Act, reprinted in Fed. Banking
L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1469, pt. 2, at 158-59 (Nov. 13, 1992). Eventually, H.R. 2654 was
incorporated into the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991,
passed both chambers, and was signed into law by President Bush on December 19, 1991.
223. Even if the problem framer specifically labels the early draft a "springboard" for
discussion, it is likely that subsequent changes in the proposal will take the form of
revisions to the original proposal. As legislators get caught up in their own negotiations on
a particular bill, they naturally tend to address new concerns by adding or deleting
provisions from the bill that is on the table. Rubin, supra note 1, at 279. The Truth in
Lending Act provides an exceIlent example of this phenomenon. [d. at 268-69.
224. Purdy, supra note 19, at 98.
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The Agenda Setter's Procedural Power

Scholars have demonstrated the power of the legislative agenda set~
ter to manipulate the outcome of the legislative process. 225 The expe~
rience of Truth in Savings in both the House and the Senate in the
100th Congress illustrates the power of the agenda setter quite clearly.
In 1988, Congress was engaged in the very serious and difficult work
of revamping the banking system. As commentators had been pointing out for years, the legal distinctions between commercial and investment banks, thrifts, insurance companies, and securities firms
made little sense from an economic point of view because those firms
had the capacity to deliver very similar products to the public. 226
Many commentators believed that the existing structure of bank regu~
lation was a burden that put U.S. banks at a competitive disadvantage. 227 In the 100th Congress, federal law was supposed to catch up
with market realities and allow banks freer competition across product
lines. The bills under consideration would have allowed banks to par~
ticipate in the securities and insurance business.
In 1988, any bill granting banks securities powers had to get by two
very powerful committees in the House of Representatives: the Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs Committee-chaired by Femand St.
Germain of Rhode Island-which had jurisdiction over banking, and
the Energy and Commerce Committee-chaired by John Dingell of
Michigan-which arguably had jurisdiction over any legislation deal~
ing with securities or insurance. Representative St. Germain 228 and
many on his committee 229 were widely considered antagonistic to the
idea of granting the banking industry wider powers. Any benefit to
the banking ir;tdustry from his committee would come at great cost. In
225. See, e.g., Farber & Frickey. supra note 151. at 901-06; infra notes 232-35 and
accompanying text.
226. See, e.g., Legislative Proposals to Restructure Our Financial System: Hearings on S. 1886, S.
1891, and S. 1905 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 81. 82 (1987) (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System), reprinted in 74 FED. REs. BULL. 91, 92 (1988)
[hereinafter Greenspan Statement]; COOPER & FRASER. supra note 206; Richard C. Aspinwall,
On the "Specialness" of Banking. 7 ISSUES IN BANK REc. 16 (1983); Bevis Longstreth. GlassSteagall: The Case for Repeal, 31 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 281 (1986); Curtis]. Polk, Chapter.
Banking and Securities Law: The Glass-Steagall Act - Has it Outlived its Usefulness? 55 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 812 (1987); William]. Shafer. Note, Glass-Steagall Reform: It's Time to Replace
the Crumbling Wal~ 14]. CORP. L. 973 (1989); Kelly A. Zazella. Note, Beyond 'The Wall": The
American Financial System and Glass-Steagall Reform, 62 ST.JOHN'S L. REv. 67 (1987).
227. Greenspan Statement, supra note 226, at 91-92. For a general discussion. see
Friedman & Friesen. supra note 216. at 414-42; H. Robert Heller. International Economic
Challenges to American Banking. 9 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 323 (1990).
228. Robert M. Garsson. Senate to Begin Hearings on Consumer Measures. AM. BANKER. Sept.
8. 1988, at 22.
229. Id.
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the past, Representative St. Germain had been viewed as one who
piled on consumer regulations to banking legislation to make it less
palatable to the banking i,ndustry or as the price the banking industry
had to pay for expanded powers. 230
As committee chair, St. Germain controlled his committee's agenda
and, thus, had a great deal of power over the outcome of committee
action. 231 As modern public choice scholars have amply demonstrated, control of the agenda and the procedures employed in the
decisionmaking process can determine the outcome. 232 If the agenda
develops through an open process whereby each legislator can propose an alternative, then the outcome of majority rule may wander
anywhere because of preference-cycling problems. 233 On the other
hand, if one person controls the agenda, that person has sufficient
230. Clifford L. Brody, What Happens if the Senate Goes Democrat?, AM. BANKER, Oct. 21,
1984, at 15;Jay Rosenstein & Lee]. Miller, Protection Push, AM. BANKER,July 23,1984, at 2.
231. OLESZEK, supra note 15, at 93.
232. See, e.g., HEAP ET AL., supra, note 142, at 249-58; Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains, supra
note 9, at 547; Farber & Frickey, supra note 151, at 38-42.
233. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Prospects for Formal Models of Legislatures, 10 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 5,
10 (1985). An example drawn from the general principles developed in PETER C.
ORDESHOOK, GAME THEORY AND POLITICAL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 65-71 (1986),and
from an example used in JOHN ALLEN PAULOS, BEYOND NUMERACY: RUMINATIONS OF A
NUMBERS MAN 262-64 (1991), illustrates the significance of voting procedure in
determining outcome. Consider a 55-member committee charged with closing one
military base from a list of five possible bases. The states with the bases are Louisiana (L),
Michigan (M), Nevada (N), Oregon (0), and Pennsylvania (P). Based on the political
consequences to each of them as elected individuals, the committee members have
ordered their individual preferences for base closing as follows, with the state listed first as
the one they would most like to close and the others listed in decreasing order of
preference:
18 members rank preferences:
(1) L
(2) 0
(3) P
(4) N
(5) M
12 members rank preferences:
(1) M
(2) P
(3) 0
(4) N
(5) L
(1) N
(2) M
(3) P
(4) 0
(5) L
10 members rank preferences:
(1) 0
(2) N
(3) P
(4) M
(5) L
9 members rank preferences:
4 members rank preferences:
(1) P
(2) M
(3) 0
(4) N
(5) L
2 members rank preferences:
(1) P
(2) N
(3) 0
(4) M
(5) L
Based on these stated preferences, it is impossible to determine which state's military base
will be closed without also knowing the voting procedure that will be employed to aggregate the preferences. The outcome of the group decision making process will hinge entirely on the voting procedure, as the following discussion demonstrates.
Those favoring closure of the Louisiana base will argue that a plurality method of voting
should prevail in which the state receiving the most first-preference votes is selected.
Under our hypothetical, Louisiana would be selected, as more members (18) have listed it
as their first choice than any other state.
The representatives from Louisiana and their political allies will argue for any method of
voting other than the plurality system. They might propose a run-offvote between the two
most-preferred states. In our example this would result in a run off between Louisiana,
which received 18 first-preference votes, and Michigan, which received 12 first-preference
votes. Under this system, Michigan would be selected, because in a vote between Louisiana
and Michigan only 18 members would prefer to close Louisiana instead of Michigan, while
37 members would prefer to close Michigan over Louisiana.
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opportunity to manipulate the voting procedure to produce a desired
result. 234 Thus, the agenda setter can effectively trump the efforts of
the legislative drafter by manipulating the outcome of the voting process. Regardless of how artfully the drafter has framed the problem, if
it does not gain the support of the agenda setter, it will have difficulty
passing. 235

The Michigan representatives and their supporters can be expected to resist this method
of voting. They might suggest a different system of counting votes, such as successive
rounds of eliminating the state that received the fewest first preferences. The state that
received the fewest first-preference votes in the first round of voting (Pennsylvania, in our
hypothetical) w.puld be eliminated, and all of the remaining preferences would be adjusted
accordingly. This would yield the following result: 18 votes for Louisiana, 16 for Michigan,
12 for Nevada, and 9 for Oregon. In the next round, the state with the fewest first preferences from the previous round (Oregon) would be eliminated and the preferences again
adjusted. By proceeding in successive rounds to eliminate the state with the fewest first
preferences, Nevada's base will be selected for closing.
Those who want to keep the Nevada base open will not support that method. They
might suggest use of the so-called "Borda count," which reflects preferences in voting. See
ORDESHOOK, supra, at 68; PAULOS, supra, at 263. For instance, Nevada might suggest that
each first-preference vote count for five points, each second-preference vote count for four
points, third-preference votes three points, fourth preference two points, and fifth preference one point, and that each state be judged on its total number of points. Under this
method, Oregon's Borda count comes out to 191 and is higher than all the others. Oregon's base would be closed.
Oregon's contingent will not support that voting method. They will argue that the best
way to determine the outcome should be to pair off the states in head-ta-head votes. If one
state beats all the other states, that state should be selected. In the parlance of choice
theorists, this exercise would produce a "Condorcet winner." A Condorcet winner is the
alternative that can beat any other alternative in a head-ta-head vote. See HEAP ET AL., supra
note 142, at 221; ORDESHOOK, supra, at 66; PAULOS, supra, at 263. Under this method,
Pennsylvania's base would be selected for closing. Obviously Pennsylvania will not support
that method and will propose an alternative method, and so on.
234. Shepsle, supra note 233, at 10.
If there is a monopoly agenda-setter-someone who is uniquely and
completely empowered to pick and order elements of an agenda ... there
is always sufficient opportunity for him to manipulate the sequence of votes
to produce any final outcome he desires; the preferences of other
legislative agents are no constraint.
Id.
235. See Barbara Sinclair, Agenda Control and Policy Success: Ronald Reagan and the 97th
House, 10 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 291 (1985) (discussing President Reagan's policy methods and
subsequent success as the congressional agenda setterin 1980), reprinted in CONGRESS, supra
note 162, at 637. While scholars have taken great pains to demonstrate the power of the
agenda setter with academic rigor, they could have established the truth of the proposition
by taking a field trip to Capitol Hill and talking openly with committee chairs there.
Representative John Dingell, long-time chair of the House Energy and Commerce
Committee, has frankly stated before the Rules Committee: "If you let me write the
procedure and I let you write the substance . . . I'll screw you every time." John
McLaughlin, Detroit Powerhouse, NAT'L REv., Feb. 27, 1987, at 24, 24.
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The Agenda Setter as Problem Framer

The agenda setter also possesses the power to serve as a second
problem framer by manipulating the amendment process to take advantage of substantive preferences of the voting group. Agenda setters employ two common strategies when acting as problem framers:
adding amendments to a bill until it collapses under its own weight, or
proposing an amendment so unpalatable to the proponents of the
legislation that they will vote against the overall measure if the amendment is adopted. 236
.
The fate of the banking legislation considered by the House Banking Committee in the 100th Congress illustrates the power of the
agenda setter as problem framer. 237 The Committee started with a
bill that would have removed product line barriers from depository
institutions and allowed them to engage in the securities and insurance business. 238 With respect to this controversial legislation, the
members of the Banking Committee and Congress at large fell into
three groups: proponents of broadened powers (Proponents), opponents of broadened powers (Opponents), and fence-sitters (Fence-Sitters). Being political animals, very few members of these three groups
had set their views in stone. They all recognized that some bargaining
would take place.
The Proponents, although having no appetite for additional banking regulation, understood that some additional regulatory measures
would be the cost of getting the new powers they desired. The Opponents, although unwilling to let banks increase their powers, realized
that such an expansion of power was possible. If powers were to be
expanded, however, the Opponents wanted sufficient regulatory safeguards and "firewalls" built into the legislation. The Fence-Sitters
were in the middle, understood both arguments, and sympathized
with the Proponents, but preferred to stick with the existing regulatory scheme unless they could be convinced that the banking industry
would not abuse its new powers.
At the outset of the process, therefore, the three groups displayed
the following preferences:
Proponents:
Opponents:
Fence-Sitters:

(1) Full New Powers
(1) No New Powers
(1) Regulated Powers

(2) Regulated Powers
(2) Regulated Powers
(2) No New Powers

(3) No New Powers
(3) Full New Powers
(3) Full New Powers

236. OLESZEK, supra note 149, at 214.
237. The discussion that follows is based in large part on a hypothetical discussed in
HEAP ET AL., supra note 142, at 251-52.
238. For a description and discussion of the bills under consideration in 1988, see
Shafer, supra note 226, at 989-97.
.
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Assuming that the three groups split the v9ting power in such a way
that two factions voting together were needed to carry the vote, the
Regulated Powers bill emerged as the natural middle ground. 239 After
these initial preferences were made known, therefore, the central issue was no longer whether additional powers should be granted, but
rather under what conditions they should be granted.
At this point, the agenda setter took on the role of problem framer.
To move the Full Powers bill before the committee closer to the Regulated Powers bill-the middle ground-the agenda setter had to
amend the Full Powers bill before the committee. During this amendment/problem-framing phase, the agenda setter could consider
amendments to the bill to make it palatable (or unpalatable, depending on the agenda setter's personal bias) to the critical mass oflegislators needed to pass it (or kill it).
In 1988, many provisions were added to the Full Powers bill at the
insistence of the Fence-Sitters and the Opponents. By the end of the
amendment process, the bill called for toughened standards for the
Community Reinvestment Act, rules relating to branch closings, a requirement that all banks provide free check-cashing for government
checks, a requirement that banks provide "lifeline" banking services,
and, of course, Truth in Savings. 24o The banking industry did not oppose each and every proposed new burden, because it understood
that some new regulation would be the price the industry had to pay
for expanded powers.
At some point, however, the additional burdens tacked onto the bill
began to outweigh the value of the new powers, especially in light of
the fact that competitors in the securities and insurance industries
would not be saddled with similar burdens. Once the additional regulations became part of the bill, however, the Proponents were virtually
powerless to get them removed, because to do so would have cost
them dearly in political capita1. 241 Faced with too high a regulatory
price to pay for increased powers, therefore, the Proponents changed
their preferences to prefer No New Powers over highly Regulated
Powers. As a result, in the end the preferences of the factions lined
up as follows:
239. In the terminology of choice theorists, the Regulated Powers option emerged as
the Condorcet winner-that is, in head-to-head votes against the other alternatives, it was
the winner against the alternatives. FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note ISO, at 51. Although the
choice of Regulated Powers was the first preference of only one group, it emerged as the
natural middle ground when all the groups considered the alternatives. HEAP ET AL., supra
note 142, at 221.
240. Garsson, supra note 228, at 22.
241. Jay Rosenstein, House Afrproves Bill Governing Ads, Disclosures for Home Equity Loans,
AM. BANKER,June 21, 1988, at 3,30.
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Proponents: (1) Full New Powers (2) No New Powers
(3) Regulated Powers
Opponents:
(1) No New Powers
(2) Regulated Powers (3) Full New Powers
(3) Full New Powers
Fence-Sitters: (1) Regulated Powers (2) No New Powers

With this rearrangement, the No New Powers bill now became the
Condorcet winner-exactly what the Opponents wanted. In effect,
the Opponents 'were able' to block the proposal for increased banking
powers by creating a poison pill for the banking industry and saying
"go ahead and take these new powers-if you dare." This episode,
therefore, illustrates how the agenda setter can manipulate the committee's actions through a form of problem framing so that the proposal adopted is actually supported by only a minority.242

5.

Systemic Political Realities

In addition to the powers of the problem framer and the agenda
setter, built-in systemic political realities shape the outcome of the legislative process, as well. Individual power plays, turf wars, and personal political agendas often decide the fate of legislation. Truth in
Savings in the 100th Congress again provides an example.
Under the neo-republican ideat civic-minded legislators primarily
desire to serve the public good without regard to personal power or
committee assignments, and all representatives have a meaningful
role in the legislative process without regard to seniority, committee
assignment, or party affiliation. 243 The observed reality, however, certainly departs from that ideal. Seemingly without regard to the generation of public-spirited debate on the underlying issues, the banking
legislation in 1988 instigated a major turf battle between Representative St. Germain's Banking Committee and Representative Dingell's
Energy and Commerce Committee. 244 The Banking Committee
steadfastly resisted attempts by the Commerce Committee to participate in review of the legislation, yet Representative Dingell vowed to
"protect the jurisdiction of [the Energy and Commerce]
[C]ommittee."245 Because both of these powerful House committees
(arguably) had jurisdiction over subject matter in the banking reform
bill, political realities resulted in two different versions of the bill. Ne& FRICKEY, supra note 150, at 39-40; HEAP ET AL., supra note 142, at 252;
supra note 233, at 71-82.
243. Michelman, supra note 162, at 27; Sunstein, supra note 157, at 1552-53.
244. The House Energy and Commerce Committee, chaired by Representative John
Dingell, had jurisdiction over any legislation involving securities laws. Representative
Dingell was seen as partial to the securities industry. In 1988, he was widely regarded as a
"spoiler" in the banking reform process, with the power to block any proposal he did no~
like. Robert M. Garsson, Proxmire Seen Maneuveringfor Reform, AM. BANKER, Sept. 26, 1988,
at 2.
245. Robert M. Garsson, Banking Panel Tums to its Own Turf Battle, AM. BANKER, Sept. 30,
1988, at 3.

242.

FARBER

ORDESHOOK,
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gotiations between the Banking and Commerce Committees reached
an impasse in early October 1988. Eventually, the Committees agreed
to one version of the bill, but it was late in the process. House
Speaker Wright, generally believed to oppose the bill, did not put it
on the calendar. 246
, Meanwhile, a companion bill t~the ~988 House version of Truth in
Savings, H.R. 176, had already been proposed in the Senate as Title VI
of S. 1866, the Proxmire Financial Modernization Act of 1988. 247 Senator Proxmire was retiring after the 100th Congress and wanted to
leave his mark by securing the passage of this comprehensive bill.
Had the Proxmire bill passed, it would, have represented the most
wide-ranging change in regulation of the banking industry since the
Depression. 248 But the Proxmire bill did not pass. When it got
bogged down in the Senate, Senator Proxmire proposed tying his entire bill to H.R. 176-the House version of Truth in Savings-as an
amendment. Because H.R. 176 had already been approved by the
House, it would have been appropriately before the Senate. This parliamentary move would have allowed the full Senate to consider the
Proxmire Financial Modernization Act and then return it to the
House for ratification as an amendment to H.R. 176. 249 Due to political maneuvering by other senators, however, Senator Proxmire was
unable to use H.R. 176 in his plan. 250 Even if Proxmire had been able
to get the amended version of H.R. 176 out of the Senate and sent
back to the House, House Speaker Wright would in all likelihood not
have asked the House Rules Committee to clear the bill for House
action. 251
The legislative history of the bill in the 100th Congress illustrates
congressional micropolitics at work. While the neo-republican model
would have political representatives deliberating over laws addressing
problems for the public interest, in fact, little attention is paid to the
problem-solving aspects of legislation. Instead, Representative
Dingell's drive to protect the political power that resided in his com246. Speaker Wright hailed from Texas, a state with wildcat S&Ls that already operated
under very liberal state laws. See STEPHEN PIZZO ET AL., INSIDE JOB: THE LOOTING OF
AMERICA'S SAVINGS & LOANS 34-35 (1989) (providing an example ofthe poor S&L situation
in Texas). Texas thrifts had little to gain from the banking reforms proposed in 1988.
Speaker Wright was widely regarded as a friend of the thrift industry, see L. WILLIAM
SEIDMAN, FULL FAITH AND CREDIT 189-90 (1993), and that industry affiliation may have
influenced his perspective on banking reform. Id.
247. See Shafer, supra note 226, at 989 & n.181.
248. See generally id. (discussing advantages of Proxmire Financial Modernization Act).
249. For a discussion of these House and Senate machinations, see Chances of Banking
Reform Bill Enactment Said Slim, 51 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 569 (Oct. 3, 1988).
250. Id.
251. Garsson, supra note 244.
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mittee, Senator Proxmire's personal desire to leave his mark on the
law, and Speaker Wright's personal allegiances and prejudices together played a major role in the legislative process. The issues that
motivated Dingell, Proxmire, and Wright were personal matters that
played out as micropolitical battles within Congress. 252 The history of
Truth in Savings, therefore, illustrates the principle that much of legislative politics is micropolitics. 253
Because the importance of micropolitics in the legislative process is
widely accepted, it is not overly cynical to suggest that major policy
issues are often decided by micropolitical motives. 254 In this view,
however, hope for a true problem-solving approach to legislation
seems lost. 255 The hope appears futile because the legislative process.
seems driven in large part by micropolitical forces that are relatively
impervious to the larger public policy decisions. At the same time,
however, the power of micropolitical forces also underscores the need
to make sure the original content of the bill has as much integrity as
possible, since micropolitical forces might just as easily pass a bill as
defeat it.
The significance of political forces in the legislative process may create despair about using legislation to address societal problems or it
may present a glimmer of hope that a competent problem framer can
help create an effective law. On the side of despair, agenda setters
and others wield substantial political power throughout the legislative
process, and that power can nullify the efforts of even the most conscientious problem framer. On the hopeful side, however, the political
forces in the legislative process seem to affect the passage of a bill more
than its content. The fact remains that a legislative proposal under
consideration shapes the debate that follows. It also remains true that
the original legislative proposal often passes with relatively few funda252. By micro political, I am referring to the political analog to microeconomics. In
other words, the politics of the legislature as legislature, rather than the politics of the
legislature as intermediary for the macropolitical forces of society generally.
253. As Kenneth Shepsle has observed, "As far as I can determine, there is nearuniversal consensus that much of legislative politics is micropolitics. There are no grand
controversies, methodological or substantive, pitting microanalysis against macroanalysis."
Shepsle, supra note 233, at 12.
254. [d. (finding that although determining exactly what the self-interest of legislators is
presents a challenge: "[Olne is not taken to be a cynic for seeing the legislature as an arena
in which self-interested behavior is manifested, that is, in which micromotives determine
macroperformance") .
255. Although the micropolitical outlook may appear bleak, it is not completely devoid
of hope. The powerful people who dominate Congress change over time. Of the power
brokers involved in 1988-Proxmire, St. Germain, Dingell, and Wright-only
Representative Dingell remains in office as of this writing. With different personnel come
different micropolitical struggles, but chances are they will not always play out the same
way.
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mental changes. These facts, therefore, give the legislative drafter
great incentive to serve her constituents by crafting her bill in a way
that identifies the problem rigorously and proposes an effective solution. These facts should also serve as an incentive to modify the legislative process to make it more of a problem-solving method.

III.

PROSPECfS FOR IMPROVING LEGISLATIVE METHODOLOGY

Although Congress currently lacks an effective problem-solving
methodology, hope exists for improvement. Any prospects for improvement must, however, come to terms with the need to candidly
identify values and facts, make decisions based on a sophisticated
model of behavior, address causes rather than symptoms, and adequately deal with the political forces that permeate the process. The
previous discussion, however, shows that the political process may not
permit the candid separation of facts and values, that the use of models may be misleading if the policy analyst is not expert, and that the
careful examination of an issue to determine causes and conditions
frequently fails to occur. Even if a problem framer takes all these
steps, the existing political process can negate· the problem framer's
efforts. This part of the Article considers and evaluates several possible avenues for dealing with these factors to improve the problemsolving ability of Congress.
A.

Change the Legislative Process

An intimate and dynamic connection exists between the legislative
process and the content of legislation. 256 Intuitively, if one aims to
improve the legislative product, it would seem necessary to change the
legislative process. An especially important change in light of bills like
Truth in Savings would be to separate the language of a particular
legislative proposal from the underlying issue the bill is designed to
address. As was the case in Truth in Savings, the language of the draft
bill may so shape the discussion of the issue as to foreclose the consideration of policy alternatives.
Professor Edward Rubin has suggested changes to the current legislative methodology that would uncouple the text of a statute from the
problem identification process. 257 Professor Rubin's problem-solving
methodology flows from the familiar public policy analysis employed
to evaluate policy options. 258 While Professor Rubin believes that per256. See OLESZEK, supra note 149; SMITH, supra note 10; TERRY SULLIVAN, PROCEDURAL
STRUCTURE: SUCCESS AND INFLUENCE IN CONGRESS (1984).
257. Rubin, supra note I, at 283-306.
258. The public policy analysis proceeds stepwise in the following manner: (1) identify
the problem; (2) define and rank goals for solving the problem; (3) specify all relevant
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forming a complete methodical policy analysis in the course of the
legislative process is likely impossible, he nevertheless believes that
public policy analysis can form the foundation of a more effective legislative methodology.259
Professor Rubin's methodology for the design of regulatory statutes
avoids the problem of the bill's language setting the stage for the rest
of the deliberation by starting the legislative process with an issue,
rather than a fully drafted bill. After an issue has been identified, a
hearing would be called, the purpose of which would not be to write
statutory language, but rather to determine goals that generate criteria for measuring the statute's ultimate success. 260 After establishing
the goals of the legislation, the next step would determine the relationship between those goals. 261 The process would then focus on
identifYing the implementing mechanism to carry out the function of
identifYing the options available for achieving the goals identified. 262
The selection of the implementing mechanism would be made after
due consideration of political factors, the expertise of the possible implementing agencies, and the salience of the new assignment to a
given agency's general mission. 263
Professor Rubin's approach reflects a general bias toward letting
the implementing agency, rather than Congress, hammer out the details of regulatory policies. 264 He offers little formal methodology with
regard to substantive provisions of the statute, since he observes that
legislators tend to focus on a bill's substance to the exclusion of all
options for meeting the goals; (4) collect data relevant to each option; (5) predict
consequences on the basis of the data collected; and (6) select the option that best
achieves the goals. Id. at 282; see also CARL V. PATION & DAVID S. SAWICKI, BASIC METHODS
OF POLICY ANALYSIS AND PLANNING 26-38 (1986).
259. Rubin, supra note I, at 282-83.
260. Id. at 286. Professor Rubin would focus on goals rather than on rigorous problem
definition because, in his view, the way Congress works tends to conflate these two
functions as a practical matter. Id. at 283.
261. Id. at 286.
262. Id. at 289. Professor Rubin identifies three general approaches to the
implementation of a statute. First, the legislature can create a new judicial or
administrative implementing mechanism. Second, it can restructure an existing judicial or
administrative implementing mechanism. Third, it can create a new set of substantive
provisions for an existing implementation mechanism. Id. at 291.
263. Id. at 292-93.
264. This position is not without its critics, who suggest that Congress has gone too far in
delegating to administrative agencies. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Legislative Theory and the
Rule of Law: Some Comments on Rubin, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 427 (1989). On the other hand, it
has been argued that the goal of deliberative decisionmaking that serves as a central
aspiration of the civic republican model may only be achieved through the operation of
administrative agencies. Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic
State, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1511, 1541 (1992); see infra notes 287-93 and accompanying text.

1994]

TRUTH IN SAVINGS

1355

else. 265 Similarly, he would not suggest the development of an array
of policy options during the legislative process because he believes
that once the goal is chosen, the possibilities for its attainment will
probably be apparent to the legislators. 266 His approach represents a
coherent and justifiable approach for improving legislative methodology. It would avoid the problem ~f the proposed text of a bUI shaping
the policy options by separating· the problem-identification process
from the text drafting process. That change alone would result in the
legislature's considering more options in response to problems.
His methodology, however, also has shortcomings. First, the proposed methodology does not call for a rigorous identification of the
problem that the legislation is supposed to address. Professor Rubin
appears too willing to give up on the possibility that the legislative
process could ever perform a rigorous public policy analysis of proposed legislation. 267 Instead; he willingly forgoes a rigorous problemidentification process and settles for a hearing to establish the goals of
the legislation. The mere identification of goals, however, does not
form a good basis for policy development. As Professor Rubin's own
observations show, goals can be quite malleable and may be more a
justification for a law rather than a reason for the law's existence. 268
Second, Professor Rubin does not suggest a methodology for linking the proposed legislative response to the problem being addressed.
He does not offer any methodology for guiding the creation of legislation other than articulating goals and carefully considering. the
method of implementation. This lack of explicit methodology may
result from his view of the legislative function primarily as the method
by which to create authority for agencies to act. 269 In practice, however, Congress does not act solely by issuing directions to agencies.
Often, Congress gets involved in the details of particular businesses,
265. Rubin, supra note 1, at 295.
266. ld. The final step in his methodology would call for either Congress or the
implementing agency to gather data to evaluate the efficacy of the substantive provisions in
light of the goals that had been identified. [d. at 299-300. This evaluative step might be
achieved through "experimental" legislation-that is, legislation with limited geographic
and/ or temporal applicability-or other means. [d .. at 302-06.
267. In one sentence, Professor Rubin dismisses the possibility of a legislative drafter
engaging in formal policy analysis, saying that "[e]ven the most politicalIy-insulated, highlytrained, individual decisionmaker cannot follow this approach [formal public policy
analysis] for even the most technical decisions." [d. at 282.
268. In connection with the Truth in Lending Act, Professor Rubin noted that the bill's
sponsors were quite willing to change the stated goals of their bill to suit evidence
presented to the subcommittee. [d. at 281. In Professor Rubin's words, "Although the
Subcommittee failed to consider alternative methods for reaching its goals, it was willing to
consider alternative goals by which its chosen methods could be justified." [d. at 280-81.
269. [d. at 283; Rubin, supra note 5, at 372-85.
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especially banking-Truth in Savings being one example. Professor
Rubin's approach would offer no guidance in these situations.
Third, Professor Rubin's process trusts the congressional committee
structure to carry out the process of issue identification and goal prioritization. If the goal of the legislative process is to find substantively
correct solutions to social problems, however, relying on the existing
committee structure to carry out those tasks will doom the project to
failure. Congressional committees are political hotbeds. 270 Any issue
that comes out of a committee will be shot through with political considerations. 271 In addition, committee members have too many demands on their time to attend or participate whole-heartedly in
committee hearings. 272 Finally, committees are an improbable place
for careful examination of the causes and conditions of an issue because most committee members already have their minds made up
about the topic before any witnesses ever appear and do not care to
obtain any additional information. 273
Overall, as a method for improving the problem-solving methodology of Congress, Professor Rubin's approach would tend to achieve
the important goal of separating the proposed language of the bill
from the identification of issues and goals. It would, however, allow
the political process to throw obstacles in the path of problem framers
trying to analyze problems rigorously.
B.

Require Written Justification of Legislative Enactments

Professor Robert Seidman has proposed a second approach to improving legislative methodology. He would impose a requirement
that Congress accompany legislative enactments with memoranda of
law justifying the action, in much the same way that judges are required to write opinions. 274 Professor Seidman focuses on the work of
the legislative drafter and the need to justify the legislation in terms of
the neo-republican ideal. 275

270. OLESZEK, supra note 149, at 93-97.
27l. As we have seen, political forces may prevent a problem framer from being able to
separate values from facts in the problem-identification process. See supra notes 181-82 and
accompanying text.
272. How CONGRESS WORKS, supra note 149, at 45; OLESZEK, supra note 149, at 98.
273. OLESZEK, supra note 149, at 98.
274. Seidman, supra note 5, at 7-8. Although legislative enactments are already
frequently accompanied by some information from the legislative drafter, those materials
are often incomplete and of poor quality. Id. at 3-4.
275. Id.
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The first part of the memorandum would identify the problem addressed by the legislation. 276 Professor Seidman insists that the
drafter be candid about her underlying view of the world so that other
players in the process might understand why she views the behavior as
a problem. The drafter would be required to develop causal explanations for the difficulty based on a sophisticated model. To perform
this task, the drafter would have to distinguish between causes and
conditions277 and provide adequate explanations. 278 To ensure the
rigor of this step, the explanations must be provable and not based on
mere assertions of subjective values or attitudes. 279
The memorandum would also require the drafter to propose a solution to the problem identified. It would have to demonstrate how the
proposed legislation would provide the most efficient solution by
describing alternative possible solutions (from history, comparative
law, scholarly writing, interested parties, or theory), describing the
proposed solution and showing how it addresses the causes earlier explicated, demonstrating how the legislation will induce the behavior it
prescribes, and preparing a cost-benefit analysis. 280
Professor Seidman's approach would go a long way toward ensuring
that a rigorous problem-solving methodology guided the legislative
drafting process. Following his system, a legislative drafter would put
the world on notice as to what values she sees the world through. It
would also require the drafter to defend rigorously her policy choices
with the use of empirical evidence, and it would ensure analysis of the
causes and conditions of the problem by making that analysis
compulsory.
Despite its many good points, Professor Seidman's approach suffers
from several weaknesses. The foremost deficiency of the approach is
that it fails to deal adequately with political influences. 281 Professor
Seidman concedes that for his method to work, the drafter cannot be
just an advocate of the bill, but instead must be an advocate of the
276. Professor Seidman sees all appropriate legislative problems as patterns of
undesirable social behavior and all appropriate legislative responses as attempts to change
that undesirable behavior. [d. at 60.
277. [d. at 62.
278. To merely state the absence of a proposed solution as a cause of the problem would
not be a sufficiently adequate explanation. [d. at 63.

279.

[d.

280. [d. at 65. Finally, Professor Seidman's approach, like Professor Rubin's, would
require some mechanism to monitor and evaluate the efficacy of the solution in terms of
the problem identified. This requirement might be met through any of several devices,
such as a "sunset clauses" or a requirement of periodic reports to Congress. [d. at 74-76.
281. Professor Seidman recognizes three separate aspects of the legislative project:
power, substance, and form. [d. at 12. His approach deals with the substantive element, to
the exclusion of the others. [d. at 15.

,
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legislative process. 282 As an ideal, this approach carries much weight,
but in the political world of Congress, a proposal for improved legislative methodology must take political reality into account.
A second shortcoming relates to the first: the approach requires
candor on the part of the drafter. Drafters would have to be forthright about the "grand theory" employed to rationalize the proposal.
Despite the benefits that may 'flow from 'candor in the legislative process, however, it may be politically impossible as a practical matter. 283
In addition to the many political obstacles that make candor difficult,
on a more subtle level the drafter likely has only a dim idea of what
her'true domain assumptions are or what "grand theory" she employs
when looking at the world. 284
Third, the Seidman methodology places a great many demands on
the drafter's time, resources, and expertise to prepare a comprehensive memorandum justifying the legislation. Many drafters, especially
those in congressional representatives' offices, will not have the time,
resources, or expertise to carry out the task. Asking those staffers to
employ sophisticated models to justify their proposals may result in a
poor work product.
Although Professor Seidman's approach possesses the beneficial aspects of a methodical system 'ror defining problems and analyzing the
policy choices in terms of the identified problems, as a practical and
political matter, it may not be a workable alternative.
C.

Delegate to Non-Congressional Bodies

Some of the problems with the current legislative methodology may
be overcome by involving non-congressional groups such as regulatory
agencies, ad hoc committees, or standing "editorial boards" in the legislative process. These groups would tend to de-politicize the process
somewhat and also bring a degree of expertise to the substance of the
legislation that congressional representatives may lack.

282. [d. at 17 (citing Purdy, supra note 19, at 77-78).
283. See supra notes 183-91 and accompanying text.
284. In remarking about candor in the judicial context, Professor Zeppos noted:
It is also possible that judges reach a result consistent with their personal
preferences but convince themselves that they have done no more than
read the originalist evidence. Thus, if we asked these judges to be candid
and to tell us their 'real' reasons, they would look genuinely puzzled and
point to their written opinions.
Zeppos, supra note 183, at 409. A similar self-deception or lack of self-knowledge may
affect legislative drafters as well.
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Delegate to Ad Hoc Committees

An alternative to the usual method of producing legislation would
be to have Congress act only as a problem identifier and to delegate
the study of those problems to ad hoc corpmittees. Congress has successfully employed this method in the past in areas of substantive or
political complexity.285 This method possesses several strengths. First,
by impaneling an ad hoc group of experts, problems could be identified on more neutral ideological grounds than in the political arena.
Second, the panel might be capable of highly sophisticated analysis
and could examine matters closely to determine causes and conditions. Third, the panels, being unelected and serving in an ad hoc
capacity, might be less subject to political influences than elected
representatives.
On the other hand, the outside committee process would present
extreme logistical problems for Congress. It makes sense in many situations where Congress lacks the political will to act or lacks the expertise necessary to address the issue. Because of the time involved,
however, it would not prove an effective method of carrying out the
routine business of Congress. Also, appointing special commissions as
a routine event might raise concerns about the legitimacy of the political process. For example, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Commission may have successfully closed unneeded military bases
precisely because it was an anti-democratic body and its proceedings
were not entirely open to the public. 286

In addition, the process employed in the special committee may fail
to meet the basic requirements of democratic'norms and the composition of the special committees might run afoul of democratic values.
While commissions might be structured in such a way that all affected
constituencies are represented, some parties with legitimate concerns
may be left out or, worse yet, the commission may be stacked to give
one viewpoint more weight. The special commission structure, therefore, may help achieve the goals of providing expert analysis of the
problem with some insulation from politics, but it may not be politically acceptable.

285. The examples of copyright law, bankruptcy law, military base closings, social
security reform, and health care are discussed supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
286. See Michael A. Fitts, Can Ignorance Be Bliss? Imperfect Information as a Positive Influence
in Political Institutions, 88 MICH. L. REv. 917, 952-53 (1990) (suggesting the success of the
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission and other ad hoc national
commissions has been due, at least in part, to the fact that the commission structure allows
the creation of an informal bargaining mechanism outside of the public eye).
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Delegate to Agencies

Some commentators suggest that any hopes for rational policy decisionmaking rest with the administrative agencies and not with Congress. 287 They favor a system where Congress identifies big issues and
delegates to agencies the authority to carry out the policy articulated
by Congress. This approach is consistent with the goal of insuring a
coherent regulatory strategy by allowing the agencies to take broad
congressional directives and translate them into specific policies. 288
Such an approach would also achieve the requirement that policymakers look at the world with the aid of a sophisticated model, as the
agency experts likely will be sophisticated in the issues presented. Finally, the opportunity afforded to interested parties to participate in
the administrative process and the relative insulation of the regulators
from the political forces that buffet Congress 289 make the administrative agencies the most likely place where true deliberation will take
place and where good policy decisions will be made. 290
Other commentators, however, have questioned the view that administrative agencies possess the expertise and political insulation
often c1aimed. 291 One of the most difficult matters to deal with in the
context of independent agencies is the tendency of those bodies to
come under the strong influence of the very industries they are sup287. Professor Rubin has been an advocate of allowing administrative agencies to playa
more active role in policy development. In his legislative methodology discussed above,
the purpose of the legislative effort would primarily be to direct an administrative agency
to take action in a particular area. Rubin, supra note I, at 283.
288. GARTEN, supra note 132, at 147-50. This process has been employed in many areas
of substantive federal law. Most of antitrust law, for instance, flows from the very broad
provisions of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), which basically
allows the Justice Department to develop substantive antitrust laws through litigation and
agency guidelines. Similarly, the Federal Trade Commission was created with the relatively
broad mission of preventing the use of "unfair methods of competition." 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(a)(2) (1988). Along the same lines, the Federal Communications Commission was
charged with regulating broadcasting "as public convenience, interest, or necessity
requires." 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1988).
289. Although one might argue that the administrative agencies are subject to political
forces as well, the forces seem to be somewhat attenuated because the executive branch
must have its nominees approved by the Senate and because the P9litically appointed
agency head must deal with an apolitical staff of civil servants who may undercut the
particular political ideology of the agency chief. See generally Strauss, supra note 122.
290. See Seidenfeld, supra note 264, at 1541-50.
29l. See Cutler & Johnson, supra note 122, at 1402-09 ("Some critics tell us that
independent agencies have been captured by the industries they regulate. Instead of
praise for useful continuity, we hear complaints about excessive bureaucratic rigidity.").
The authors go on to note that increasingly the agencies are being asked to decide political
questions, rather than questions requiring the action of disinterested "experts." [d. at
1405.
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posed to regulate. 292 If the agencies charged with developing policy
are predisposed to one group, the problem-identification process will
be skewed and the entire regulatory effort will go awry.293

3. Adopt The Uniform Law/Permanent Editorial Board Model
Another alternative regime for improving federal statutes is to take
a page from the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL) and establish expert panels to oversee and revise existing regulatory structures and suggest changes for their improvement. 294 Congress has experimented on occasion with the use
of expert or "blue ribbon" panels to help formulate national policy on
an ad hoc basis. 295 On a more permanent basis, however, it could
establish "permanent editorial boards" (for lack of a better term)
based on the model used for the development of uniform and model
state laws. 296 The uniform laws model would permit experts from industry, academia, and the legal profession to draft legislation. Such a
panel would certainly operate with a sophisticated model of how the
real world works and would have experience \\ith the problems the
statutes should address. A standing editorial board could monitor the
statute to make sure it is carrying out its intended purpose and addressing all the issues it was supposed to address without inadvertently
raising new ones.
292. When an interest group "captures" an agency, the agency begins to act as an
advocate for a parochial interest rather than disinterested, independent experts. See
Sunstein, supra note 69, at 426-28.
293. Taking the situation with Truth in Savings as an example, an agency considering
the issues presented by Truth in Savings could frame the issues in very different ways. With
respect to the relationship between the bank and its customer, for instance, a regulator
with a pro-consumer bias might identify the problem as unfair bargaining power between
banks and their customers such that banks can dictate the terms of deposit accounts and
customers must live with those terms. On the other hand, a regulator with a pro-banking
bias might look at the bank-customer relationship and see a problem where banks were
being subjected to potentially ruinous litigation arising from Perdue-type claims. See supra
notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
294. Professors Neil Cohen and Barry Zaretsky have suggested such an arrangement for
the unification of commercial law. Neil B. Cohen & Barry L. Zaretsky, Drafting Commercial
Law for the New Millenium: Will the Current Process Suffice?, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 551, 557-61
(1993).
295. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
296. For an overview of the structure and history of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, see Frederick H. Miller et aI., Introduction to
Uniform Commercial Code Annual Survey: The Centennial of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 46 Bus. LAw. 1449, 1449-51 (1991);JamesJ. White, Ex
Proprio Vigore, 89 MICH. L. REv. 2096, 2097-103 (1991). For an overview of the process by
which the Model Business Corporation Act (overseen by the American Bar Association,
rather than the NCCUSL) is revised, see Robert W. Hamilton, Reflections of a Reporter, 63
TEX. L. REv. 1455, 1458-63 (1985).
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Although in theory a politically insulated, independent panel of experts proposing a new law might be expected to produce a high quality proposal for legislation, the evidence from the uniform-laws
process does not necessarily bear out that assumption. 297 In the 101
years of its existence, the NCCUSL has proposed between 200 298 and
360 299 acts, depending on how one defines an "act." The quality of
the uniform law proposals has varied considerably. Using the number
of states that have adopted a proposed uniform law as a proxy for
quality, the NCCUSL's success rate has been quite modest. Only
twenty-two acts have been adopted by more than forty states,300 while
107 acts have been enacted in fewer than ten states. 301
Evidence of the uneven quality of the uniform acts need not rest
solely on the record of adoptions. Common experiences establish
that the uniform law process sometimes produces a poor product.
While the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) has been hailed as "the
most spectacular success story in the history of American law,"302
many professors and lawyers can relate horror stories of particular
provisions (or entire articles) that do not work very well, despite 'the
prolonged efforts of many dedicated and talented persons at the NCCUSL.303 Although specific flawed provisions in a statute as complex
297. The NCCUSL is an elite group, typically composed of prominent lawyers selected
by the governor of their home state. White, supra note 296, at 2096. In Professor White's
words, the NCCUSL is a group "much more sophisticated in the law and more interested
in long-range questions than they would be if they [were elected legislators who] had to
stand for reelection every two or four years." [d.
298. [d. at 2103.
299. Richard E. Coulson, The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
and the Control of Law-Making - A Historical Essay, 16 OKLA. CrIY U. L. REv. 295 (1991).
300. White, supra note 296, at 2103. Actually, this number somewhat overstates the
success rate because the Uniform Commercial Code-by far the NCCUSL's most
successful project-replaced several different earlier successful uniform acts and itself is
counted as at least three acts (original 1962 version and subsequent revisions). [d. at 210304.
301. [d. at 2103. Of that 107, 77 have not been adopted by even five states, and beyond
that a number of proposed acts were never adopted by any jurisdiction. [d.
302. JAMES WHITE & ROBERT SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 5 (3d ed. 1988).
303. Probably the most notorious example of a botched provision of a uniform law is
§ 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code. In the words of Grant Gilmore, § 2-207 is
"arguably the greatest statutory mess of all time" and "was a miserable, bungled, patchedup job-both text and Comment-to which various hands ... contribute~ at various
points, each acting independently of the others (like the blind men and the elephant)."
Letter from Grant Gilmore, Professor of Law, Vermont School of Law, to Robert S.
Summers, Professor of Law, Cornell University Law School (Sept. 10, 1980), reproduced in
RICHARD E. SPEIDEL ET AL., SALES AND SECURED TRANSACTIONS 514 (5th ed. 1993). Section
2-207's poor performance may be a function of the strained process it underwent on the
way to becoming part of the UCC and the subsequent changes made to the provision after
its original formulation. For a discussion of the background of § 2-207, see WHITE &
SUMMERS, supra note 302, § 1-3.
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as the VCC should not serve as an indictment of the entire uniform
law movement, they may belie the idea that careful deliberation by a
panel of experts will, produce a flawless product. 304 In fact, no
shortage of criticism exists concerning the efforts of the NCCUSL's
recent drafting efforts. 305
A more serious problem with the uniform-laws process is that the
elite experts involved in the drafting process may leave a distinctive
stamp on the content of the proposed laws that end up treating one
class of persons more favorably than others. 306 The anti-democratic
aspect of the expert panel settling all the details of the legislation deflects m~ch of the legitimate input from elected representatives and
may silence the political voices of some segments of society who
should have a say in the process. 307
304. The process of drafting uniform law provisions is nothing if not deliberate, For a
discussion of the torturous process involved in the development of the revised Articles 3
and 4 and new Article 4A, see William D. Warren, UCC Drafting: Method and Message, 26
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 811 (1993),
305. A symposium issue of the Alabama Law Review on Article 2A contained pieces
critical of both the drafters' underlying policy choices and the language used in the Article
to put those policies into effect. See Symposium, Article 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code, 39
ALA, L. REv, 559 (1988), A similar symposium issue on the revisions to Articles 3 and 4
produced similar criticisms, See Symposium, Revised U, C. C. Articles 3 & 4 and New Article 4A,
42 ALA. L. REv, 373 (1991). The fact that so few "uniform" acts are in fact uniform
provides some evidence of dissatisfaction at .the state legislature level with the product
produced by the NCCVSL. Cf F, Stephen Knippenberg & William J. Woodward, Jr"
Uniformity and Efficiency in the Uniform Commercial Code: A Partial Research Agenda. 45 Bus.
LAw. 2519 (1990) (discussing the VCC's strengths and weaknesses despite its actual
uniformity among the several states).
306. For instance, Articles 3 and 4 of the VCC have been criticized as pro-bank and anticonsumer, a result achieved primarily because of the composition of the drafting
committee, See generally Gail K. Hillebrand, Revised Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial
Code: A Consumer Perspective, 42 ALA, L. REv, 679 (1991) (noting the negative effects on
consumers, specifically in the regulation of checking accounts); Edward L. Rubin,
Efficiency, Equity and the Praposed Revision of Articles 3 and 4. 42 ALA. L. REv. 551 (1991)
(noting the failure of implementing economic efficiency or social equity for the
consumer); Julianna J. Zekan, Comparative Negligence Under the Code: Protecting Negligent
Banks Against Negligent Customers, 26 V, MICH.J.L. REFORM 125 (1993) (noting the increase
in consumer responsibilities and in potential consumer liability).
307. Professor Edward Rubin has related his experiences as chair of the ABA committee
that had input into the revisions of Articles 3 and 4 in a surprisingly frank article that
severely criticizes the drafting process. Edward L. Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, Acting Like
a Lobbyist: Some Notes on the Process of Revising UCC Articles 3 and 4, 26 Loy. L.A, L. REv, 743
(1993). In the article, he states that the revisions of Articles 3 and 4 do the bidding of the
banking industry with little regard to the interests of other groups affected by the payments
process, especially consumers. See id, He notes:
In the process of drafting and enacting the revisions of Articles 3 and 4,
however, one of the major forces was not present. Banks were well
represented; corporate users were· represented intermittently; but
consumers were virtually unrepresented. The result was that the banking
industry and its attorneys dominated the entire process, save for a few brief
interludes .. , , The banking industry is entitled to be represented, of
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Another possible drawback to this method is that it may tend only
to codify existing practice 308 and ignore new ideas or innovative approaches to the problem. 309 The result of this tendency may produce
a law that will require frequent revisions and amendment, especially if
it has many technical provisions. 310 This result defeats the goal of employing experts in order to achieve a sophisticated view of the
problems addressed in hopes of implementing innovative and effective policies. In light of these several criticisms, therefore, creating
"permanent editorial boards" may not result in more effective
legislation.
D.

Post-Enactment Review

An alternative to changing the legislative process to get the legislation right in the first place is to create post-enactment review mechanisms whereby the legislation would be required to justify itself based
on the problem it was supposed to solve. Reviewing the legislation
after enactment would affect the legislative process because sponsors
of legislation who want their statutes to remain in effect will be more
explicit about what goals the law seeks to achieve and how those goals
course, and it can be expected to lobby assiduously for its positions. But
the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws should not lend their names to the bankers'
enterprise. When then do, as occurred with the Article 3 and 4 revisions,
they give the banking industry the ability to clothe itself with public policy,
and to overwhelm most state legislatures with a false aura of public-oriented
impartiality. This was a disgrace. If the ALI and NCCUSL cannot do better
under their present structure, both organizations should be extensively
reformed or entirely abolished.
Id. at 787-88; see also Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform Laws
Process: Some Lessonsfrom the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REv. 83 (1993) (analyzing
the current structure of the uniform laws drafting process and concluding that it "is almost
custom-made for the drafting and enactment of pro-business legislation").
308. See Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code:
Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REv. 605, 626-27 (1981) (voicing concern that
the codification process tends to enshrine the practices of the past).
The basic flaw in our analysis was our failure to perceive that the twentieth
century financing assignee was not in the least like the stranger who, one
hundred and fifty years earlier, had bought goods, commercial paper, and
other property in an open market without being able to find out about the
prior history of whatever he bought.
Id.; see also Richard Danzig, A Comment on the jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27
STAN. L. REv. 621 (1975).
309. Commenting on the Revised Model Business Corporation Act, Professor Hamilton
stated: "A major consequence of the Committee's large plurality of practicing attorneys
was a substantial conservatism. By and large, this group was reluctant to consider
innovative proposals unless the need for them had been demonstrated by actual practice
or experience." Hamilton, supra note 296, at 1466.
310. Julian B. McDonnell, The Code Project Confronts Fundamental Dilemmas, 26 Loy. LA.
L. REv. 683, 686-88 (1993).
.
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will be achieved. Post-enactment review would also provide legislators
with valuable feedback about which approaches work and which do
not. 311 In general, four approaches have evolved to carry out postenactment review: enhanced judicial review, sunset clauses, oversight
committees, and law revision or audit commissions.

l.

Enhanced Judicial Review

There seems to be a dynamic link between the judiciary and the
legislature where the actions of one may result in actions by the
other. 312 Professor Cass Sunstein has argued for heightened judicial
review of congressional enactments to reinforce the ideals of the neorepublican model and, by implication, to improve the content of legislation. 313 Professor Sunstein would seek to heighten the rationality
requirement of the equal protection, due process, contract, and eminent domain provisions of the Constitution. 314 Under such an approach, the courts would not defer as a matter of course to legislative
actions, but rather would have to find that the legislature in fact acted
to attain a legitimate purpose and not just in response to interest
group pressures. 315 In addition, courts would insist on a tighter fit
between the statutory means and the articulated policy ends. 316 By
providing a "negative feedback loop" to legislators, judicial review
would create incentives to make the problem-solving process more rigorous and deliberate.
Professor Sunstein's approach might make legislatures more deliberative, but it might as easily make them more devious. Given the
complexity of the legislative process and Congress' sheer size,judicial
review of the deliberative nature of the legislative process may be a
weak method of improving the legislative product. 317 Even if the judiciary were to take a more active role in the critique of the legislative
process by articulating a set of values that support our legal system and
311. Designers of legislation need information about the failure of statutes in order to
improve statutory design, See supra note 13.
312. See, e.g., John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, Limitation of Statutes: Strategic Statutory
Interpretation, 80 CEO. LJ. 565 (1992) (discussing how judicial review affects the
deliberative processes in the other branches of a democratic government); Mark C. Miller,
Congress and The Constitution: A Tale of Two Committees, 3 CONST. LJ. 317 (1993) (examining
how different congressional committees handle constitutional matters).
313. CAss R. SUNSTEIN, AFrER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 164 (1990); Sunstein, supra note
160, at 69-72.
314. Sunstein, supra note 160, at 69.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Seidenfeld, supra note 264, at 1541.
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form the basis for governmental policy,318 the use of judicial review
would likely fall short of improving the problem-solving process by
enhancing the neo-republican ideal.3 19 The effect of judicial review is
too far removed from the policy-development process to make an
impact.

2. Sunset Provisions
Commentators have remarked on the modern explosion in statutory law320 and the need to elhni'nate unnecessary or obsolete statutes. 321 One approach to weeding out laws is to make legislative
enactments terminate after some set period of time, subject to explicit
review and reauthorization. 322 During the 1970s, a number of states
adopted sunset laws designed to force the review of government programs after a certain time period. 323 Under these statutes, the review
of government programs often is delegated to an independent audit
agency with the power to make recommendations to the legislature. 324
At the national level, a sunset law was introduced in Congress but was
never passed. 325
318. This approach has been suggested by Professor Frank Michelman. Michelman,
Forward, supra note 160, at 66-73.
319. Seidenfeld, supra note 264, at 1542. Professor Sunstein concedes that the judicial
branch acting on its own will not be able to accomplish a great deal in bringing politics
closer to the republican ideal, but nevertheless maintains that if courts adopted a more.
explicit republican outlook on the political process they could exert some influence on the
political process. Sunstein, supra note 160, at 68.
320. See Hutchinson & Morgan, supra note 6, at 1753 (providing statistics on explosion
of legislative activity at state legislature level and number of cases before Supreme Court
involving application of a statute).
321. See, e.g., Garwood et aI., supra note 67, at 793.
322. An early proponent of this idea was Professor Theodore Lowi. Professor Lowi
found inspiration in the writings of Thomas Jefferson to propose a "Tenure of Statutes
Act," which would place a limit of five to ten years on every organic act of Congress.
THEODORE]' LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 309-10 (1969). In Professor Lowi's view, the
required termination of the program would require serious thought on the part of
Congress as to whether to keep the program alive and would supplant the largely
superficial (in his view) review of programs that occurs each year during the
appropriations process. Id.
323. More than 75% of the states have some form of sunset legislation on the books.
KI::EFE & OGUL, supra note 10, at 350; see, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-104 (West
1990 & Supp. 1993).
324. THE EFFECfIVENESS OF LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM REVIEW 17, 21 (Richard E. Brown ed.,
1979). The Connecticut.sunset law·is an example of this arrangement. CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 2c-3 (West 1988).
'
325. For a discussion of the fate of the proposed federal sunset legislation, see ESKRIDGE
& FRICKEY, supra note 163, at 860-61. It may be that because of the interaction between the
judiciary and the legislature, formal statutory sunset provisions are not necessary because
judges already employ their own "sunset" powers when interpreting statutes. Dean
Calabresi has suggested a twist on the statutory sunset scheme. He argues that judges
should be entitled to interpret legislative enactments in a manner relevant to modern
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Despite their early momentum, sunset laws have not lived up to
their advance billing. 326 It is not clear whether the use of sunset laws
would provide meaningful feedback to legislators· necessary to improve the problem-solving methodology of Congress. Many sunset
laws deal only with statutes creating government agencies. By focusing on that particular implementation mechanism, the laws would be
underinclusive in their attempt to eliminate ineffective statutes. 327
On the other hand, if sunset laws were extended to statutes that did
not create agencies, the risk of politi.cal f~rces terminating necessary
or useful statutes looms large,328 as does the risk that statutes would be
evaluated on inappropriate grounds. 329 In addition, overinclusive
sunset provisions may undermine government morale and effectiveness as the various agencies approach their "drop dead" dates. Such
an effect could adversely affect the regulatory scheme. 33o While sunset laws could prove quite disruptive, the feedback they would provide
legislative drafters appears quite attenuated.
3.

Oversight Committees

Congressional oversight committees could monitor the effectiveness of statutes. Congress engages in oversight activities on an ongoing basis. 331 Typically, congressional oversight activities are thought
conditions, or even to eradicate obsolete or anachronistic laws. GUIDO CALABRESI, A
COMMON LAw FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 34 (1982). He goes further to state that judges
already do so without explicit recognition of what they are doing. [d. at 190 n.3l.
326. KEEFE & OGUL, supra note 10, at 350.
327. ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 163, at 86l.
328. See CALABRESI, supra note 325, at 6l.
329. The methods of evaluation would have to be subject to close analysis. The match
between the problem addressed by the statute and the method of evaluation should be
demonstrated as rigorously as possible in order to avoid improper evaluations. A brief
illustration demonstrates the practical importance of the relationship between the
problem and the standard for determining the effectiveness of a policy. In the 1970s, the
federal government implemented a wide-ranging program designed to reduce drunk
driving called the Alcohol Safety Action Project (ASAP). Part of the program called for
identifYing recidivists and channelling them out of the criminal justice system and into
alcohol-abuse treatment programs. The purpose for this effort was to help alcohol abusers
come to grips with their drinking and thereby reduce the incidence of repeat offenders.
The ASAP pilot program's effectiveness was measured, however, in terms of whether it
produced a decrease in alcohol-related fatalities in the cities where it had been
implemented. No statistically significant reduction was noted, so treatment programs were
labelled as ineffective in the fight against drunk driving. The obvious mismatch between
the treatment program's goals and the method used to evaluate it highlight the need to be
clear about the link between a law's purpose and the way in which attainment of that
purpose will be judged. See Eric J. Gouvin, Note, Drunk Driving and t~ Alcoholic Offender: A
New Approach to an Old Problem, 12 AM.J.L. & MED. 99,123-24 (1987).
330. ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 163, at 863.
331. In general, the oversight activities of Congress can be broken down into four
substantive areas: review of policy implementation; review of the administrative structure;
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of in connection with authorizations,332 appropriations,333 and explicit oversight-investigatory actions,334 although the informal (and
cumulative) aspects of congressional monitoring should not be underestimated. 335 The General Accounting Office provides additional
oversight of programs, and its activities often form the basis for formal
congressional hearings. 336 When congressional oversight works well,
it can ferret out waste and mismanagement,337 allow politically elected
representatives to exercise some control over the unelected administrative bureaucracy,338 and provide useful information back to the legislature. 339 Conceivably, the oversight function might inform the
legislature about the effectiveness of particular programs, the accuracy of particular problem descriptions, and other matters relating to
the problem-solving capacity of Congress.
Placing such a burden on existing oversight mechanisms, however,
may be overwhelming. The existing system of congressional oversight
is far from perfect. 340 One obvious shortcoming is that it is not systematic, but rather is somewhat rare (in its formal mode) and fairly
particularistic in its inquiry.341 Even with congressional agencies
charged with oversight of particular programs, the level of inquiry can
vary considerably based on the personalities of the parties involved or
review of the individuals charged with implementing policies; and review of the
expenditure of public funds. For a general discussion, see KEEFE & OGUL, supra note 10, at
342-66.
332. OLESZEK, supra note 149, at 268.
333. Id.
334. The explicit oversight-investigatory activities of Congress are carried out most
visibly by two standing committees, the House Committee on Government Operations and
the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, which have more or less free reign to look
into the operation of government programs. See CHRISTOPHER H. FOREMAN, SIGNALS FROM
THE HILL: CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT AND THE CHALLENGE OF SOCIAL REGULATION 12
(1988).
335. Id.
336. Id. at 16.
337. See KEEFE & OGUL, supra note 10, at 357-62.
338. The oversight process performs this function by (1) providing an avenue to allow
Congress to add flesh to administrative directives that were necessarily broad or vague
when passed; (2) keeping a check on bureaucrats' policy choices; and (3) challenging the
executive branch over policy implementation. See FOREMAN, supra note 334, at 17l.
339. Id. at 13.
340. For an overview of the many shortcomings of political oversight, see Sidney A.
Shapiro, Political Oversight and the Deterioration of Regulatory Policy, 46 AoMIN L. REv. 1 (1994).
341. ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 163, at 486; Keefe & Ogul, supra note 10, at 360;
FOREMAN. supra note 334, at 84. It appears that no one really knows how much oversight
Congress engages in, as the definition of "oversight" is far from precise and could include a
wide range of informal activities, such as the review of required agency reports, informal
communication with regulators, and ad hoc groups within the Congress. OLESZEK, supra
note 149. at 277.
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ideological matters. 342 Because congressional oversight will necessarily be a political process, impartial evaluation of programs may be beyond its reach. 343 Because of the overwhelmingly political character
of the existing oversight process, therefore, it may not serve as the best
way to improve the underlying legislative methodology. The political
realities that bedevil the problem-framing process will resurface in the
context of political oversight of those statutes.
4.

Law Revision/Audit Commissions

Another way to .provide feedback to legislators about the effectiveness of their statutes is to revise the laws systematically. Although Congress has from time to time revised the federal laws, the process does
not proceed with the regularity that it does in other countries. 344 One
method for effecting such a systematic revision process is to create a
law revision commission. This idea is not a new one. 345 Justice Benjamin Cardozo called for the creation of a law revision commission
more than seventy years ago to help sort out the chaos of federal legislation,346 and he has been joined over the years by others,347 including Judge-now Justice-Ruth Bader Ginsburg. 348 An active law
revision commission could go a long way toward consolidating and
updating statutes and removing archaic language, Latin expressions,
342. ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 163, at 485·86 (relating the experience of oversight
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a function of the personalities involved); KEEFE & OGUL,
supra note 10, at 362 ("Oversight is an 'intensely political activity.' Its performance varies
with changes in political climate.").
343. As currently structured, the oversight process serves as part of the dynamic
checking mechanism between Congress and the executive. Frequently, the oversight
process is more a form of "guerilla warfare" on specific administration policies than it is an
impartial evaluation of the "right" policies. See OLESZEK, supra note 149, at 277·78.
344. Canada has performed seven complete revisions of its federal statutes since
Confederation in 1867. Peter E. Johnson, Legislative Drafting Practices and Other Factors
Affecting the Clarity of Canada's Laws, 12 STATUTE L. REv. 1,3·4 (1991).
345. Justice Cardozo noted in 1921 that in the countries of continental Europe the
project had already "passed into the realm of settled practice." Benjamin N. Cardozo, A
Ministry ofjustice, 35 fuRV. L. REv. 113, 114 (1921).
346. Justice Cardozo envisioned a "Ministry ofJustice" as a courier between the judiciary
and the legislature, helping to keep communication open so Congress would be made
aware of particularly troublesome statutes that might profitably be amended. Id. at 113·14.
347. See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking - judges Who Can't and Legislators
Who Won't, 63 CoLUM. L. REv. 787 (1963) (proposing an agency to oversee and revise
proposed legislation); Bernard S. Meyer,justice, Bureaucracy, Structure, and Simplification, 42
MD. L. REv. 659, 675·79 (1983); Roscoe Pound, Anachronisms in Law, 3 AM. JUDICATURE
SOC'y 142,145 (1920) (proposing a "ministry of justice, charged with the responsibility of
making the legal system an effective instrument for justice").
348. Justice Ginsburg has called for Congress to systematically take a "second look" at
statutes, especially those identified by the judiciary as ambiguous. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg
& Peter W. Huber, The lntercircuit Committee, 100 fuRV. L. REv. 1417,1429·34 (1987); Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, A Plea for Legislative Review, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 995,1011·17 (1987).
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transition provisions, and other obsolete material. 349 Such a commission might also create an incentive for legislators-who want to see
their enactments stay on the books-to pay closer attention to the
effectiveness of the legislation being produced.
Several states operate such commissions,350 as do other major English-speaking industrial countries. 351 In fact, the United States already
has such an office, called the Office of Law Revision Counsel. 352
Although on paper the Office of Law Revision Counsel's powers
sound impressive,353 its modest staffing, limited compensation levels,
and lack of participation by members of Congress translates into limited prospects for meaningful revision of federal statues as a practical
matter. 354 Justice Ginsburg has suggested raising the functions of the
Office to a more active status and putting members of Congress in
charge of the operation. 355 By invigorating the Office, the judiciary's
task of deciphering legislation might be made easier and the quality of
the legislative product may improve.
How directly such a commission would affect the legislative process
is an open question. If political realities require the passage of a bad
law, a bad law will be passed. Because law revision commissions have
the power to recommend change, but not to enact it, their effectiveness rests on the legislature's taking action. Yet, the legislature'S failure to act (or to act properly) is exactly the problem the law revision
commission must wrestle with in the first place. 356 As with oversight
committees, the political process may frustrate attempts to enforce
discipline on the lawmaking power of Congress.
349. Johnson, supra note 344, at 3-4.
350. In general, state law revision commissions fall into one of three models: (1) those
that perform administrative duties and revise statutes, e.g., Maine, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
I, §§ 91-95 (West Supp. 1992); Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. ANN. § 13.83 (West 1986 & Supp.
1993); (2) those that revise laws by unifying and reorganizing laws scattered throughout a
state's statutes, e.g., Maryland, MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 2-1315 to 2-1318 (1984); and
(3) those with broader powers to recommend substantive changes to the law, e.g.,
California, CAL. GOV'T. CODE §§ 8280-8298 (West 1992); New York, N.Y. LEGIS. LAw §§ 7072 (McKinney 1991). For a general discussion, see Catherine T. Clarke, Comment, A
Survey of the District of Columbia Law Revision Commission, 34 CATH. U. L. REv. 1309 (1985).
351. For instance, Great Britain operates such a commission, see MICHAEL ZANDER, THE
LAW-MAKING PROCESS 367-74 (2d ed. 1985), as does Canada, see Johnson, supra note 344.
352. See 2 U.S.C. § 285 (1988).
353. The Office of Law Revision Counsel is charged with proposing amendments to
"remove ambiguities, contradictions and other imperfections both of substance and of
form" from the federal statutes, 2 U.S.C. § 285b(1) (1988), the submission of
recommendations for the removal of "obsolete, superfluous and superseded provisions,"
id. § 285b(2), and the periodic preparation and publication of the U.S. Code, id.
§ 285b(3).
354. Ginsburg & Huber, supra note 348, at 1432.
355. Id.
356. CALABRESI, supra note 325, at 63-64.
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Institutionalize the Policy Analysis Functipn

Rather than focusing on post-enactment review, changing the legislative process in order to get the policy right in the first place may be a
more profitable approach. One way to move toward that goal would
be to modify the legislative process to ensure that every bill receives
the benefit of some formal policy analysis. Many bills considered by
Congress already undergo sophisticated policy analysis. 357 Although
Congress has developed some policy analysis expertise,358 a significant
number of bills, like Truth in Savings, nevertheless slip through without ever being subject to a methodical analysis.
Because political influences can skew a problem framer's perspective of the world,359 it may be advisable to provide for a process
whereby policy analysis can take place relatively free from the influence of unmitigated political power. 360 . Ultimately, the decision to
pass a law must be a political one-and Congress possesses that power
under the Constitution-but as a matter of public policy, it may make
sense to get the legislative project off to an apolitical start. 361 The
357. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
358. Congress as an institution can .carry out policy analysis through at least four
congressional support offices: the Office of Technology Assessment, the General
Accounting Office, the Congressional Budget Office, and the Congressional Research
SeIVice. See FOREMAN, supra note 334, at 16; KEEFE & OCUL, supra note 10, at 345.
359. See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
360. The interaction of policymaking and politics is tidily summed up in the following
passage:
Law-making would be a complex process if it consisted only of deciding
how best to implement a particular policy through the statute book, but is
in many cases inevitably and rightly complicated by disagreements over the
policy itself. That, it may be thought, is the job of the politicians and the
political parties and so, to a large extent, it is, but law-making is not solely
the concern of politicians and political parties: it is a mattt;r of taking
effective, timely, and appropriate action and its complications and
ramifications make it too serious a matter to be left to the politicians or,
indeed, anyone body of people of opinion.
Michael Rush, Making Better Law: A Review o/the Hansard Society Commission on the Legislative
Process, 14 STATUTE L. REv. 75, 75 (1993).
361. Despite the desire to make Congress into an efficient and rational policymaking
organ, however, it would be foolhardy and undesirable to eliminate all political elements
from the legislative process. Congress is a political body and it may in fact seIVe more
important functions than merely solving problems. For instance, it may seIVe primarily as a
mechanism for harnessing political forces through debate, oversight, and constituent
representation in such a way to keep a check on the government as a whole. It may also be
that Congress does solve problems, but does so in a much more subtle and complex way
than formal policy analysis can take in. See FOREMAN, supra note 334, at 1-10. Some
scholars have suggested that critiques of Congress that focus on rationality and
effectiveness miss the point because they equate "effectiveness" of legislation in the public
policy sense with effectiveness of the representative role, which are different matters
altogether, and because they fail to deal with the contextual constraints placed on the
institution. See Joseph Cooper, Assessing Legislative Performance: A RepLJ to Critics of Congress,
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creation of an extra-political 362 policy analysis office-an Office of
Public Policy-may lead toward more coherent regulation and
legislation. 363
Exactly how such an office would operate in its many details is beyond the scope of this Article. One could, however, imagine a change
in the legislative process where all congressional committees, administrative agencies, and executive branch departments would be required
to send all new legislative proposals to the Office of Public Policy,
along with a report on the public policy analysis of the bill, if any, that
had already been performed. The Office of Public Policy's first action
upon receiving a proposal would be to determine whether considering the proposal merits the expenditure of congressional resources.
This initial screening step would weed out the vast majority of bills. 364
13 CONGRESS & THE PRESIDENCY 21,22-26 (1986), reprinted in CONGRESS, supra note 162, at
809. Casting the legislative process as a straightforward problem-solving activity may fail to
encompass the process' dynamic give-and-take nature and the "hard fought compromises"
reflected in the statutes provisions. See Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v.
Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 374 (1986).
362. Many independent agencies in the federal government are set up in such a way as
to minimize the force of the political winds. Although some agencies nevertheless end up
subject to political influences, see Cutler & johnson, supra note 122, at 1402-05; Strauss,
supra note 122, others-such as the Federal Reserve Board-maintain a meaningful
degree of independence, see Sunstein, supra note 69, at 427 n.89. Of course, creating a
truly apolitical organization composed of human beings is probably an impossible task,
and lack of political accountability brings its own set of problems. See supra notes 268-70.
To promote the extra-political nature of the Office of Public Policy, its staff might be
required to develop along certain lines. For instance, to minimize the power of seniority,
prevent the creation of policy fiefdoms, and foreclose the natural process of ossification
that seems endemic in bureaucracies, the permanent employees of the Office of Public
Policy might be required to step down after some set period of time, perhaps five years. To
provide continuity, the staff might be broken up into five different groups, one of which
would be required to move on in a given year.
363. The idea of an independent policy analysis body to assist the legislature has a long
pedigree. john Stuart Mill advocated the creation of a "Commission of Legislation" in the
mid-nineteenth century. JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 237-39 (H.B. Acton ed., E.P. D':Itton & Co. 1980) (1861). More recently,
Professor Sunstein has suggested the creation of a similar agency in either the executive or
the legislative branch. SUNSTEIN, supra note 313, at 108. The approach outlined here
expands on that idea and ties it into the legislative process. An Office of Public Policy
could result from a consolidation and expansion of the policy analysis functions provided
by the Congressional Budget Office, the Office of Technology Assessment, the
Congressional Research Service, and the General Accounting Office. The current
scattered policy-analysis functions may be a relic of an earlier era in congressional
organization that stressed decentralized power and perhaps should now evolve into the
more centralized nature of the congressional structure. See Roger H. Davidson, The New
Centralization on Capitol Hil~ 50 REv. OF POL. 345 (1988), reprinted in CONGRESS, supra note
162, at 829.
364. Of the nearly 10,000 bills introduced during the 99th Congress, for instance, the
number actually enacted was only 663. Most of the bills that were introduced had no
chance of passage and were often proposed by legislators who had no intent that they
actually become law. OLESZEK, supra note 149, at 81-83. Many of those inconsequential
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Proposals that did not clear this first screening would be sent back to
the appropriate congressional committee without further action by
the Office of Public Policy. Congress would then be free to act on
those bills or not, depending on the political realities of the particular
proposal. 365
For proposals surviving the first cut, the Office of Public Policy
would then examine the supporting analysis accompanying the bills.
If sufficient, the Office of Public Policy would not repeat the analysis,
but would forward the bill and its supporting analysis back to the responsible congressional committees. 366 For the remaining bills, the
Office of Public Policy would group them into subject matter groups
and undertake a rigorous policy analysis, beginning with a thorough
examination of the problem. To make the problem identification
step as meaningful as possible, the Office of Public Policy would have
to address underlying issues, rather than the language of a proposed
bill. 367 By separating the underlying policy from the statutory language, the Office of Public Policy's analysis would be free to move in
the best direction, rather than being shackled to the language of a
proposed bill.
bills were "commemoratives," see supra note 149, which would not require any policy
analysis. In addition, a significant portion of the bills before Congress deal with
administrative matters. These bills amounted to 11 % of all legislation in a recent
Congress. How CONGRESS WORKS, supra note 149, at 43. These bills, too, would not
require explicit policy analysis.
365. Many of those inconsequential bills will nevertheless be enacted into law. Congress
has long recognized the reality that most legislation is not important. The House has
several short-cut methods of disposing of bills that clearly do not require consideration by
the full House. The House consent calendar, the private calendar, and the procedure for
suspending the rules, among other procedural mechanisms, allow the House to dispose of
insignificant or noncontroversial bills without wasting the time of the entire body. How
CONGRESS WORKS, supra note 149, at 46-49. In essence, an Office of Public Policy would
create a special track for legislation at the other end of the spectrum, so substantial bills
would be channelled into a special process as well.
366. Congress might want to undertake a separate policy analysis of bills that originate
in the executive branch as a matter of political power between the branches.
367. Canada already has a process built into its parliamentary system that attempts to
start legislation from the policy stage. Johnson, supra note 344, at 2. In Canada, bills
originate primarily with the government. See CANADA DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN CANADA 9 (1987). All proposals for new legislation must be
sponsored by a Cabinet Minister. The Cabinet Minister proposing legislation must present
the idea to the Cabinet as a whole through a "Memorandum to Cabinet." The
Memorandum to Cabinet is a policy paper only-it cannot contain statutory language or
be accompanied by a draft bill. In this way, the Canadian system attempts to ensure that
legislation starts with a coherent policy objective and that the statutory language reflects
the policy, rather than having the policy be shaped by proposed legislative language. The
emphasis on the policy, rather than the specific language of the law may in large part be a
function of Canada's bilingual status and the need to make sure both the anglophone and
the francophone drafters assigned to the bill are drafting with the same policy in mind. See
id. at 9-10; cJ. Johnson, supra note 344, at 2.
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The Office of,Public Policy might approach its task by assembling
teams of industry professionals, activists, academics, and others to give
a balanced perspective on the various issues. The teams would serve
on an ad hoc basis to avoid the problems that go along with a seniority
system and the drawbacks of the permanent editorial board system
discussed earlier. In carrying out their work, the policy team would
employ a method similar to Professor Seidman's approach as a helpful
guide in the systematic exploration of the issues. 368 The Office of
Public Policy might be required to examine each alternative proposed
solution and evaluate its potential effectiveness. 369 The Office of Public Policy would also be required to test the theories upon which the
problems are grounded, to use empirical methods to evaluate the seriousness of the problems, and to evaluate the expected effectiveness of
the various proposed responses. 370
Finally, as part of its evaluative process, the Office of Public Policy
might be required to analyze the proposed solutions in light of the
larger regulatory scheme to ensure that the new proposals were consistent with other laws, not redundant, and, most importantly, coherent in light of the general regulatory policy. Mter completing the
entire policy analysis process, the Office of Public Policy would then
report its findings to Congress. Congress would then deal with the
368. See supra notes 274-84 and accompanying text.
369. Again, Professor Seidman's approach provides a good framework for the types of
analysis that should be undertaken for each alternative response. The report of the Office
of Public Policy should describe each proposed solution and show how it addresses the
causes earlier explicated, as well as include a cost-benefit analysis of the proposed
legislation. Seidman, supra note 5, at 65. In order for the proposed solution to be
adequate, it must do the following: (1) fit with the explanations advanced; (2) have a high
probability of inducing the problem-correcting behavior desired; and (3) be cost effective.
Id. at 67-74.
370. As currently structured, the legislative process does not explicitly require empirical
testing of assumptions, or the collection of data to see if a problem exists, or the testing of
a proposed solution's effectiveness. In the history of Truth in Savings, for instance, the
limited empirical evidence of the problem came from the Consumer Federation of
America's survey of the pricing of retail banking products and services. See, e.g, Jack
Reerink, Consumer Account Fees Up 28% Since '90, Poll Finds, BANKING WK., June 14, 1993, at
12. Although the Consumer Federation of America admitted that its study was neither
scientific nor based on a statistically valid sampling, see CFA Study, supra note 49, the study
nevertheless enjoyed wide currency, probably because it was one of the few studies that
attempted to quantify the perceived problems in deposit accounts. Ac\ditionally, the
current legislative process does not effectively work with empirical data to reach policy
decisions, but frequently uses data merely as a way to justify existing policy choices. See,
e.g., Rubin, supra note I, at 276 (describing role of empirical data in the adoption of the
Truth in Lending Act). For instance, even if one accepts the Consumer Federation of
America survey as empirical evidence for the existence of a "problem" involving deposit
accounts, it nevertheless leaves open the larger question of whether a causal link exists
between the amount of information disclosed or that would be required under Truth in
Savings and the cost of maintaining deposit accounts.
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analyzed bills as it does presently, the major difference being that after a proper analysis of the problem, the legislative process might have
a better start.
The weaknesses in such an approach are many. First, creating a
new bureaucracy may only serve to replicate the political forces that
distort the policy process in Congress. By virtue of its existence as an
organization, the Office of Public Policy would place a great deal of
power in the hands of the agenda setter. 371 Attempts to make the
Office extra-political would not prevent the agenda setter from exercising his or her power, whether consciously or unconsciously. Of
course, the very idea of an extra-political entity may be viewed with
some skepticism.
Another drawback to this approach is that it would delay the legislative process. Certainly, in the thick of legislative negotiations each
new amendment offered to a comprehensive bill could not go
through the Office of Public Policy. While the diversion of an issue
into this track may result in the bill's being delayed for some time, it
should be noted that under our current system important or controversial bills rarely pass in the Congress in which they are
introduced. 372
The prospects for improving legislation through structural changes
in the legislative process deserve closer study, and perhaps even empirical research. The matter of improving the effectiveness of legislation is too important to ignore. If we continue to look at legislation as
a method of solving problems, we need to change the system to facilitate that process. We may never determine the "right" way to make
laws, but as scholars focus attention on the problem-framing process,
merely raising awareness of the issue may improve the legislative
process.
CONCLUSION

Problem solving lies at the heart of the legislative enterprise. Yet,
for a significant portion of bills considered during a session of Congress, no process exists for rigorously identifying the problem addressed by the proposed legislation. Failure to identify problems
imposes a great cost on the legislative process. Congressional resources may be squandered addressing matters that are not real
problems. Even if Congress responds to a real issue, failure to identify
371. For a discussion of the powers of the agenda setter, see supra notes 225-42 and
accompanying text.
372. How CONGRESS WORKS, supra note 149, at 42.
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the specific problem makes evaluating the proposed policy difficult, if
not impossible.
Congress fails to rigorously identify problems for many reasons,
most of which are built-in consequences of legislative politics. Nevertheless, Congress could change the legislative process in hopes of promoting a better problem-solving methodology. The proposals
suggested so far have both benefits and drawbacks. A closer examination of these alternatives is in order, however, to prevent promulgating ineffective legislation like Truth in Savings.

